equality of the angles of a triangle to two right angles. It evinces the confusion in which the ideas are involved, and the need of a new classification.

2. Retrospect sometimes refers to events that were experiences of the subject but are quite forgotten, e.g. that during a certain remote period the subject regularly breakfasted, dined, and slept. The object of this retrospect is not immediately, but is mediately, given as having been an event undergone by the subject. At first sight the retrospect opposed to remembrance presents the aspect of an inference, and belongs to a kind of mental event of which I shall treat by-and-by (xcv.) under the name, quasi-inference. If the subject endeavour to explain the origin of the knowledge it involves, the first suggestion likely to offer itself is that it sprang from an inference too rapid for notice, and based on the evidence that privation of regular breakfasts, dinners, and sleep during any considerable period is an event too conspicuous to be forgotten. That no such inference obtained or was possible, is proved by the fact that, ever since the period in question, he was unconsciously cognisant of the pretended conclusion. The knowledge was an

unconscious product of experience, a kind of mental event which will occupy our attention by-and-by. The contrast of this knowledge with that of remembrance serves to reveal in the latter a superior degree of intimacy and satisfactoriness attaching to the differentia, seeming of immediateness.

3. Having in view the difference which the above contrast exposes in mnemonical knowledge, we are able to distinguish a species of remembrance that

would otherwise be liable to be confounded with nonmnemonical retrospect. A change from adversity to prosperity occasions a change of the customs of a life which tends to make the dreary ones a frequent object of retrospect. They are not forgotten, they are remembered, not directly, but by means of an ideal event that serves as type in respect of which they are antitypes, a true concept. Nevertheless the retrospect seems to be an immediate discernment of a past event undergone by the subject, and is therefore a remembrance.

XLIX.

1. It is probable that the idea of time is developed piecemeal, and that its constituent which symbolises the past originates in a remembrance. It is consistently conceivable that the infant, undergoing remembrance before he had undergone expectation, should have the past incidentally for object before an ideal symbol of the future obtained in him. An ideal symbol of the past is not possible apart from one of the present, so that the infant's idea of the past, unconnected with a reference to the future, must symbolise the past in contrast to a present. It is also consistently conceivable that the infant, undergoing expectation before he had undergone remembrance, should have the future incidentally for object before an ideal symbol of the past had obtained in him, the future being given in contrast to the present. And, since consistency does not object to the possibility of a gradual development of the idea of Time, such a de

velopment is probable. When the origin of an idea can be consistently imputed to experience, common sense demands that it be so imputed, though the notion of an à priori origin of the idea be consistent. It seems to me probable that expectation contributes its quota of the idea of Time, viz. the symbol of the future, before remembrance develops a symbol of the past. Irritability having caused the first suckling of the nurse's breast, when the infant's mouth again encounters the nipple redintegration would connect with the tactile perception the idea of the associated satisfaction as being imminent, determining an expectation, and therein a symbol of the future. It seems to me probable that the circumstances of the infant favour the obtaining of such an expectation in advance of a remembrance, and, therefore, the objectivity of the future in advance of that of the past.

2. The thesis that expectation caused by redintegration engenders the idea of the future, is corroborated by its explanatoriness. It explains the great law of expectation of the like of the past,-how we are determined to count on a future that mainly resembles the past, a law which probably determines or contributes to determine our belief that, for an indefinite time, nature will function as she has functioned. The infant's first idea of the future, according to this theory, is the idea of an imminent event like one he had previously experienced. He makes no comparison, he discerns no likeness, he does not refer to the past; but what he anticipates is the like of a past object of his experience. Because he experienced that object, he expects the like. The future he expects is necessarily the counterpart of what he experienced; but events

will instruct him to expect variety as well as similarity, only the variety is to be superficial, the similarity fundamental.

3. Let retrospect that has for object what is given as past event be distinguished as historical, and that which has for object past time unconnected with event as transcendent. A retrospect that has for object the foundation of Rome, or that I breakfasted this morning, is historical; one that contemplates time anterior to Cosmos is transcendent.

CHAPTER IX.

SUBSTANCE.

L.

ONE of the leading intentions of this chapter is to define kind and essence. A kind being a species of sum, it behoves to define the term sum before defining Kind. But a definition of the term, sum, depends upon a definition of the term " unit." Now, the differentia of the kind, units, is far from obvious, seeing that a unit may itself consist of units. Το find out what is common and proper to units that do and units that do not consist of units, for example, to a monad such as an atom, an emotion, a volition, and such a unit as one hundred, one thousand, one million, is not an easy matter. I shall have to tax the attention of the reader in quest of the differentia of Unity. Essence being a species of attribute, I should define "attribute" before I define essence. But, attribute having been hitherto held to be a correlative of substance, it becomes necessary, as a preliminary of a definition of attribute, to examine the idea of Substance. But this idea breaks down, or rather evaporates, under scrutiny. The valid idea which it masks proves to be that of the correlatives "concrete" and