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laws is, to make us independent of all foreign nations for such an indispensable article as bread-corn. He would presume from this, that the people wanted to get all their corn from abroad, and to stop altogether the cultivation of the lands at home; but this is quite a mistake, as every person wishes to see as much food in the country as it is possible, whether raised in or out of it. For almost every other article essential to our manufacturing, commercial, and naval greatness,* we are dependent on foreigners, and there is a principle in human nature which makes reciprocal interest the great bond of nations. He must know also, that the authors of these laws maintain that they are necessary for our safety in case of war: but this is an argument which displays moral cowardice in its supporters, foreign to the character of the British people; for even their greatest enemies must admit that they are not a people that shrink from dangers, either present or remote, but coolly and bravely meet them, prepared for the issue whatever it may be. There is something so self-tormenting in this pusillanimous conduct of placing a country, in times of profound peace, and with prospects of their permanency, in a condition preparing for war, as to approach to the idiosyncrasy of a miser, trembling under fear of starvation with the abundance of every thing at his command. Dreadful would be the fate of this country, were its destinies in the hands of a party actuated by such a sordid and pusillanimous disposition during the dangers of a foreign war, or of an invasion of the native soil.

The laws prohibiting, or imposing heavy duties on the importation of animal and vegetable food into the British

Even the very ropes, cordage, and sails of our shipsof war, are manufactured by us of materials received from a country under a powerful and despotic monarch, who may become our most formidable enemy.

The party

Islands, are of a comparatively modern date. that enacted them must have derived its mighty power from some source antecedent to these laws, and it will therefore be necessary to go to the origin of this fiscal political power, and to trace its progress.

This is not a question that touches or encroaches upon the executive power of the sovereign, or his prerogatives. For the support of the executive authority, and for the maintenance of the institutions of the country, a certain amount of revenue is required; and, in one point of view, it is apparently indifferent to the monarch, from what source the funds are derived, and in what way they are collected. The arrangement of these points is left entirely to the parties who are to pay the amount; or, in theory, it is supposed that they are left. At all events, the sovereign does not directly interfere in the business, but he demands of his subjects to settle among themselves in what manner, and within what time, a given amount shall be paid into the treasury. It is manifestly for the interest of the sovereign, and for his security and happiness, that his people should be prosperous and happy: but the great misfortune of the prince is, that he cannot see with his own eyes, or hear with his own ears, what is going on beyond the precincts of his palace, or his accustomed haunts; and as he is the grand umpire in the disputes of parties and factions in the country, he is continually surrounded by persons who have a strong interest, or bias, in favour of measures represented for the general good, though perhaps really meant for the advantage of a small section of the population, and that, perhaps, the most wealthy and powerful part of it.

It is considered proper to make these observations, before proceeding farther, in order at once to prevent any impression being made of a design to sap the foundations of the

monarchy. It can be demonstrated from the whole tendency of British history, that the throne, resting on constitutional principles, has been the safeguard of the liberties of the people against the efforts of the aristocratic power to crush them ;* and the people may rest assured, that, were the throne overturned, and an elective executive magistrate with the name of president, protector, or any other, raised in its place, this country would become the scene of fierce struggles among a score of powerful men for the possession of the government, and intrigue and corruption would alternate with violence and civil war, through the length and breadth of the land.

From historical evidence, and on conviction, the people ought therefore to look up to the throne as the palladium of their freedom: and, independent of this attachment to constitutional monarchy, there are, in the sovereign who now reigns, circumstances which strongly engage the affections, and strengthen the loyalty, of her subjects. Without enumerating these particular circumstances, it will be necessary only to say that Queen Victoria, by her presence of mind, her calmness in danger, and her consideration for the safety of other persons, has drawn towards her the sympathies of a manly people.

While it is acknowledged that the throne is the barrier that stands between the people and the ambitious aristocratic faction; on the other hand, it is maintained that the sovereign, who takes a proper view of his position, will

*The increase of popular power in the form of trading guilds and corporations, was from the encouragement of the crown, as a counterpoise to the power of the aristocracy. But the exclusive or aristocratic principle entered into those very corporations, which in the course of time, and from the altered circumstances of the people, became the very hot-beds of corruption.

find in the people the truest friends and the firmest supporters.

In order to guard against misconception of the design of these observations, it may be well also to state decidedly, that the object contemplated, is to free the great body of the people from the invasion of the aristocratic party, and to restore them to their just rights; and not to destroy the legitimate influence of the constitutional higher branch of the legilsative body. It is essential to the preservation of the liberties of the people, that the legislative or deliberative assembly be divided into two independent branches, for the purpose of a mutual check on each other, and to prevent haste and carelessness in the formation of laws. Countries with the legislative power in the possession of one body of men, have quickly fallen into the worst species of despotism-that which is covered with a guise of liberty, to deceive to ruin. The Roman people, with all their passion for freedom, and with all their energy, could not stand against the senate. Their tribunes were more properly their attorneys or leaders, than their representatives, in the modern meaning of the word. The liberties of the English people were rapidly giving way, during the time of the one-sided legislation of Cromwell. Scotland had its legislature in one assembly, composed of lords and commons. Its history is filled with deeds of violence done by the aristocratic power, and it shows an almost uninterrupted struggle between the king and the nobles for the government of the country. The Venetians fell under one of the most terrible despotisms that ever crushed a people, by the legislative and executive power being engrossed by one senatorial body.

The North American provinces, where there exists the most perfect state of democracy, have their legislative body

divided into two chambers. The French since their revolution have adopted the same plan. In fine, a division of the legislative faculty into two deliberative assemblies, with a veto on their proceedings by the executive authority, is really essential to the existence of the liberties of a people.* Therefore let King, Lords, and Commons, as established by the theory of the constitution, continue to form the government of the country. But in the election of the peers, the principle adopted for the cases of Scotland and Ireland, would appear to be more agreeable to the law of common sense, than the hereditary principle as established in England. Should extra-constitutional force ever be applied in this country, it is probable that the elective principle will be at once introduced into the senate, the same as in the popular branch of the legislature.

But in the mean while, every effort will require to be made by the people to get their subsistence freed from the clutches of the landed aristocratic power; and unless that be done, the exclamation may be made-" Fear not; England has a sufficiency for twelve millions of inhabitants-all the rest must perish, and then there will be no scarcity of bread!"

As it is for the preservation of the liberties of the people, that the legislative body should be divided into two independent sections, and that the sovereign should possess the power of controlling both, by means of a veto on their proceedings-so, also, it is for the safety of the sovereign, that

The instinct of mankind in these matters, leads to a division of the legislative power. We perceive this through the whole of that part of America formerly colonies of Spain. In the schedules of the laws of those republics from Chile to Texas, we find the following principle laid down :"The legislative power shall reside in a Chamber of Deputies and in a Senate, which shall compose the General Congress."