Bridges and bridge tolls. Bridges in different parishes. "tenant subject to the restrictions. The case of Corpora- 66 66 "in respect of the whole profit derived from the land, but 66 a corresponding diminution of the rateable value of the "premises supplied with the water. We may also observe "that the reservoir by itself, without the power of con"necting the reservoir with the houses by pipes running through the streets, is probably worth nothing, and "certainly is not worth 6517. a year; and it is the same "Act of Parliament which gives the power to lay the pipes, and therefore creates the value of the reservoir, "which contains the restrictions on the amount of profit "which the occupiers of the reservoir can earn. Even in "the case of the reservoirs of public companies established by Act of Parliament to supply towns with water, in "estimating the rateable value of the reservoirs, the Court only considers the amount of profit which the terms of "their Act enable the company to earn, not the profits "which the company might earn if Parliament had "enabled the company to establish waterworks without "restriction as to the price to be charged to consumers." 66 The principle that profits must be rated where they are earned, which has been noted above in the case of docks,1 applies as well to bridges, with regard to which the parochial principle also holds good." Where the proprietors of Hammersmith Bridge had land on both sides of the river, on which they erected 2 See Castle, 415 et seq. 1 Reg. v. Bristol Dock Co., 10 L. J., M. C. 105. piers and abutments, but took the tolls on one side only, it was held that they were rateable for the lands on both sides, which were used by the proprietors for the purpose of passage over the Thames, in respect of which they received tolls.1 Similarly, the owner of a bridge resting on piles driven into the soil, one end of which was in the parish of A., and the other in the parish of B., where the toll-house was situated, was held rateable for an occupation of land in A. pro ratâ, though the road over the bridge was repaired by other persons.2 There the tolls had been let by parol at a yearly rent; and Lord Denman, C. J., after pointing out that the case was almost identical with that of Rex v. Barnes, said: "Assuming then that the tolls are claimable "in respect of the ownership of the land, there is no evi"dence here that the land eo nomine is professed to be “demised at all; there is nothing to show that at this "moment the marquis is not in the possession of the land "for doing the repairs,-indeed for every purpose con"sistent with the bare collection of the tolls by Everett at "the toll-house. On the other hand, though there is an agreement for the demise of the tolls eo nomine, yet, as "by their nature they can only pass by deed, no interest "at law has passed out of the marquis, who must there"fore be still considered in possession of them, his in"tended tenant being in truth only his bailiff for collect"ing them." The marquis was therefore held rateable in respect of his beneficial occupation. mersmith Bridge Co. The rateability of bridge tolls came again under con- Reg. v. Hamsideration in Reg. v. Hammersmith Bridge Co.,3 where it was decided that a rate is to be apportioned between two parishes, "according to the length of the bridge in "each parish." In this case it was argued that the tolls should be distributed between the bridge proper and its 1 Rex v. Barnes, 1 B. & Ad. 113; 8 L. J., O. S., M. C. 115. 2 Reg. v. Salisbury, Marquis of, 3 N. & P. 476, Q. B. 3 18 L. J., M. C. 85; 15 Q. B. 369; 3 New Sess. Cas. 424; 13 J. P. 103. See Castle, p. 435. road approaches, but the Court declined to consider this reasoning. "The approaches," said Lord Denman, C. J., "stand in the same relation to the bridge as stations and "warehouses to railways, reservoirs and wharves to canals, "aqueducts and mains to water supplies, gasometers and "mains to gas burners; and the principle for dividing the "direct from the indirect sources of profit, for rating the "indirect sources, and for apportioning the residuary net "rateable value among the districts in which the direct "source was situate, was explained in Reg. v. Mile End "Old Town."1 Where the revenue of a bridge company, over and above the working expenses, was raised from tolls, but was wholly absorbed in the payment of mortgage debts, leaving nothing by way of interest for the shareholders, though there was a provision for paying them off (if the tolls were sufficient), when the tolls should cease, the company were nevertheless held to be rateable. Where, in such a case, money is raised for the construction of an undertaking, so as to cause a debt, the interest of which is paid for out of the profits, such interest is not allowed as a deduction.3 637. 