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intervenes no discourse. They are the offspring of a latent action of the mind fecundated by conscious experience. The study of these concepts, whether of those that are symbolic of mental events or of those that symbolise unconscious events, is not an exercise of reflection. The judgments which it engenders, and in which are explicated what is either obviously or unobviously implicit in the concepts, do not derive from reflection. The study is occasionally interrupted and assisted by an experiment on the mind which sometimes has the effect of freshening, augmenting, retrenching, or in some way correcting, one or more of the concepts studied. We set Reason, memory, or imagination, to work in order to study afterwards the record of the operation,—not to study the operation while it is proceeding. It is the connection of this kind of experiment with the study of ideas of mental event that causes the confusion of both study and experiment with reflection and self-consciousness. This, by the way, exposes the futility of Comte's objection to psychology as being the product of a mere counterfeit of observation. The psychologist, he maintains, is confined to the method of attempting to observe his mental operations while the faculties are at work, which he correctly holds to be abortive; and, with this error, he is for scourging psychology out of the temple of science.

6. When one reflects, he is inattentively aware that he is reflecting, i.e. a reflection is always attended by an apperception. This contrast puts in the most striking relief the difference between the two.

LXXXVII.

Apperception, quá referent to a consciousness, may be distinguished as psychical, and, quá referent to a bodily event, as corporal.

ness.

LXXXVIII.

Apperception does not acquaint us with the structure of the mind; it acquaints us with no mental quality except the existence of the subject of consciousAll other mental qualities are unintuitable. Apperception acquaints us with certain mental events, with consciousnesses, but not with the mental attributes which they presuppose, for example, with remembrance but not with memory, with imaginations but not with the faculty, Imagination, with conceptions but not with the conceptual faculty, with judgments but not with the faculty, Reason, with motives and intentions but not with a moving or intending faculty,-not, if there be such a thing, with Will. How penuriously knowledge of the mind-knowledge that can afford to be brought to book-is imparted to us, is evinced by the opinion, now obtaining ascendency amongst philosophers, that the immediate object which passes for the Ego is not a reality but a mere modification of consciousness.

LXXXIX.

The immediate object of apperception that passes

with it for the Ego or subject of consciousness, is it real? To Descartes the affirmative seemed to be an axiom, and the pivot of all guaranteed knowledge. It is the support of his famous argument, Cogito ergo sum. The affirmative is a datum; but its pretence to be an axiom is not universally allowed. To certain minds the idea of subjectless consciousness does not seem to be inconsistent. Indeed, by perhaps the majority of modern physiologists, consciousness is implicitly held to be subjectless. They hold it to be an effect of ganglionic, cerebral, or other corporal event, but not an attribute of a bodily organ or organism in such a sense that the organ or organism could be supposed to be conscious. If this be true, the immediate object of apperception given as being the Ego is not real; nor is it a true symbol. If it be held that the symbol is true because the organ or organism corresponds to its significance as the thing signified, it is only partially true. It is untrue in so far as it symbolises the remote object as being, not only a source or cause, but also, a subject of consciousness. Admitting that there is a subject of consciousness, a thing that, besides being

a source or cause, is also a subject, of consciousness,it does not follow that the immediate object of apperception which passes for the Ego is real. When a patient who during sleep undergoes unapperceived pain awakes and apperceives the pain, the immediate object of the apperception may consist of a real and an unreal object, viz., the pain, and a symbol of the subject of the pain. The idea of cerebration causing in the soul a pain and with it a symbol of a subject of consciousness, is not inconsistent: therefore the datum, that the immediate object of apperception is real, is not guaranteed-is not an axiom. We seem to be at

present without means of ascertaining whether the datum be or be not true. Here we have striking proof that inconsistency of the opposite is not an indefectible guarantee. Until physiology exposed the dependence of consciousness on corporal event, the thesis, that the immediate object of apperception is real, seemed to be an axiom, and now it is manifest that the seeming is merely specious, and that its speciousness is determined by privation of a thesis-by poverty of philosophic imagination. (§ xx. 3.)

XC.

Experience affords no example of apperception without sensation. It must therefore be conceded to the materialist that, in all probability, sensation is a sine qua non of apperception, that the unconscious mento-corporal" event which causes the one necessarily causes the other.

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CHAPTER XIII.

EMOTION.

XCI.

1. EMOTION is consciousness involving either pleasure or pain, and given as having the heart for its habitat, but not as its subject. It differs from sensation only in the respect that it does not seem to be a bodily attribute. Its difference from sensation is put in sharp relief when events that usually cause painful emotion cause instead a sensational pain in the heart. Pain, pleasure, and desire, are proper to sensations and emotions.

2. Certain emotions are given as being perceptive, others as being imperceptive. The datum that gives emotion as being perceptive is so obscure that its exposure had to await the advent of Hutcheson, but, once detected, it is easily made plain to all the world. The attribute, sacredness, is no more empirically knowable apart from an emotion of reverence, the attribute, beauty, apart from an æsthetic emotion, the attribute, duty, apart from a moral emotion, than light is empirically knowable by the blind. Fear is essential to the empirical perception of danger, a peculiar emotion of

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