ness are occasional constituents of the object of perception.

LXXXIII.

Space and Cosmos are constant objects of senseperception. The perception is necessarily inattentive. If we endeavour to make space and Cosmos objects of attentive sense-perception, we find ourselves attending to mere ideas of them. Space and Cosmos are given to sense-perception as the habitat of all its other objects.

LXXXIV.

Certain sensations are given as involving desire, e.g. hunger, thirst, the sexual sensation, the sensation consequent to suspension of breathing. Pleasing sensations that do not menace departure, e.g. warmth, sensations constituting or incident to relief, the sensation caused by agreeable muscular exertion, are given as not involving desire. Certain sensations are given as involving neither pain, pleasure, nor desire, viz. those to which no uneasiness succeeds.

LXXXV.

Appetite is the common name of certain of the sensations that are given as involving desire, e.g. hunger, thirst, the sexual sensation. The name is limited to

those that are of periodic recurrence. The most notable are hunger, thirst, and lust; but the craving for rest when we are fatigued, for exercise when the supply of animal force is ample, for sleep during a considerable part of the twenty-four hours, are readily allowed to be appetites. If the animal economy in man were such that the need of respiration should occur only at periods separated by intervals of three or four hours, and the need were manifested by the sensation by which it is now manifested when respiration is suspended for a few seconds, that sensation would be accounted an appetite.

CHAPTER XII.

APPERCEPTION.

LXXXVI.

1. WHAT is denoted by the term, apperception, has been confounded with a species of perception which Locke denoted by the name, "reflection." He says of it, "though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called 'internal sense.' He implies that attention is essential to "reflection," imputing the child's ignorance of psychical event to his inability as regards reflective attention. Reflection, he implies, attentively inspects such mental events as perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and so begets knowledge of them. According to Ancillon,-"The reflective Ego... . . is never developed in the majority of mankind at all, and even in the thoughtful and reflective few it is formed only at a mature period, and is even then only in activity by starts and at intervals."2 This sentence is opportunely cited by Sir William Hamilton, and that it implies what agrees with his theory of Reflection is cor1 Human Understanding, B. II. chap. 1, sec. 4.

2

1

Metaphysics, Lecture XIX.

2

roborated by his remark that "The faculty of selfconsciousness corresponds with the Reflection of Locke."1 This remark, in view of his doctrine that self-consciousness is essential to consciousness, exposes the viciousness of the confusion of apperception with reflection; for it implies that consciousness is wanting to the majority of mankind.

2. Reflection is perception given as having for immediate and sole object a consciousness of its subject. It is essential to it to be attentive. If such a thing were possible as an inattentive reflection, it would not be distinguishable from apperception, and philosophy could know nothing about it. Unintuitive sensations and unintuitive emotions endure its gaze, but not discernments. It sometimes surprises and is surprised by a discernment, but the object seems to vanish at the instant it is seen. Whether there are men who have the power to watch their intellectual operations and the discernments involved in discourse,

-in remembering, imagining, etc.—the writer is ignorant; but that there are none such seems to be proved by the meanness of the results of psychological speculation. There seems to be no room in the mind for a study of discernment. The aversion of discernment to be attentively discerned is shown by the fact, that when reflective attention is turned upon an intuitive emotion the intuitive element of the emotion vanishes at once, leaving a part that tends to recover the element so soon as reflection withdraws its eye. An irascible person who aims at conduct may profit by the mental law under which this curious kind of fact obtains. If he watch the emotion, anger, he occults its object, and, 1 Metaphysics, Lecture XXIX.

2 Lecture XI.

deprived of discernment, the emotion tends to decline and perish. If he persist long enough the emotion dies. If he cease to stare at it before it has lost its intensity, it is sure to recover its object and its first force.

3. Reflection watchful of the spirit of its subject that he may keep it pure, has an important function in what is known as the spiritual or interior life. It speedily discovers to the ascetic those of his instincts that are opposed to the Christian spirit. One of the first striking results of Saint Theresa's surrender to her vocation was her psychological enlightenment; nor is this wonderful, seeing that the instincts symbolised by the Christian trinity of evil, the Devil the World and the Flesh, must expose themselves in strife with the new spirit.

4. No mental exercise is more fatiguing than reflection. It differs greatly in this respect from apperception, which is as little fatiguing as breathing or the pulsation of the heart.

5. Reflection has been confounded with philosophic study of ideas of kinds of mental events,-a study that is the immediate source of psychology. Apperception of mental events begets ideas of corresponding kinds, e.g. of the kinds, perception, remembrance, imagination, judgment, as experience of event exterior to consciousness begets ideas of motion and rest, force and inertness, action and reaction, birth, growth, and death. The mind is not a conscious party to the production of either set of ideas. Between the conscious experience that begets them and their inception there