mistaken; these men were slaves, and the Asiatics were free men. By the same rule the Venitians, Switzers, Grisons, and Hollanders, are not free nations but liberty in its perfection is enjoyed in France and Turkey. The intention of our ancestors was, without doubt, to establish this amongst us by magna charta, and other preceding or subsequent laws; but they ought to have added one clause, that the contents of them should be in force only so long as it should please the king. King Alfred, upon whose laws magna charta was grounded, when he said the English nation was as free as the internal thoughts of a man, did only mean, that it should be so long as it pleased their master. This it seems was the end of our law, and we who are born under it, and are descended from such as have so valiantly defended their rights against the encroachments of kings, have followed after vain shadows, and without the expense of sweat, treasure, or blood, might have secured their beloved liberty, by casting all into the king's hands.

We owe the discovery of these secrets to our author, who, after having so gravely declared them, thinks no offence ought to be taken at the freedom he assumes, of examining things relating to the liberty of mankind, because he hath the right common to all: but he ought to have considered, that in asserting that right to himself, he allows it to all mankind. And as the temporal good of all men consists in the preservation of it, he declares himself to be a mortal

enemy to those who endeavour to destroy it. If he were alive, this would deserve to be answered with stones rather than words. He that oppugns the public liberty, overthrows his own, and is guilty of the most brutish of all follies, whilst he arrogates to himself that which he denies to all men.

I cannot but commend his modesty and care, "not to detract from the worth of learned men." But it seems they were all subject to error, except himself, who is rendered infallible through pride, ignorance, and impudence. But if Hooker and Aristotle were wrong in their fundamentals concerning natural liberty, how could they be in the right when they built upon it? or if they did mistake, how can they deserve to be cited? or rather, why is such care taken to pervert their sense? It seems our author is by their errors brought to the knowledge of the truth. "Men have heard of a dwarf standing upon the shoulders of a giant, who saw farther than the giant:" but now that the dwarf standing on the ground sees that which the giant did overlook, we must learn from him. If there be sense in this, the giant must be blind, or have such eyes only as are of no use to him. He minded only the things that were far from him. These great and learned men mistook the very principle and foundation of all their doctrine. If we will believe our author, this misfortune befel them because they too much trusted to the schoolmen. He names Aristotle; and, I presume, intends to comprehend Plato, Plutarch, Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, and all the ancient Grecians, Italians, and

others, who asserted the natural freedom of mankind, only in imitation of the schoolmen, to advance the power of the Pope; and would have compassed their design, if Filmer, and his associates, had not opposed them. These men had taught us to make the unnatural distinction between royalist and patriot, and keep us from seeing, "that the relation between king and people is so great, that their well-being is reciprocal." If this be true, how came Tarquin to think it good for him to continue king at Rome, when the people would turn him out? or the people to think it good for them to turn him out, when he desired to continue in? Why did the Syracusians destroy the tyranny of Dionysius, which he was not willing to leave, till he was pulled out by the heels? How could Nero think of burning of Rome? or why did Caligula wish the people had but one neck, that he might strike it off at one blow, if their welfare was thus reciprocal? 'Tis enough to say, these were wicked or mad men; for other princes may be so also; and there may be the same reason of differing from them. For if the proposition be not universally true, 'tis not to be received as true in relation to any, till it be particularly proved; and then 'tis not to be imputed to the quality of prince, but to the personal virtue of the man.

I do not find any great matters in the passages taken out of Bellarmine, which our author says comprehend the strength of all that ever he heard, read, or seen produced for the natural liberty of the subject: but he not mentioning where they are to

be found, I do not think myself obliged to examine all his works, to see whether they are rightly cited or not however, there is certainly nothing new in them: we see the same, as to the substance, in those who wrote many ages before him, as well as in many that have lived since his time, who neither minded him, nor what he had written. I dare not take upon me to give an account of his works, having read few of them: but, as he seems to have laid the foundation of his discourses in such common notions as were assented to by all mankind, those who follow the same method have no more regard to Jesuitism and Popery, though he was a Jesuit and Cardinal, than they who agree with Faber, and other Jesuits, in the principles of geometry, which no sober man did ever deny.

SECTION V.

GOD LEAVES TO MAN THE CHOICE OF FORMS IN GOVERNMENT; AND THOSE WHO CONSTITUTE ONE FORM MAY ABROGATE IT.

BUT Sir Robert "desires to make observations on Bellarmine's words, before he examines or refutes them." And indeed it were not possible to make such stuff of his doctrine as he does, if he had examined or did understand it. First, he very wittily con

cludes, "that if, by the law of God, the power be immediately in the people, God is the author of a democracy." And why not, as well as of a tyranny? Is there any thing in it repugnant to the being of God? Is there more reason to impute to God Caligula's monarchy, than the democracy of Athens? Or is it more for the glory of God, to assert his presence with the Ottoman or French monarchs, than with the popular governments of the Switzers and Grisons? Is pride, malice, luxury, and violence, so suitable to his being, that they who exercise them are to be reputed his ministers? And is modesty, humility, equality, and justice, so contrary to his nature, that they who live in them should be thought his enemies? Is there any absurdity in saying, that since God in goodness and mercy to mankind hath, with an equal hand, given to all the benefit of liberty, with some measure of understanding how to employ it, 'tis lawful for any nation, as occasion shall require, to give the exercise of that power to one or more men, under certain limitations and conditions; or to retain it to themselves, if they think it good for them? If this may be done, we are at an end of all controversies concerning one form of government established by God, to which all mankind must submit; and we may safely conclude, that having given to all men, in some degree, a capacity of judging what is good for themselves, he hath granted to all likewise a liberty of inventing such forms as please them best, without favouring one more than another.

His second observation is grounded upon a falsity in matter of fact. Bellarmine does not say, that de