A

SPECTATOR, No 575.

Lewd young fellow feeing an aged her mit go by him barefoot, Father (fays he) you are in a very miferable condition if there is not another world. True, Son (faid the Hermit) but what is thy condition if there is? Man is a creature defigned for two different states of being, or rather, for two different lives. His firft life his fhort and tranfient; his fecond permanent and lafting. The question we are all concerned in is this, In which of these two lives it is our chief intereft to make our felves happy? or, in other words, Whether we fhould endeavour to fecure to our felves the pleasures and gratifications of a life which is uncertain and precarious, and at its utmoft length of a very inconfiderable duration; or to fecure to our selves the pleasures of a life which is fixed and fettled, and will never end? Every man, upon the first hearing of this question, knows very well which fide of it he ought to close with. But however right we are in theory, it is plain that in practice we adhere to the wrong fide of the question, We make provifions for this life as tho' it were never to have an end, and for the other life as though it were never to have a beginning,

Should

Should a spirit of fuperiour rank who is a ftranger to humane nature, accidentally alight upon the earth, and take a furvey of its inhabitants; what would his notions of us be? would not he think that we are a fpecies of beings made for quite different ends and purposes than what we really are? must not he imagine that we were placed in this world to get riches and honours? would not he think that it was our duty to toil after wealth, and ftation, and title? Nay, would not he believe we were forbidden poverty by threats of eternal punishment, and enjoined to purfue our pleafures under pain of damnation? He would certainly imagine that we were influenced by a scheme of duties quite opposite to those which are indeed prefcribed to us. And truly, according to fuch an imagination, he muft conclude that we are a fpecies of the most obedient creatures in the universe; that we are conftant to our duty; and that we keep a fteddy eye on the end for which we were fent hither.

But how great would be his aftonishment when he learnt that we were beings not defigned to exift in this world above threefcore and ten years? and that the greatest part of this bufie fpecies fall short even of that age? How would he be loft

in horrour and admiration, when he should know that this fett of creatures, who lay out all their endeavours for this life, which' scarce deserves the name of existence, when, I fay, he should know that this fett of creatures are to exift to all eternity in another life, for which they make no preparations? Nothing can be a greater difgrace to reason, than that men, who are perfwaded of thefe two different states of being, fhould be perpetually employed in providing for a life of threefcore and ten years, and neglecting to make provifion for that, which after many myriads of years will be ftill new, and ftill beginning; efpecially when we confider that our endeavours for making ourselves great, or rich, or honourable, or whatever elfe we place our happiness in, may after all prove unsuccessful; whereas if we conftantly and fincerely endeavour to make our felves happy in the other life, we are fure that our endeavours will fucceed, and that we shall not be disappointed of our hope.

The following queftion is started by one of the schoolmen. Suppofing the whole body of the earth were a great ball or mafs of the finest fand, and that a fingle grain or particle of this fand fhould be annihilated every thousand years. Suppofing then that you had it in your choice to be happy all the

(

while this prodigious mafs of fand was confuming by this flow method, till there was not a grain of it left, on condition you were to be miferable for ever after; or, fuppofing that you might be happy for ever after, on condition you would be miferable till the whole mafs of fand were thus annihilated at the rate of one fand in a thousand years: Which of these two cafes would you make your choice?

It must be confeffed in this case, so many thousands of years are to the imagination as a kind of eternity, tho' in reality they do not bear fo great a proportion to that duration which is to follow them, as an unit does to the greateft number which you can put together in figures, or as one of thofe fands to the fuppofed heap. Rea-fon therefore tells us, without any manner of hefitation, which would be the better part in this choice. However, as I have before intimated, our reafon might in fuch cafe be fo overfet by the imagination, as to difpofe fome perfons to fink under the confideration of the great length of the first part of this duration, and of the great distance of that fecond duration which is to fucceed it. The mind, I fay, might give itself up to that happinefs which is at hand, confidering that it is fo very near, and that it

would

would laft fo very long. But when the choice we actually have before us is this, Whether we will chufe to be happy for the fpace of only threefcore and ten, nay perhaps of only twenty or ten years, I might fay of only a day or an hour, and miferable to all eternity; or, on the contrary, miserable for this fhort term of years, and happy for a whole eternity: What words are fufficient to exprefs that folly and want of confideration which in fuch a cafe makes a wrong choice?

I here put the cafe even at the worst, by fuppofing (what seldom happens) that a courfe of virtue makes us miferable in this life: But if we fuppofe (as it generally happens) that virtue would make us more happy even in this life than a contrary courfe of vice; how can we fufficiently admire the ftupidity or madness of those perfons who are capable of making fo abfurd a choice?

Every wife man therefore will confider this life, only as it may conduce to the happiness of the other, and chearfully facrifice the pleasures of a few years to those of an eternity.