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The Federalist, on the New Constitution, Written in the Year 1788
Alexander Hamilton,James Madison,John Jay
Uten tilgangsbegrensning - 1818
The Federalist, on the New Constitution, Written in 1788
James Madison,John Jay
Uten tilgangsbegrensning - 1852
admit advantage America answer appear appointment army authority body branch causes character circumstances citizens common conduct confederacy confederation congress consequence consideration considered constitution CONTINUED convention council course courts danger depend direct duty effect elections equal established evident executive exercise existing experience extent fact favor federal force foreign former France give greater hands happen important independent individuals influence instance interest judges jurisdiction kind latter laws least legislative legislature less liberty limits majority manner means measures ment nature necessary necessity never objects obligations observations operation opinion particular parties peace persons political possess present president principle probably proper proportion proposed provision question reason regard regulation relation render representatives require respect rule senate sense side single situation sufficient supposed thing tion treaties union United whole
Side 443 - State, or its trade ; nor shall any body of forces be kept up by any State, in time of peace, except such number only, as in the judgment of the United States, in Congress assembled, shall be deemed requisite to garrison the forts necessary for the defence of such State...
Side 444 - United States in Congress assembled, and then only against the kingdom or State and the subjects thereof, against which war has been so declared, and under such regulations as shall be established by the United States in Congress assembled, unless such State be infested by pirates, in which case vessels of war may be fitted out for that occasion, and kept so long as the danger shall continue, or until the United States in Congress assembled shall determine otherwise.
Side 157 - States, to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal government adequate to the exigencies of the Union; and to report such an act for that purpose to the United States in Congress assembled, as, when agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state, will effectually provide for the same.
Side 445 - The United States in Congress assembled shall also have the sole and exclusive right and power of regulating the alloy and value of coin struck by their own authority, or by that of the respective States...
Side 444 - No state shall engage in any war without the consent of the united states in congress assembled...
Side 216 - The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places.
Side 459 - In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected...
Side 193 - The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments, are numerous and indefinite.
Side 208 - An elective despotism was not the government we fought for; but one which should not only be founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits, without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.