hours and a half in the delivery, was received with warm applause by the friends of the speaker, and with the admiration which genius and talents always inspire in the breasts of honorable opponents. Before his manly form had disappeared in the mass of the house, and the tones of his sonorous voice had ceased to fill that crowded hall, Madison, diminutive in stature and weak from recent illness, rose to address the Assembly. Nought but a sense of public duty, upheld by a proud consciousness of superior worth, would have impelled him at that moment to such a serious undertaking. His few first sentences were wholly inaudible. When his voice was more assured he was understood to say that he would not attempt to make impres sions by ardent professions of zeal for the public welfare; that the principles of every man will be, and ought to be, judged, not by his professions and declarations, but by his conduct; by that criterion he wished, in common with every other member, to be judged; and should it prove unfavorable to his reputation, yet it was a criterion from which he would by no means depart. He said the occasion demanded proofs and demonstration, not opinion and assertion. "It gives me pain," he said, "to hear gentlemen continually distorting the natural construction of language; for it is sufficient if any human production can stand a fair discussion. Before I proceed to make some additions to the reasons which have been adduced by my honorable friend over the way (Randolph), I must take the liberty to make some observations on what was said by another gentleman (Henry). He told us this Constitution ought to rejected because it endangered the public liberty. Give me leave to make one answer to that observation let the dangers which this system is supposed to be replete with be clearly pointed out; if any dangerous and unnecessary powers be given to the general legislature, let them be plainly demonstrated; if powers be necessary, apparent danger is not a sufficient reason against conceding them. He has suggested that licentiousness has seldom produced the loss of liberty; but that the tyranny of rulers has almost always effected it. Since the general civilization of mankind, I believe there are more instances of the abridgement of the freedom of the people by gradual and silent encroachments of those in power, than by violent and sudden usurpations. On a candid examination of history we shall find that turbulence, violence,

and abuse of power, by the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, have produced factions and commotions, which, in republics, have more frequently than any other cause produced despotism. If we go over the whole history of ancient and modern republics, we shall find their destruction to have generally resulted from those causes. If we consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and what are the sources of that diversity of sentiment which pervades their inhabitants, we shall find great danger to fear that the same causes may terminate here in the same fatal effects which they produced in those republics. This danger ought to be wisely guarded against. Perhaps in the progress of this discussion it may appear that the only possible remedy for those evils, and the means of preserving and protecting the principles of republicanism, will be found in that very system which is now exclaimed against as the parent of oppression."

He next reverts to Henry's observation that the people were at peace until the new system was put upon them: "I wish sincerely, sir, this were true. If this be their happy situation, why has every State acknowledged the contrary? Why were deputies from all the States sent to the General Convention? Why have complaints of national and individual distresses been echoed and re-echoed throughout the continent? Why has our general government been so shamefully disgraced and our Constitution violated? Wherefore have laws been made to authorize a change, and wherefore are we now assembled here?" After

130

130 This argument, when used by Mr. Madison, was hardly fair. He knew that the Annapolis resolution had brought about the present state of things, and that he had offered that resolution when Virginia had settled upon a plan to arrange her commercial relations with Maryland, Pennsylvania, and other States. That arrangement was completed by the Assembly by the selection of five delegates, consisting of St. George Tucker, William Ronald, Robert Townsend Hooe, Thomas Pleasants, and Francis Corbin, on the 25th of November, 1786, and it was believed that our Federal relations were at an end for the session, and a large number of the members had probably left for their homes; when, on the 30th of the same month, or five days later, and on the last day of the session, Mr. Madison caused the Annapolis resolution to be called up, to be hurried through the House, and sent to the Senate, which body passed it within an hour after receiving it. But two members in the House opposed the resolution. It was plain that the sequel

