scious restraining prudence are common.

I say con

scious prudence, implying that there is such a thing as unconscious prudence,-such a thing as unconscious equivalents of motive.

14. Design, or the formation or generation of an ideal type, pattern, or plan, (§ cxxxiv. 5) supposes the existence of an unconscious part of the mind and of unconscious mental event. No one could intend to design until he had experience of power to design; therefore a first design must be as unintentional as the growth of a tree unconscious mental processes occurring in and evincing an unconscious part of the mind must have engendered the pattern or plan. By the way, to ascribe design to the omniscient is inconsistent. The idea of such a being supposes his ideas of what he would do to be co-eternal with him, whereas it is essential to design to begin and end; which obliged Plato to judge that creative design, and the archetypes or ideas of all things, were co-eternal with the Creator. This reduces the Creator to a mere subject of fateful ideas,

to a personification of fate. It seems then that the marvellous concurrence of aptitudes displayed by Cosmos does not presuppose design,—that the datum which is the pivot of natural theology is delusive.

15. What recalls us to the resumption of interrupted work when the cause of the interruption has so absorbed the mind as to leave no room for an intention to resume? It must be an unconscious somewhat that is an equivalent of an intention to resume. In discussion, whether with oneself or with another, the operation of this equivalent whereby we are made to revert to the question, is familiar. We differ from one

another and at different times the same man differs from himself as regards the efficiency of the mental attribute on which this equivalent depends. It is more efficient in abler minds and in the stronger states of the same mind. It is for the most part feeble in the insane, and in idiots, if it exist at all, extremely feeble. It is not resolvable into habit, for it is as efficient in respect of strange as of familiar work. Is it identical with the unconscious force which, in compliance with a purpose to awake at a given hour, awakes us at that hour? Both are equivalents of intention to do something after a certain time, one to awake after the lapse of a given time, the other to resume a certain work on the termination of a certain other work. They differ only in two respects, 1st, that one does and the other does not operate during sleep, 2nd, that the one is and the other is not interdependently coupled with an equivalent of an appreciation of a certain quantity of time and of an intuition of its completion.

16. An unconscious approximative knowledge of the weight of a thing which one is about to lift determines the amount of effort which he applies. Sometimes the thing proves to have more or less weight than the knowledge counted on, and we experience an emotion of surprise.

CHAPTER III.

THE BRAIN A PART OF THE MIND.

CLXVII.

1. WE have irresistible evidence for the induction, that the unconscious part of the mind is corporal, and that the brain is either a part or the whole of it: the evidence makes it highly probable that the corporal part of the mind consists of the encephalon, spinal marrow, afferent and efferent nerves, and the peripheral parts of the organs of sense. As regards the latter we have the sanction of a datum for the belief that they are subjects of the sensations and sense-perceptions proper to them. It is true that when experience develops belief in a spiritual subject of consciousness this datum is discredited, (it has been proved to be inconsistent) and then the organs of sense are accounted mere accessories or instruments of the mind, bearing to it such a relation as a telescope bears to the visual faculty; but when the mental effects of concussion of the brain and cerebral lesions and disorders otherwise caused expose the relation of cause and effect that exists between cerebral event and consciousness, such that the brain can no longer be considered a mere accessory but must be allowed to be a part of the mind, the

credit of the datum respecting the organs of sense is so far restored that it is no longer easy to refuse to rank those organs as parts of the mind.

2. That all knowledge and skill depend upon modifications of the brain caused by experience and mental exercises of every kind, is proved by the fact that a concussion of the brain may deprive one of all knowledge and skill without impairing the power of the mind to recover both; the former from new experience, the latter from new interaction of the Ego and its environment. Certain cerebral lesions deprive the mind not of all knowledge, but of a considerable part, and others of a minute part so oddly selected that, as some one has remarked, it would seem as though Puck had been sporting with the brain. These facts shut us in to the conclusion that the extinction of knowledge or skill, or of both, is due to an effacement or impairment of durable cerebral modifications. They are conclusive that conscious knowledge and skill active are effects of an action of those modifications, that a series of unintuitable corporal events underlies, as cause and condition sine qua non, all such consciousness and activity of skill as cerebral lesion has the property of destroying or suspending. Concussion of the brain has been sometimes followed by a remarkable enhancement of mental faculty. General paralysis often begins its terrible work by an enhancement of mental faculty; idiotcy and bodily impotence are always the accompaniments of its regular final stage. The psychical effects of other diseases, like those of concussion, attest the dependence of mental faculty on corporal constitution, and of consciousness on corporal event. A servant girl whom disease had reduced to idiotcy was temporarily restored

to mental integrity by a fever such as ordinarily causes delirium.1 A beginning of insanity has raised the mind of a person bordering on idiotcy to the ordinary level of ordinary intelligence.2 An abscess formed under the scalp has converted a violent headache into spectral illusion.3 Impending apoplexy is sometimes wonderfully prophetic, predicting truly the time of the death of the subject.* It is sometimes a source not only of prescience but also of melodramatic invention explanatory of the expected event. A patient who suffered from an excess of blood in the brain, expecting an imminent effacement of consciousness, used to undergo a melodramatic hallucination put as explaining the event. A witch seemed to rush upon him and strike him on the head with a stick. The effects of hanging and drowning sometimes corroborate the testimony of concussion and disease as regards the dependence of consciousness on cerebral event. A gentleman who in great depression of mind attempted to hang himself but was cut down in time to save his life, related that the strangulation plunged him into ecstasy in which he re-lived his childhood and boyhood. Drowning has sometimes occasioned a panoramic display of the past. The mental effects of narcotics, anæsthetics, and stimulants, such as opium, hashisch, chloroform, and alcohol, add their testimony to the dependence of consciousness on corporal event. We have striking instances of the dependence of the moral faculty on bodily states. Certain disorders, e.g. uterine changes, transform honest people into thieves. Com

1 Physiology and Pathology of the Mind. Maudsley, p. 260.

2 Obscure Diseases of the Brain. Winslow, p. 273.

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid. p. 312.

5 Ibid.

P. 440.

• Ibid. p. 442.