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pon, between the mouth of that river and Verona, and not opposite Albaredo below the mouth of the Alpon, 1st, because the Austrian hussars occupied the village of Albaredo, and, if the bridge had been thrown over there, it would have put Alvinzi on his guard. A surprise was what was chiefly calculated upon, as the enemy had neglected to occupy the marshes opposite Ronco, contenting themselves with having them observed by patroles of hussars, who rode over the dikes twice a-day: 2dly, the French army amounted to only 13,000 men, and could not expect, as matters stood, to beat 30,000 in an open plain where the lines could be deployed; but upon dikes surrounded by morasses only the heads of columns would engage, and numbers would there have no influence. 3dly, Alvinzi was preparing to storm Verona: his head-quarters were within three leagues of that place: it was possible that the moment the French army should march upon Ronco, he would march to attack Verona. It was therefore indispensable that the army should pass the Po above the mouth of the Alpon, in order that no natural obstacle should prevent it from following Alvinzi upon Verona. If it had passed opposite Albaredo, a few battalions of Croats, in position on the right bank

of the Alpon, would have sufficed to cover the march of Alvinzi on Verona : this city once lost, the French army must have been compelled to retreat, in order to rejoin Vaubois at Mantua, and to get there before the enemy.

IV. Why was the village of Arcole evacuated by the French army at the close of the first day?—and why was the same thing repeated at the conclusion of the second? Because the advantages obtained on the first day, though pretty considerable, were not sufficiently so to enable the army to debouch in the plain, and to restore its communications with Verona. It was, however, to be feared that, even during the very day of the battle of Arcole, Davidowich might have moved from Rivoli, upon Castel-Nuovo, and then there would have been no time to lose; the army must have marched all night to rejoin Vaubois the next day on Castel-Nuovo and Villa-Franca, to beat Davidowich, save the blockade of Mantua, and afterwards return, if possible, before Alvinzi should have passed the Adige. Napoleon received intelligence, at four o'clock in the morning, that Davidowich had not moved the preceding day; upon which he repassed the bridge and took Arcole. At the close of the second day he reasoned in the same manner; he had obtained

some advantages, but still not sufficiently decisive to enable him to risk debouching in the plain; it was still possible that Davidowich might have marched against Vaubois; it was still necessary to be in a situation to cover the blockade of Mantua. This very delicate train of reasoning depends upon a calculation of hours, and cannot be comprehended without a perfect knowledge of the relative situations of Verona, Villa-Nuova, Ronco, Mantua, CastelNuovo, and Rivoli.

V. It is asked, why the French army did not, on the first day, throw a bridge over at the mouth of the Alpon, in order to debouch in the plain?—or why, at least, it did not take this step on the second day?-Because it had experienced disasters during the eight preceding days; because it consisted of only 13,000 fighting men; and lastly, because it was not until the third day, that some degree of equilibrium was established between the two armies by the successes of the French. Such was the state of things, that, if Napoleon had convoked a council of the generals previously to giving his orders for the third day, to discuss the question whether he should march upon Verona by the left bank, or proceed to the aid of Vaubois by the right bank, every opinion would have

been in favour of the movement by the right bank; and when his generals of divisions received, two hours before day, orders to advance, they thought the movement very bold. As the divisions were beginning to move, the couriers announced that the enemy was in retreat upon Vicenza and the Brenta.

NOTE VI. (CHAP. XXXVI.)

BATTLE OF RIVOLI.

I. Clarke had in reality a mission to the Court of Vienna; he was also instructed to negotiate the interests of the minority of the Directory with Napoleon. It would be a great mistake to imagine that he ever presumed to aim at superseding Napoleon. The government was divided, but both parties were equally satisfied with the progress of the affairs of Italy. Besides, Clarke was totally unaccustomed to command; his mind was chiefly adapted for observation: at head-quarters he was principally employed in making enquiries respecting particular officers, which displeased several of them, and drew on him some unpleasant consequences: he was a man of industry and integrity.

II. The 59th never formed part of the Army

of Italy; but the 57th and 58th served in that army.

III. When Napoleon departed from Rivoli and went to Mantua, he left Generals Massena and Joubert at the former place. In this campaign it was the plan of the Aulic Council that the operations of Alvinzi by Montebaldo, and those of Provera by the Lower Adige, should be independent of each other. Orders had been given to Wurmser to manoeuvre for the purpose of uniting with Provera, if Alvinzi should prove successful; and to push his advantages as far as circumstances would admit: but, should Alvinzi be defeated and Provera victorious, Wurmser was to take the opportunity of the two or three days during which he would be master of the course of the Po, and to pass it with all his staff, and all his skeletons of artillery, infantry, and cavalry regiments; he was to march to Rome, join the Pope's army, augment and discipline his levies, and thus oblige the French general to divide his force into two bodies. With respect to Mantua, he was to provision it for two months, if he could maintain the command of the Serraglio long enough for that purpose: if not, he was to abandon that important place, and carry