approbation to that of nobleness, a peculiar emotion of aversion to that of vice.

Emotive perception is what is denoted by the name sentiment. One may have an unemotive knowledge or belief and a heart-knowledge or sentiment of the same thesis, e.g. that there is a God; that the moral imperative is the will of God; that an enemy who has insulted and otherwise injured the subject, as not having achieved personality and therein power of choice, is a proper object of pity, not of censure or resentment; that the retributive spirit is a stultifying devil, which makes a hell upon earth, and, without impairing the efficiency of civil surgery, should be drowned in charity. When, in the change known as "change of heart," the heart discovers what was previously known only to the intellect, the discovered thesis is not recognised, and the discoverer learns with surprise that it is possible for one to discover what he knew before. Heart-knowledge of the deliverances of revelation is what Christendom terms faith. The emotive element of the knowledge is quantitative, so that those in whom it is greater seem to know better. Under certain circumstances, e.g. those which give occasion for obedience to divine command, it is an incentive, and either instigates, or, as motive, solicits the will. This explains the relation of faith to works in virtue of which works are the measure of faith. It will appear byand-by (§ clxxix.) that wisdom is a high degree of heartknowledge of moral law, and that "as a man thinketh in his heart so is he."

3. By the way, the immediate objects of emotive perception are a species of aspects which, on account of their dependence on emotion, may be termed emotive

aspects. The discrimination of the species enables controversy respecting the foundation of morals to come to close quarters, instead of making passes in the dark altogether wide of the mark. Those who insist upon the absoluteness of the moral imperative must allow that it is knowable only by a contingent aspect which depends upon the emotive constitution of the person knowing. Is that aspect a phantom of the heart unrelated to the absolute ? or is it a face of the absolute determined by its contact with the contingent?

XCII.

1. When treating of Wisdom (Bk. III. chap. iv.) I shall have occasion to refer to a species of sympathy that has not been hitherto noticed. On this species and a kind of emotion on which it depends, we have now to bestow a moment's attention. Sympathy is emotion caused by what seems to be the emotion or sensation of another, and having a tendency to dispose to kindness; e.g. pity, and convivial emotion. The ascription of emotion or sensation to another being is a condition sine qua non of sympathy. Sympathy is

divisible into that which does, and that which does not, arise out of concurrence of emotions of the same kind. Conviviality is sympathy that arises out of such a concurrence: pity for one in pain is sympathy that does not so arise. Let sympathy of the former kind, as being conditioned by homogeneity of emotions, be distinguished as homogeneous, and sympathy of the latter kind as heterogeneous. Sympathy is further divisible into that which does, and that which does not, either

beget or enhance a feeling of fellowship.

Homogene

ous sympathy always excites such a feeling. Not so heterogeneous sympathy. Pity for a lower animal in pain has no tendency to cause or enhance such a feeling.

2. There is reason to believe that the immediate object symbolic of the emotion which we intuitively ascribe to another is for the most part agreeable. There are people who, without sympathy or antipathy, have pleasure in the intuitive ascription of emotion to others. Many who seem to be incapable of sympathy have pleasure in the intuitive ascription of emotion caused by the drama and by romance. This it is, probably, that throngs the scaffold and constituted the bad pleasure with which a Roman watched a shipwreck from his villa. Poets, dramatists, and writers of romance, have an exceptional power of imagining the emotions of others, and, apart from sympathy, have pleasure in its exercise. Men who are greatly swayed by public opinion sometimes seem to imagine the censure of which they take themselves to be the objects by means of a vicarious emotion, in which, as though they were a part of the critical public, they condemn themselves. It is probable that the power of worldliness is due to such vicarious and symbolic emotion. I do not risk much in taking for granted the existence of what I shall term ascriptive emotion. Heterogeneous sympathy depends upon ascriptive emotion.

CHAPTER XIV.

EXPERIENCE.

XCIII.

1. IF experience were defined, event involving a relation of a mind to a reality in virtue of which the reality is immediately objective and known to the mind, the definition would correspond to the common notion of experience. This notion supposes the mind to embrace as it were and penetrate the reality, and, so, to have it for object and object of knowledge. The supposition received a shock to which it has since succumbed when physiology detected the series of nerve and cerebral changes that intervene between peripheral contact and consequent sense - perception. That a cerebral event, and not a proximity of the thing perceived, should be the proximate cause of sense-perception, discredited the datum of immediate objectivity of reality in the foremost species of experience. When Hume showed, or seemed to show, that power or cause could not be immediately objective, the idea of it was transferred from the kind ideas à posteriori to the kind ideas à priori, so intimately connected were ideas imputed to experience with immediate objectivity of reality. But the common notion of experience,

although it supposes that kind of objectivity to be intimately connected with, does not suppose it to be essential to, experience; for the notion, although profoundly altered by proof that, certain consciousnesses excepted, reality is never immediately objective, has, in philosophic minds, survived that proof. What then is the differentia of Experience which contributed to determine the idea of it prior to the physiological discovery, and now determines the philosophic idea of it? To answer this question it is necessary to distinguish and name two species of knowledge that have hitherto escaped notice.

1

2. Let knowledge that originates in a ratiocination, and refers to an object other than the ratiocination, be distinguished as ratiocinative; and all other knowledge as "irratiocinative." (I make free to enlarge the synonyms, Ratiocination and Reasoning, and their cognates, from the narrow signification to which contrary to a law of language they have been confined, and to use them as denoting every exercise of Reason, its barren scrutiny as well as its most fruitful deduction or induction.) Knowledge of infinity, as originating in an act of Reason and not having the act in which it originates for object, is an example of ratiocinative knowledge; on the other hand, knowledge of the judgment that originates knowledge of infinity, is an example of irratiocinative knowledge. Again, knowledge of the guilt of John, inferentially originated, is ratiocinative, and knowledge of the originating inference is irratiocinative.

1 To distinguish this kind of knowledge as "judicial" would be preferable, but that it would commit us to a contradiction in terms, viz. that in one of its aspects a judgment might be non-judicial.