date on the occurrence of a specified event. The law in this case is the obligation placed on employers to protect the life, health, safety and welfare of employees. The future occurrence when it takes effect is thirty days after official publication of the findings of the commission. Neither are the commission's investigations and findings a usurpation of the authority of the courts. This is cared for by the procedure. Formerly a factory inspector issued orders on the spot, and prosecuted for disobedience in the trial courts. The court was at liberty to raise the question whether the order was necessary, or whether too expensive or confiscatory, or whether the manufacturer was not as competent as the inspector to determine the effectiveness of his safeguards. Now these questions of reasonableness cannot be raised in the trial court. Only the fact of compliance or non-compliance can be raised. If the question of reasonableness is raised it must come up in an action against the commission in the county court at the state capital, and thence in the Supreme Court of the state. Furthermore, if the petitioner introduces evidence which was not before the commission, the case must be remanded back to the commission with the new evidence, and the commission must be given opportunity to change its order if it so determines. The case can then go back to the court.

In this way, the commission's complete power of investigation is protected, its orders are made prima facie reasonable, and the burden. is on the petitioner to break them down in court. The court retains all of its powers of investigation and philosophy, as far as it chooses to use them. But the commission's investigations are not limited by the strict rules of evidence prevailing in court. It can consider all of the facts without objection. It can initiate investigations. It is, in fact, a body of social and economic investigators, rather than a tribunal restricted to technical rules of evidence. The Supreme Court of the state has sustained the commission, so far as it affects procedure under the compensation law. The procedure respecting safety and health is similar, but has not as yet been passed upon, although in the case of the Railroad Commission, with similar procedure respecting reasonable rates and services, its findings of fact have been held to be conclusive.

COMMISSION AN ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

The Industrial Commission is also made an appellate administrative court in all cases of local boards of health, common councils or other local bodies that issue orders on places of employment. Their authority to issue such orders has not been infringed upon, but they are protected against court injunctions by the requirement that appeal shall first be made to the Industrial Commission. The latter, on investigation, may affirm the local order, or may substitute a “reason

able one," and the petitioner must then proceed against the commission as above explained, in place of the local authority. The commission has endeavored to bring about agreement with local boards by securing their representatives on the advisory committees and it is expected in this way that state and local inspectors will not issue conflicting orders on employers.

Advisory committees of employers and employees have also been enlisted in the administration of the free employment offices. The Milwaukee committee consists of representatives of the manufacturers' association and representatives of the trade-unions. They assist the Civil Service Commission in the examination of applicants, and have thus overcome the two greatest obstacles in the way of successful operation of such offices by the state-politics and trade-unions. The superintendents and assistants of these offices are not only removed from political influence but are removed from all suspicion of using their position for or against employer or employee in the case of strikes. The growth of business transacted by the Milwaukee office has been phenomenal during the first year of this method of management, and its transformation from a mere charitable agency to find work for unemployables, into a labor exchange bringing employer and employee together, is evidenced by the following statement made by the chairman of the committee and representative of the employers, A. T. Vanscoy of the International Harvester Company:

I was not particularly enthusiastic at first over this movement, but have changed my views in regard to it, and believe it has been of great benefit to the working people in that it has, through what might be called a clearing house, enabled them to obtain employment quickly and without expense, and it has also been equally valuable to the employer, in that it has enabled him through this employment bureau or clearing house to obtain, usually without effort on his part other than telephoning his wants, the help desired. Its work is broadening all the time, employers learning that an effort is made, and generally successfully, to furnish them with the kind of help desired, instead of sending men promiscuously, and employees learning that the quickest and most expeditious way for them to obtain employment is through the bureau.

The opinion of the trade-unions is represented by the following statement of the representative of the Federated Trades Council:

Without blare of trumpets the free state employment office in Milwaukee is doing one of the best works at present going on in the city. It is supplying a head center where men needing work may go and where work seeking men may also apply. Its offices on Fourth Street, just north of Grand Avenue, always present a busy scene. .. While the work of such offices seems local, the unemployed problem is a state-wide problem and even more, and can best be met and handled as it is now being handled under the Industrial Commission with coöperating offices in the principal

cities of the state. One praiseworthy thing that the free employment office has done must not be overlooked. It has cut down the crowds of hundreds of work-hungry men at the factory gates mornings. This sort of a scramble, often by men almost despairing, with families waiting to learn of the success or failure of the quest, is not only a pathetic sight, but often downright tragedy. The free employment office provides the better way, and the manufacturers themselves have come to realize it. It is certainly more humane for the men, saves them a lot of tramping, and is a great convenience in the securing of workmen. Nay, more, it saves his feelings, for it is found that the rebuffs that he gets at factory gates have a souring effect on a man in spite of himself.

