tent for good and evil. By virtue of the former it is the unconscious cause of evolution, of the order about which astronomy is conversant, of the processes by which the earth has become what it is, of the production of the conditions of life and of the mind of man. Its unconscious power is the undesigning cause of all design, of all ratiocination, of poetry, music, eloquence, wit, craft, emotion, in fact of every event whatever except volition. In view of this wealth of resource we should not presume to judge that, in the domain of reflex action, it is incapable of mimicry of intentional action. When we see the parts of an earwig or Australian ant that has been cut in two turn upon each other and apparently fight to the death, or the trunk and legs of a headless frog behave as though they were furnished with sensibility and intelligence, we should not conclude that mutilation can promote a rump into an intelligent animal: the opinion that in such cases non-vital reflex action mimics intentional action is less extravagant-more congenial to common sense. When the senseless polype seeks the light or seems to fight for food with another polype, we should see in the act mere mimicry of intentional action. The mimicry of prescience and providence wrought by the instincts of the lower animals should teach us to forbear from setting bounds to the capability of reflex action in respect of mimicry. It is probable that the behaviour of the somnambulist is mere mimicry of intentional action-mere unconscious reflex action.

The psychical hypothesis implies that death cannot be gradual-that there is no such thing as dying by inches-no such thing as the death of a part of an animal or plant. Death is the cessation of the relation between soul and body on which life depends.

Q

For aught we know to the contrary asphyxia might involve a cessation of all function without causing death. The distinction between somatic and molecular death is groundless. There is no such thing as molecular death loss of functional aptitude of a part of the body is not a death of the part. A thing that is part of an animal or a plant may be made by detachment a living thing; but quá part it is not a living thing and is therefore unsusceptible of death.

:

common sense.

As regards explanatoriness the psychical hypothesis leaves nothing to be desired. It explains that certain corporal events affect the soul so as to make it a subject of consciousness, that in the absence of such events the soul is unconscious, that, being made conscious and the consciousness involving a practical alternative, the soul is qualified to choose. This agrees with the data, 1st, That a man is a durable individual, 2nd, That consciousness has a subject, 3rd, That man is a free agent, 4th, That consciousness excludes extension is not a corporal event. It confirms the credit of the datum-giving faculty, and therefore that of It exempts from the necessity of considering such inconsistent hypotheses as the vibratiuncles of Hartley, rebaptized by Lewes neural tremors -indeed from the convulsive dialectic that in any way strives to identify consciousness with corporal event. And how futile are the objections to the psychical hypothesis. Forsooth, it is inconceivable that soul and body could act upon one another!anatomy had not been able to find the soul with its scalpel!—the principle of parsimony objects that the soul is superfluous! So conceivable is the interaction of soul and body that it has been matter of common belief to the bulk of men for ages. There is a false

presumption abroad that, to know a cause, is to know how an antecedent operates; and, as the idea of psychical causation in respect of corporal events affords no room for such a knowledge, it is held that reality cannot correspond to the idea. I have shown I have shown (§ lxiii. 12) that, considered in respect of immediate effects, knowledge of cause is not knowledge how an antecedent operates. Between a dynamic event and its immediate effect intervenes no event- -no event the indication of which could be an answer to the question how the dynamic event causes. To those who are distinctly aware of this truth the idea of psychical causation is beset by no mystery or difficulty that does not equally embarrass that of corporal causation. If the anatomist have not found a soul with his scalpel, neither has he an atom nor even a molecule; and as for the principle of parsimony, its pretension to abolish the soul deserves nothing better or worse than a smile.

CHAPTER XVIII.

GENERAL IDEAS.

CXXXIV.

1. AN idea of a Kind may symbolise the kind as a whole, or as a sum of the parts,-in the one case veiling the severality and enhancing the aspect of unity, in the other enhancing the aspect of severality, and obscuring that of the unity. The idea of all men congregated on the Day of Judgment symbolises a kind as a whole; that denoted by the term, all men, in the proposition, all men are mortal, symbolises a kind as a sum of the parts. What is predicated of a kind symbolised as a whole is not supposed by the predication to be true respectively of its individuals, whereas what is predicated of a kind symbolised as a sum of the parts is supposed by the predication to be true respectively of its individuals. An idea of a kind symbolised as a sum of the parts is supposed by the predication to be true respectively of its individuals. An idea of a kind that symbolises the kind as a sum of the parts is general; one that symbolises the kind as a whole is non-general. But a general idea is not therefore definable as one which symbolises a kind as a sum of the parts. There are

ideas of kinds that symbolise the kinds neither as wholes nor as sums of the parts. The idea of solidity is such a one. It inconsistently symbolises the kind as a monad pervading a multitude of subjects, viz. solids. The plurality of the kind is hidden from ordinary discernment, and has been hitherto only vaguely discerned by philosophic scrutiny. Such ideas have been correctly classed as General Ideas or Concepts, but not hitherto under the sanction of a correct definition of such ideas. The classification obtains this sanction when we define a general idea to be an idea of a kind that does not symbolise the kind as a whole. This definition excludes from the kind, general ideas, such an idea as that of a congregation of all men, and makes room for ideas of kinds that hide the plurality of the respective kinds.

2. The terms "general idea" and "concept" are synonymous. The term Conception has two meanings; first, discernment of which the immediate object is a general type, second, the faculty of that kind of discernment. A concept is the immediate object of a conception.

3. Concepts are either abditive or inabditive; the former being those that do, and the latter those that do not, hide the plurality of the kind they symbolise. Concepts symbolic of the concrete, e.g. concepts of men, horses, circles, angles, are inabditive; those symbolic of the inconcrete, e.g. of solidity, weight, justice, dignity, are for the most part abditive. General ideas of the inconcrete attributes, figure, colour, odour, heat, cold, although symbolic of the inconcrete, are inabditive. The abditive concept has overlaid the plain face of concrete and attribute with confusion and mystifica