Opinion of the Court. court's answer to this proposition was, as is our answer to the like proposition in the case at bar: "It has never been regarded as essential to the validity of remedial procedure that it should be applicable in all of its provisions to all persons or parties, alike. Different situations and conditions often render appropriate and necessary different provisions, the necessity or propriety of which rests largely in the legislative discretion. **Distinctions of this nature have not been infrequent since the adoption of the present constitution. * * * Of a like nature are regulations for changes of venue. They are designed to secure to parties a fair and impartial trial of their causes, which is the ultimate and highest purpose of judicial proceedings; and the extent to which such regulations may go, for the accomplishment of that purpose, is addressed to a sound legislative discretion, in view of the nature of the case to be provided for, and the probable conditions likely to arise. * **This statute imposes no penalty or burden upon one suitor or class of suitors from which others similarly situated are exempt, as did the statute held invalid in Coal Co. v. Rosser, 53 Ohio St., 12; nor does it affect any right of property of some owners differently from others in the same situation, as did the act declared unconstitutional in State v. Ferris, Ibid, 314. In the first of those cases the act was held invalid because it exacted an attorney fee from a class of defendants to which parties in no other class of actions were subject; and in the other case the law failed because it laid a burden in the nature of a tax, unequally upon property." Opinion of the Court. It is specially urged that the classification made by the act is unjust and unreasonable, and that this renders the act invalid. This objection, at first blush, seems plausible, but we think it is not sound. Always to be borne in mind is the fact that the discriminations of the law are made up of distinctions, oftentimes slight, sometimes nice, and yet possessed of substance. Next to an act declared by statute to be unlawful will be found one having many points of resemblance, and yet not precisely like the other which is excluded; or an offense may be classified into grades and offenders receive different punishments, but such discriminations do not render either statute unreasonable, or for any reason invalid. A familiar instance is the statute respecting larceny. If a thief steals property of the value of one cent less than thirty-five dollars he may be imprisoned in the jail or workhouse; if the property be of the value of thirty-five dollars, or over, he may be incarcerated in the penitentiary. The two acts equally involve moral turpitude, but one is a felony while the other is but a misdemeanor. Such classes are arbitrarily formed by the general assembly, and necessarily so. "If the legislature has erred in not including what has been excepted from the law, it is simply an error of judgment in the exercise of its authority, and can not be reviewed by the courts." The State v. Nelson, 52 Ohio St., 88. The books are full of illustrations of this principle. See authorities cited by counsel. The act in question partakes of a two-fold nature. Some of its provisions come purely within Opinion of the Court. the domain of the police power; others within the general legislative power, while others partake of both characteristics. It is a remedial act, intended, in the first instance, to regulate the use of automobiles, and to provide for the safety of others who are lawfully using the public highways. Why should they not be regulated, and why should not the old-fashioned user of the highway be protected by the law? Doesn't everybody know that the automobile is a new machine of travel; its use a new use of the highway; that it is dangerous to other travelers; that its power, its capacity for speed, the temptation it affords the reckless driver to operate it at a dangerous rate and in a careless manner, all distinguish the automobile from all other vehicles. Surely it cannot be necessary to further elaborate this fact so patent to every observing and reading person. The automobile is, therefore, a class by itself, the users of such machines a class by themselves, and legislation in recognition of this condition is based upon a solid, easily recognized distinction. The objection that because section 33 (which section prescribes the venue in the present case), permits the action to run only against the owner of the automobile, it is therefore invalid, seems to be wholly without force. The act might well have included in its operation more persons using automobiles than the owner or persons renting for more than thirty days, but failure to extend the class no more invalidates the provisions which take in the owner and the thirty-day renter than I did the failure of the act in review in The State Opinion of the Court. v. Nelson, supra, to protect drivers of horse cars and gripmen on cable cars, render the provision protecting other motormen invalid. Nor is there any injustice inflicted on the defendant by the provision as to venue. It is not, intrinsically, more unfair to permit a suit of the character here involved to be tried in the county where the victim of the alleged wrong resides than in the county where the alleged wrong-doer resides. The plaintiff would have just as clear a natural right to ask that the law permit a trial in his county as the defendant could have to demand that the trial shall be in his county. That the demand as to venue of the defendant is not based upon natural right is illustrated by the fact that had the plaintiff procured personal service of summons on the defendant in Fayette county the venue of the action would have been fixed in that county; this by reason of a statute whose validity has never been questioned. How clear is it, therefore, that the whole question is one of legislative discretion, and how idle is it to insist that the authorization of summons to go to Highland county is an invasion of any natural or constitutional right of defendant. The act, in other sections, provides that violation of certain of its requirements shall be deemed a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment. Had the defendant been charged in a criminal complaint with a violation of any of these provisions at the time and place of the alleged accident he would have had to answer to a court outside of his own county; this by mandate of the constitution. Thus Opinion of the Court. does the constitution itself deny that there is any inherent right in a violator of law to be tried in the county of his residence. As hereinbefore indicated we are not called upon to inquire into the reasons which actuated the general assembly in enacting section 33 of the act in question. In our judgment abundant reasons existed, and do still exist. As applied to the present case, the common law afforded a right of action; the statute provides where that right may be pursued and where the remedy may be enforced. The constitution clothes the court of common pleas with capacity to receive jurisdiction; the statute provides what that jurisdiction shall be, and how, and where exercised. We are of opinion that the provision is not unconstitutional, nor unreasonable, and that it works no injustice. This conclusion calls for a reversal of the judgments below. The cause will be remanded to the court of common pleas of Fayette county with direction to overrule the motion, and for further proceedings according to law. Reversed. PRICE, JOHNSON and DONAHUE, JJ., concur. |