replying to Henry's arguments on the majority of three-fourths, on the exclusive legislation of Congress in the federal district, on the provision concerning the militia, and on the tendency of power once transferred never to be voluntarily renounced, he discussed the objection that the raising and supporting of armies of the resolution was mainly a matter of course, and afforded no legitimate argument to Mr. Madison, who was privy to the whole game. Nor was it quite fair for Mr. Madison to talk of the Constitution of the State as having been violated. These so-called violations were by acts of the Assembly, not by violence; and on Madison's own principles the Legislature might be authorized to take what liberties they pleased with that instrument; for he contended in his speech on the Convention question in the House of Delegates, at the May session of 1784. that the Convention of May, 1776, which framed the Constitution, was "without due power from the people;" that it was framed in consequence of the recommendation of Congress of the 15th of May (which is a great mistake, as the Virginia resolution of absolute independence was adopted on that very day, and a resolution to report a plan of government for an independent State also, while the resolution of the 15th of May [or rather the 10th, see Folwell's edition of the Journals of Congress, II, 158], which was only a re-enactment of the resolution of Congress of the previous year, advising the colonies to form such a plan of government as would most effectually secure good order in the province during the present dispute between Great Britain and the colonies," was a temporizing measure only), which was prior to the Declaration of Independence; that the Convention that framed the Constitution did not pretend" that they had received "any power from the people " for that purpose; that they passed other ordinances during the same session that were deemed "alterable;" that they made themselves a branch of the Legislature under the Constitution which they had framed; that the Constitution, if it be so called, etc., etc. (Rives' Madison, I, 559.) It is thus evident that in Madison's deliberate judgment the Constitution of Virginia had no higher dignity than other ordinances of the Convention, which all admit were alterable; and that it was competent for the legislature, in Mr. Madison's opinion, to alter the instrument at pleasure. It was then a little prudish to blame the Assembly for doing what they had a right to do, or to apply any other test than that of expediency to their action. We have shown in a previous note our views upon this subject, and will merely add that Mr. Randolph's views were quite as capricious as those of Mr. Madison, as that gentleman alleged in the course of one of his speeches in Convention that the Declaration of Rights was no part of the Constitution, and, of course, of no obligation whatever. It is necessary to know what ideas these gentlemen had of the Constitution before we can estimate what they call "violations" of it.

With apparent

was a dangerous element in the Constitution. candor he declared that he wished there was no necessity of vesting this power in the general Government. "But," he said, "suppose a foreign nation to declare war against the United States; must not the general legislature have the power of defending the United States? Ought it to be known to foreign nations that the general Government of the United States of America has no power to raise and support an army, even in the utmost danger, when attacked by external enemies? Would not their knowledge of such a circumstance stimulate them to fall upon us? If, sir, Congress be not invested with this power, any powerful nation, prompted by ambition or avarice, will be invited by our weakness to attack us; and such an attack by disciplined veterans would certainly be attended with success when only opposed by irregular, undisciplined militia. Whoever considers the peculiar situation of this country, the multiplicity of its excellent inlets and harbors, and the uncommon facility of attacking it however he may regret the necessity of such a powercannot hesitate a moment in granting it. One fact may elucidate this argument. In the course of the late war, when the weak parts of the Union were exposed, and many States were in the most deplorable condition by the enemies ravages, the assistance of foreign nations was thought so urgently necessary for our protection that the relinquishment of territorial advantages was not deemed too great a sacrifice for the acquisition of one ally. This expedient was admitted with great reluctance, even by those States who expected advantages from it. The crisis, however, at length arrived, when it was judged necessary for the salvation of this country to make certain cessions to Spain, whether wisely or otherwise is not for me to say; but the fact was that instructions were sent to our representative at the court of Spain to empower him to enter into negotiations for that purpose. How it terminated is well known. This fact shows the extremities to which nations will go in cases of imminent danger, and demonstrates the necessity of making ourselves more respectable. The necessity of making dangerous cessions, and of applying to foreign aid, ought to be excluded."

When he had replied to the argument derived from the policy of the Swiss Cantons in their confederate alliance, and stated his impression that uniformity of religion, which he thought ineligi

ble, would not necessarily flow from uniformity of government, and that the government had no jurisdiction over religion, he adverted to the policy of previous amendments, contending that if amendments are to be proposed by one State, other States have the same right, and will also propose alterations, which would be dissimilar and opposite in their nature. "I beg leave," he said, "to remark that the governments of the different States are in many respects dissimilar in their structure; their legislative bodies are not similar; their executive are more different. In several of the States the first magistrate is elected by the people at large; in others by joint ballot of the members of both branches of the legislature; and in others in a different mode still. This dissimilarity has occasioned a diversity of opinion on the theory of government, which will, without many reciprocal concessions, render a concurrence impossible. Although the appointment of an executive magistrate has not been thought destructive to the principles of democracy in many of the States, yet, in the course of the debate, we find objections to the federal executive. It is argued that the President will degenerate into a tyrant. I intended, in compliance with the call of the honorable member, to explain the reasons of proposing this Constitution and develop its principles; but I shall postpone my remarks till we hear the supplement, which, he has informed us, he intends to add to what he has already said."

He next investigated the nature of the government, and whether it was a consolidated system as had been urged by Henry. On this subject, he said, "there are a number of opinions; but the principal question is whether it be a federal or consolidated government. In order to judge properly of the question before us, we must consider it minutely in its principal parts. I conceive myself that it is of a mixed nature; it is in a manner unprecedented. We cannot find one express example in the experience of the world. It stands by itself. In some respects it is a government of a federal nature; in others it is of a consolidated nature. Even if we attend to the manner in which the Constitution is investigated, ratified, and made the act of the people of America, I can say, notwithstanding what the honorable gentleman has alleged, that this Government is not completely consolidated, nor is it entirely federal. Who are parties to it? The people-but not the people as composing one