ence antecedently to a certain injury to the brain has been superseded or destroyed without any manifest degradation of power to acquire such knowledge anew from like experience. Mind, therefore, it might not unreasonably be held, includes both those modifications and the modified organ. I shall show by-and-by that those modifications, serving as bases or hinges of unconscious knowledge, are in live connection with conscious knowledge, that, as unconscious equivalents of reasons, they determine conscious knowledge. When this is proved, it must be admitted that bodily organs are constituents of the human mind; not accessories, but constituents. Our definition admits of such a

conclusion.

LXXII.

It is obvious that an inception, enhancement, decay, or termination, of an unconscious knowledge, is a mental event;-that, therefore, mental events include unconscious events. Unconscious mental events are not confined to inceptions, terminations, and changes, of unconscious knowledges. They include redintegrative operations, e.g. that which in the mind of the burned child inserts the symbol of ardent heat into the immediate object symbolic of the next luminous thing he sees; they include the latent bearing of likeness on the mind, to which, as I shall explain by-andby, we are indebted for recognition, for the grouping of minima visibilia into bodies, and of bodies into flocks, herds, crowds, swarms, etc. They include the latent mental processes which beget our knowledge of primary kinds and our knowledge of our own customs

and of those of our social environment,-processes to be fully explained when I treat of Experience (chap. xiv.), whereof they are species. It is not important, nor would it be easy, to ascertain the differentia of mental event. Indefiniteness in respect of it, however, harbours no risk of error.

LXXIII.

Let "propensity” be the common name of all mental qualities that are presupposed by motives, intentions, and actions which proceed upon intention; e.g. the appetites, irascibility, fear, reverence, benevolence, conscience, the moral sense, the æsthetic sense.

LXXIV.

Mental qualities, whether faculties or propensities, are things unconscious and unintuitable. Apperception is not cognisant of them. They are knowable only through inference. Their existence is signified, to the illative faculty, by the consciousnesses of which they are the mental causes; e.g., sensations of hunger and thirst and sexual yearnings and pleasures signify to the illative faculty their unintuitable mental causes, the appetites; emotions of anger signify to it their unintuitable mental cause, irascibility; remembrances, their unintuitable mental cause, memory; judgments, their unintuitable mental cause, Reason. Apperception is cognisant of but one durable part of the mind, viz.

the Ego or subject of consciousness; but whether that be material or immaterial, whether the immediate object symbolic of the Ego be a reality or a mere symbol, it is ignorant. To pretend, as Positivism pretends, that consciousnesses comprise the mind, is to deny that there exists a complement of qualities corresponding to our ideas of memory, imagination, Reason, propensity. If there be no such qualities, no differences of the proportions in which they are compounded, in different men, what determines the order of mental events, the regular recurrences of like consciousnesses on like occasions, the constancy of character of the individual mind and its differences from other minds? If the qualities be cerebral, why then, the brain is either the mind or a part of the mind. The existence of the qualities is presupposed by the events, consciousnesses; and the concrete subject of the qualities, whether material or immaterial or a composite of matter and spirit, is Mind.

CHAPTER XI.

SENSATION AND PERCEPTION.

LXXV.

1. THE Consciousnesses, hunger, thirst, heat and cold of one's own body, what we are conscious of when relieved of bodily pain, vertigo, nausea, the various thrills that constitute bodily pleasure, are examples of what is commonly denoted by the term, sensation. They suppose discernments of which they are respectively objects, but are not given as being themselves discernments. Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and tactile consciousness, are intuitions that are given as being involved in sensations, sensations to which it is essential to be intuitive as well as intuited. We intuite the motions and attitudes of our bodies without sight or touch, also the expressions of our faces, and, when we perceive by means of one of the five senses, we intuite the sense as well as the thing perceived. All these intuitions are given as being involved in sensations. What is common and proper to the consciousnesses to which we give the common name, sensation, is, appearance of being an attribute of the body of the subject. The appearance is such as to make it doubtful whether the consciousnesses be not given as

attributes of composite subjects, each consisting of an inextended Ego or mind and a body; but the datum is decisive as to the human body being either the exclusive or the partial subject. Accordingly, I define Sensation, consciousness given as being a bodily attribute.

2. A sensation is given as being an attribute of a part of the body, e.g. hunger, of the stomach, thirst, of the throat, vertigo, of the head, visual intuition, of the eye, auditory intuition, of the ear.

3. Consciousnesses that differ from sensation only as being latent, or as being inchoate, I term vicesensation. Pain that survives the self-consciousness

of the sleeping patient is an example of the kind, vice-sensations. The latent consciousness that obtains when the eyes are closed in moderate light is also an example. The kind of consciousnesses to which the name, sensation, is commonly applied, is undefinable except upon condition of dividing it into the species. which I denote by the names sensation and vice-sensation. This division brings it within the pale of definition, which is of course a gain for science. It exposes an obvious differentia of one of the species, viz. the being given as a bodily attribute, and also a differentia of the other, which, although obscure, suffices for definition. The genus may be defined, consciousnesses given as bodily attributes, and consciousnesses so resembling these that, although not so given, the likeness binds them together in even a more intimate general union.

4. Let sensation given as being intuitive be distinguished as quasi-intuitive, and all other sensation as