10 Q. B. 208. See ante, P. 2 Reg. v. Blackfriars Bridge Co., 8 L. J., M. C. 29; 9 A. & E. 828; 1 P. & D. 603. See Castle, p. 373. 3 Ib. See Castle, p. 475. CHAPTER X. OF THE REMEDIES FOR THE INFRINGEMENT OF RIGHTS OF WATER. ments of trespass or ALL infringements of rights of water, natural or acquired, All infringecome under one or other of two classes-trespass or nuisance. Where the act complained of is a wrongful water either disturbance of another in the exclusive possession of pro- nuisance. perty it is a trespass; where the infringement of the right is the consequence of an act which is not in itself an invasion of property, the cause from which the injury flows is termed a nuisance. "The distinction between nuisance "and trespass," says Mr. Angell,2 "is that the former is only a consequence or result of what is not directly or "immediately injurious, but its effect is injurious. A person who digs a channel or erects a dam on his own "land, does no more than what is, in itself, lawful; but "as the effect of his so doing is to divert the water from 66 a natural watercourse to the loss of a riparian owner "below, or to turn it back to the injury of a riparian 66 66 owner above, such acts become unlawful,-'the law in "such instances taking care,' says Blackstone, 'to enforce "the precept of gospel morality of doing to others as we "would that they should do unto ourselves.' Trespass, 66 on the other hand, is a direct and immediate invasion of "property, as treading down grass in a neighbour's field, "or destroying his inclosures." This distinction between trespass and nuisance, so far as 1 Phear, Rights of Water, p. 100; Reynolds v. Clarke, 2 Ld. Raymond, 1399; Smith v. Milles, 1 T. R. 475; Courtney v. Collett, 12 Mod. 164; 1 Ld. Raymond, 274: 2 On Watercourses, p. 575. Public nui sance. Abatement of private nui. sances. No more absolutely necessary. the form of action is concerned, is now of little value, as by The Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, and The Judicature Acts, 1873 and 1875, all forms of action are abolished. Where the act complained of is an invasion of a public right-such as the obstruction of the public right of navigation or fishery, or the pollution of a river to the public prejudice-it is termed a public or common nuisance.1 Remedy by Act of Party. A private nuisance may be removed or abated by the party aggrieved, if it can be peaceably done and without a riot.2 Thus if a ditch is dug, by means of which the water is diverted from the land of a riparian proprietor, through whose land it would otherwise flow in its natural course, he may go upon the land of the wrongdoer and fill it up; even though at the time it causes him only nominal damage. A thing, however, cannot be abated, until it actually becomes a nuisance; so that if one see his neighbour erecting that which it is probable will ultimately be such, it cannot be abated as long as it continues in an inoffensive state.5 3 If a person injured abate no more than is necessary, any damage must damage resulting from the act will not be laid to his charge; but he must act reasonably and take reasonable care that no more damage be done than is positively necessary for effecting his purpose. Thus where one erected a mill dam partly on his own land and partly on the land adjoining, upon which the owner of the adjoining land pulled down the part on his land, and the whole dam fell down and the water ran out, it was held that the owner was justified. But where the plaintiff had a right to irrigate his meadow by placing a dam of loose stones across 1 Woolrych on Waters, p. 192. See Stephen's Blackstone, p. 402. 2 Blackstone's Com. 5; Battens case, 9 Rep. 54 b.; 2 Roll. Abr.; Nuisance, 8; Angell, p. 576; Woolrych, p. 281. 3 Vin. Abr., Nuisance. See 9 Edw. IV. 35; 8 Edw. IV. 5; Grey v. Brown, Mo. 644; Raikes v. Townshend, 2 Smith's Rep. 9. 4 Penruddock's case, 5 Co. 101 b. 5 12 Mod. 510; Holt's cases, 499. 6 Wickford v. Bill, Cro. Eliz. 269. |