It is incumbent upon a party, objecting to the admission of evidence, to state adequate grounds to support his objections. It is also necessary that counsel, in reserving exceptions to the court's charge, do so with clearness and certainty, and point out the exact portion to which he objects. It seems logical, by analogy, that if a party wishes to avail himself of the chance of having a verdict directed in his favor on part of the record, but, if overruled, to go to the jury on the whole record, it is but fair to the court and his adversary that he specifically show the facts he relies upon as undisputed. If he moves for a verdict on all of the evidence, as was done in this case, he undoubtedly affirms that there is no disputed question of fact before the court, and, if his adversary agrees with him, both should be concluded. While I believe that a new trial should be refused for the reasons above stated, still, in justice to the defendant, I feel bound to say that I think, in any event, the undisputed facts in the record entitle it to a verdict. The motion for a new trial will be overruled. UNITED STATES ex rel. CALAMIA v. REDFERN, Immigration Com'r. (Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana. May 26, 1910.) No. 13,789. 1. ALIENS (§ 54*)-DEPORTATION-LIMITATION. Act Cong. March 3, 1903, c. 1012, § 21, 32 Stat. 1218, fixing three years as the period within which an alien unlawfully in the country might be deported, governs deportation of an alien who landed March 3, 1907. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. § 54.*] 2. ALIENS (§ 54*)-DEPORTATION-WARRANT-SUFFICIENCY. A warrant for the deportation of an alien charged to be unlawfully in the country in violation of Act March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, and Act Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909. p. 447), is not insufficient because signed by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Labor instead of the Secretary. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. § 54.*] 3. ALIENS (§ 54*)-DEPORTATION-LIMITATION. Under Acts Cong. March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213, and Feb. 20. 1907. c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 447), providing for the deportation of aliens unlawfully in the country within three years after landing, deportation need not be completed within that time, the government having the whole of the last day of the three years in which to make the arrest, and prescription being interrupted by the arrest, the government is entitled to a reasonable time in which to carry out the sentence of deportation. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. § 54.*] 4. ALIENS (§ 53*)-"PASSPORT"-EFFECT. A passport from a foreign government to its citizen is merely written permission from the government to travel, and does not affect his status in the United States, in the absence of treaty provision, and hence is no defense to proceedings to deport him. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Aliens, Dec. Dig. § 53.*1 For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes Application by the United States, on the relation of Guiseppe Calamia, against Samuel E. Redfern, Commissioner of Immigration, for a writ of habeas corpus. The writ having been discharged, relator moves for a new trial. Motion denied. Patorno & Denechaud, and Geo. Sladovich, for relator. FOSTER, District Judge. In this case relator sued out a writ of habeas corpus alleging that he was unlawfully restrained of his liberty by the respondent, and that he was about to be illegally deported from the United States. He alleges that he arrived at the port of New York on March 3, 1907, and was duly admitted to the United States; that on February 26, 1910, he was arrested in New Orleans by an immigrant inspector upon a warrant from the Secretary of Commerce and Labor; that he was given a hearing immediately after his arrest, and was thereafter released on bond; that on March 2, 1910, his bondsmen were called upon for his surrender and he was taken into custody by respondent. He alleges certain irregularities as to the method of his examination immediately after his arrest, and urges particularly that it will be physically impossible to deport him from the United States within three years after his landing, and that, therefore, the immigration officers are without power in the matter. To this petition respondent made due return, denied any illegality in the arrest or examination of relator, and set up that prior to his entry into this country he had committed certain felonies in Italy involving moral turpitude, and had been convicted and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment at hard labor. On the trial of the case the return to the writ was not traversed in any way, but on the contrary the facts set out therein were admitted to be true, so there is no doubt that relator belongs to one of the classes of aliens excluded from admission to the United States, both under the act of Feb. 20, 1907, c. 1134, 34 Stat. 898 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1909, p. 447), and the act of March 3, 1903, c. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213. Upon this hearing of the case the writ of habeas corpus was discharged and relator remanded to the custody of respondent. The matter is now before me on an application for a new trial. In addition to the matters set out in the original petition it is urged that relator was admitted into the United States under the act of March 3, 1903, and that said act fixes the limitation for deportation at two years, instead of three years as provided by the act of Feb. 20, 1907; that the warrant of deportation was not signed by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, but was signed by one of his assistants, and is therefore void; that in the course of ordinary events the Secretary could not have examined the facts before issuing the warrant; that relator was in possession of a passport issued by the Italian government, and therefore is entitled to remain in the United States until such time as he may desire to return to Italy, and in the meantime should be considered under the special protection of the treaty, and not subject to deportation. It seems to me to be immaterial whether or not the limitation as to deportation is to be governed by the act of March 3, 1903, or the act of Feb. 20, 1907. The act of 1907 is unambiguous, and fixes a period of three years after landing in which an alien, unlawfully in the country, may be deported. Section 20 of the act of 1903 fixes a period of two years, while section 21 of the same act fixes a period of three years. In this case I consider section 21 would govern. The warrant under which relator is held sets up that he is unlawfully in the country in violation of both the acts of 1903 and of 1907, and I consider it sufficient in form. Nor is it a defect that it is signed by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Labor. See Rev. St. § 177 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 90); Marsh v. Nichols, Shepard & Co., 128 U. S. 615, 9 Sup. Ct. 168, 32 L. Ed. 538; United States v. Peralta, 19 How. 347, 15 L. Ed. 678. It is urged with great earnestness by counsel for relator that as it was physically impossible to deport him from the United States within three years from the time he entered, when he was surrendered by his bondsmen, that he cannot be deported at all, as the law should be held to be that an alien must be both arrested and deported within three years. I cannot agree with this view. I consider the government should have the whole of the last day of the three years in which to make the arrest, and, prescription being interrupted by the arrest, the government is entitled to a reasonable time in which to carry out the sentence of deportation. Relator's contention in regard to the privileges accorded him by virtue of his passport is entirely without merit. The passport is, at most, a written permission from his government to travel, and, in the absence of express treaty provisions, has no effect upon his status at all. As no pertinent provision of the existing treaties has been pointed out, I assume there is none. The other contentions of relator are equally without merit. The motion for a new trial will be denied. In re HOXIE et al. (District Court, D. Maine. July 2, 1910.) BANKRUPTCY (§ 384*)-COMPOSITION. Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 12d, 30 Stat. 550 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427), the approval of the majority of creditors of an offer of composition is evidence, prima facie, that the composition is for the best interests of the creditors; and the burden is upon those who attack the composition. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Dec. Dig. § 384.*] Proceedings in bankruptcy in the matter of Charles E. Hoxie and another, individually and as partners. Confirmation of an offer of composition denied. Williamson & Burleigh, for objecting creditors. Albert S. Woodman and Norman L. Bassett, for bankrupts. For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes HALE, District Judge. The bankrupts were duly adjudicated on the 15th day of March, 1910, upon an involuntary petition filed February 26, 1910. At the first meeting of creditors, claims of 44 creditors, amounting to $9,146.59, were filed. Claims of certain other creditors, duly scheduled, have not yet been presented for allowance. Appraisers have been appointed, and have filed their report, showing the value of the assets of the bankrupts to be: Real estate, $5,300, which is under mortgage for more than that amount; personal property, $4,481.95. The appraisers report that the basis of their valuation is partly at cost price and partly at possible selling value. After the bankrupts filed their schedule and were examined they offered a composition at the rate of 15 per cent. A majority in number of all the creditors whose claims have been allowed, namely, 29 creditors, representing $5,362.06, have accepted in writing the offer of composition. The referee reports the above facts. He recommends that the composition will be for the best interests of the creditors; that it is made in good faith, and not procured by any means, promises, or acts prohibited by the bankrupt law; and that the bankrupts have not been guilty of any act, or of any failure in duty, which would be a bar to their discharge. He also assigns certain reasons which have influenced him in coming to his conclusion. It is provided by section 12d of the bankruptcy act of 1898 (Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427]) that the judge shall confirm a composition if satisfied (1) that it is for the best interests of the creditors. There being no question of the bankrupts having been guilty of any act or of any failure in duty which would be a bar to their discharge, and the offer and acceptance having been in good faith, the single question before the court is whether or not the confirmation of the composition is for the best interests of all the creditors. The English rule appears to be that the approval of the majority of the creditors to the offer is final. Under our statute such approval is evidence, prima facie, that the composition is for the best interests of the creditors; and the burden is upon those who attack the composition. The same rule prevailed under the bankruptcy act of 1867 (Act March 2, 1867, c. 176, 14 Stat. 517). In Ex parte Jewett, 2 Low. 393, Fed. Cas. No. 7,303, Judge Lowell said: "In the absence of fraud and concealment, the question for the court seems to be, not whether the debtor might have offered more, but whether his estate would pay more in bankruptcy." act. Substantially the same issue is before the court under the present Adler v. Jones, 109 Fed. 967, 48 C. C. A. 761; Adler v. Hammond, 104 Fed. 862, 44 C. C. A. 229; In re Waynesboro Drug Co. (D C.) 157 Fed. 101. Certain creditors object to the confirmation of the composition, and file specifications of objections. The examination of the bankrupts, and all papers relating to the estate, are before me. It is for the court to determine whether the nonassenting creditors have met the burden of showing that the offer of composition is inadequate, and that a substantially larger sum may reasonably be expected to result from the administration of the assets under the regular course of bankruptcy proceedings. A sum less than $1,500 is required to carry out the offer of composition. The appraisal shows assets amounting to about $4,500. The learned counsel for the bankrupts urge that the evidence shows the appraisal to be largely in excess of the available value of the property. It is not necessary to discuss in detail the different views taken by counsel touching this matter, or the testimony relating to it. It is in evidence that since the adjudication the business of the bankrupt firm continues to be carried on, and that many of the creditors who have accepted the offer continue to supply the bankrupts with goods, and to do business with them. It is urged that they are willing to accept the offer for the reason that their profits in future from the conduct of the business will fully repay them for their losses in bankruptcy. I do not esteem it to be my duty to discuss the evidence in detail, or to decide what induced the assenting creditors to assent. The bankruptcy law does not make their decision conclusive, but only prima facie. Their assent does not relieve the court from passing on the question whether the composition is for the best interests of all the creditors. This question is addressed to the judicial discretion of the court, and from its conclusion either party may appeal. Adler v. Hammond, supra. Upon a careful review of the examination of the bankrupts, the schedules, and all the evidence before me, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the nonassenting creditors have met the burden of showing that the acceptance of the composition will not be for the best interests of all the creditors. The whole testimony leads me to the conclusion that the assets should produce nearly double the offer of 15 per cent. It is with hesitation that I come to a conclusion opposed to that of the painstaking and competent referee, who assigns some very good reasons for coming to his conclusion. Some of the reasons which he assigns, however, are not tenable, and would enlarge the inquiry beyond its legitimate scope. The offer of composition is not confirmed. JUNG V. AMERICAN CREDIT INDEMNITY CO. (Circuit Court, E. D. Louisiana. April 22, 1910.) INSURANCE (§ 432*)—CREDIT INDEMNITY POLICIES-LOSSES COVERED. |