A peculiar use of advisory committees has been undertaken in the administration of the street trades law in Milwaukee. The law is supplementary to the child labor law in that the children concerned are mainly not employees but are merchants, and therefore without employers who can be held liable for violation of the child labor and truancy laws. The newsboys, numbering about 4000, have been organized in the "Newsboys' Republic" for the purpose of enforcing the law. The Republic itself, including certain adults chosen jointly by the boys and the commission, constitutes a lively advisory committee to the commission. The plan is only now in process of installation, after careful investigation had been made of the administration of similar laws, and especially of the similar organization in Boston. In the administration of the new apprenticeship law, supplementing the industrial education law, the commission is aided by a committee of the Manufacturers' Association.

SERVICE OF ADVISORY COMMITTEES

Wherever practicable, the commission has found that these advisory committees are invaluable in the enforcement of laws under its charge. They are being extended wherever it is found that the commission needs the coöperation of the classes affected by the administration of the law or their judgment upon the reasonableness of its orders. It will be seen, too, that this practice meets the political objection against the multiplication of commissions and "government by commissions." The Industrial Commission consolidates what otherwise might be three or four commissions and executives, thus reducing the expense. It does not remove government "from the people" and place it in the hands of "experts," for it necessarily and actually, both in full compliance with the doctrine of reasonableness and in securing full coöperation of the public in understanding and enforcing the laws, brings the government directly into the hands of the people. It is certain that the state must have executives in order to enforce the labor laws, as well as other laws. To object to them is

like urging your son to learn to swim but forbidding him to go near the water. The real question is not how to avoid commissions, but how to organize them, how to do away with overlapping commissions, how to make them efficient and economical, how to keep them near to the actual life of the people, in short, how to make them the branch that fills the gap of constructive investigation in our scheme of government.

It has been suggested by inquirers from other states, and it might be inferred from the emphasis here laid on investigation, that the executive part of the commission's work should be kept separate with a single head, as it has been in the past, in order to center responsibility for the enforcement of laws. In that case a board of experts might be created for the purpose of investigating and drafting the rules, which the independent executive would be required to enforce. For several reasons, this separation of departments would probably be impracticable. The most valuable agents for the kind of investigation required are the inspectors, whose duty it is to enforce the rules. By associating them with the advisory committees, they enter into the spirit of coöperation, they learn the principle of reasonableness, and they acquire the virtue of tact. If they have no knowledge of the reasons for the rules, and therefore no particular interest in bringing about their enforcement through patient instruction of employers and superintendents, their attitude is likely to be that of the typical factory inspector who says to the employer, "Well, I didn't make the law there it is, and you've got to obey it." Instead of inspiring the "safety spirit" throughout the state, they stir up needless opposition and friction between the factory inspector and the board of experts.

Furthermore, no system of general rules laid down in advance can anticipate all of the special conditions or obstacles in the way of enforcement. The Wisconsin law cares for this by means of "special orders" in addition to "general orders." But these special orders can only be issued on investigation and public hearing, precisely the same as the general orders. The inspector, therefore, instead of insisting upon something impracticable, can join with the employer in asking for a special order before proceeding to prosecution. If the inspector is subject to an independent executive, desirous of making a reputation for the enforcement of law, not only is he tempted to discredit the work of the expert commission, but he is under no obligation to join with the commission in perfecting its orders so as to conform to the rule of reasonableness. The deputies of the Industrial Commission are continually reporting omitted points or impracticable applications, and the execution of the law becomes a continuous investigation and progress towards reasonableness. With separate departments for investigation and execution, the investigations would doubtless fall

into the hands of experts not familiar with the great variety of conditions to be met, and the execution would be that perfunctory and blind enforcement which has already brought discredit on much of the American factory inspection.

Finally, the commissioners themselves cannot divide their work into the separate fields of law, investigation and execution, especially where, as with the Wisconsin commission, such a wide range as fourteen departments are brought together under one head. Each commissioner must take his share in the executive work of different departments, and each must carry on continually the constructive investigation that the law implies. It is only by this means of administration and investigation combined in a single commission that friction and antagonism between overlapping officials can be avoided, coöperation with employers and employees secured, and obedience to the authority of the judiciary observed.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL AND RAILROAD COMMISSIONS

While the Industrial Commission is modeled after the law creating the Railroad Commission, its field is widely different. The Railroad Commission regulates monopoly - the Industrial Commission regulates competition. It endeavors to enforce "reasonable" competition in so far as dealings with employers are concerned, by raising the level of labor competition. The distinction offers a practicable suggestion for the creation of a commission by the federal government for the regulation of "trusts." Such a commission need not have the power to regulate prices, as the Railroad Commission does, on the theory that monopoly is inevitable, nor to give special privileges to so-called "good" trusts that accept federal incorporation or federal license, and agree to abide by the commission's orders. Rather should a federal commission be a "free trade" commission, controlling all interstate trade so far as necessary, for the purpose of investigating and prohibiting all kinds of "unfair competition." It would take the place which the federal courts now assume, of dissolving and regulating corporations. But instead of committing this power to lawyers it would be committed to a body of men representing the every-day life of all the people, equipped to conduct constructive investigations, to prosecute for violations of the anti-trust laws, to prescribe and enforce rules of reasonable competition and so to raise the level of business competition.