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cation, nor by reasoning which while pertinent to the election of a single person may be quite inapplicable to the election of several or many.

It is said, and the remark is quite true in a general sense, that ours is a system of self-government, but no plan of representation ever devised can make it such completely and beyond the possibility of a disfranchisement of some members of the electoral population. We must content ourselves with an approach to a standard of absolute perfection, without indulging hopes of ever reaching it by the utmost exertion of our powers. But we must approach it as nearly as we can, or we will be false to the principles we profess and subject ourselves to just reproach from the friends of free government in all lands. Our country is new and our experiment and trial of free institutions is being made not only upon a grand scale, but under conditions more favorable for success than ever before existed in the whole history of the human race.

The more complete representation of the people in government is, simply stated, the object of those who advocate electoral reform upon either of the plans before mentioned; but it is an entire mistake to assume that they intend to subordinate the greater to the less in any of the arrangements they propose, or to subvert or impair any principle heretofore accepted as sound and just in republican government. On the contrary, they adhere to the principle of majority government with admirable. fidelity and give to it new, useful, and extended operation and effect. They represent more persons-disfranchise fewer ones-and cut off the main source of

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electoral corruption, by carrying the majority principle further than it has ever been carried and placing a power for its effectual enforcement in the hands of the people themselves.

The force of these general remarks will be best exhibited by an illustration of the principle of extended representation to which they refer, and for such illustration I will take the case of Bloomsburg-my own town-where four elections have been held under the plan of the free vote. The town contains, say, 612 voters, 312 of whom are Democrats and 300 Republicans. (These are not far from the exact numbers as shown at recent elections.)

A President of the town Council is to be elected annually who is the principal executive officer of the town as well as President of the Council. If the 312 Democratic voters unite in support of a candidate he will be elected, and properly elected, upon the sound principle that a greater number shall be preferred to a less in the assignment of representation. A very few voters in this case turn the scale, but the result is perfectly just. There is but one majority to be considered and that in favor of the successful candidate.

Next, two Assessors of taxes are to be elected annually, and here the free vote comes into play and secures their division between parties. Each voter is permitted to give one vote to each of two candidates, or two votes to one. Each party, of course, will run but one candidate, because they can elect no more, and the second majority in the town is represented as well as the first. The figures are as fol

lows: Divide 612 (the whole vote) by 2, (the number of assessors,) and we obtain a ratio, or number of voters for an assessor, of 306. Give the first assessor to the first majority of 312 Democrats and deduct the ratio; we have then left, unrepresented, but 6 Democrats to 300 Republicans, and the free vote carries the second assessor to this second, or Republican majority. How much better this is than giving both the assessors to the first majority! Here but 6 voters are unrepresented instead of 300. And in practical government a clear advantage is gained; for the possible spite, partiality or incompetency of one assessor is checked or corrected by the other, and the chances of fair play in the valuations of property in the town are increased.

A similar and salutary division of officers takes place annually in the choice of two school directors and two constables, and triennially in the choice of two assistant assessors.

But in the election of three persons the improvement introduced by the new plan is still more evident than in the case of two. The numbers will run Ratio, 204; first Dem. majority 312; second Rep. maj. 300; third Dem. maj. 108, and the general result will stand 2 to 1 in favor of the party having the preponderance upon the total vote. The disfranchisement of Republican voters will be reduced from 300 to 96, and this by simply permitting each voter to cast his three votes for one, two or three candidates as he shall think fit. In Bloomsburg three town Auditors are elected together every third year.

Take next the case of the annual election of six

Councilmen. The ratio for a Councilman will be 102 and the five successive majorities after the first will all be represented by the free vote. Although no calculation of them will be made at the election such will be the inevitable result; for as each voter may bestow his six votes upon any number of candidates less than six, each party will run but three, all of whom will be elected and but six voters in the whole population will be unrepresented instead of 300. Here we have a very nearly complete representation of all the voters of the town by following the majority principle at each successive stage of the distribution.

The exclusive representation of first majorities at plural elections is a stupid misapplication of a just principle—a crude, unjust and pernicious rule, the inevitable effect of which, if continued, will be the destruction of republican government. For it produces violent struggles between parties and candidates for a preponderance of vote, with constantly increasing corruption at elections and demoralization of the people. These evils cannot be cured or corrected by mere preachment while their cause is left in full operation. We must take away or greatly reduce the motive for corrupting voters in order to introduce reform which shall be effectual and lasting, and this will be accomplished when we provide that all interests in political society, of any considerable magnitude, may represent themselves in government by their own votes and in proportion to their numbers, without resort to corruption or other means of undue influence.

Nov. 30, 1871.

THE CHOICE

OF

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS.

A SPEECH DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 17, 1869.*

[In Senate, January 28, 1869, Mr. Buckalew, by unanimous consent, introduced a Joint Resolution (Sen. Res. No. 209) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States in relation to the manner of choosing electors of President and Vice-President of the United States, which on his motion was referred to the select Committee on Representative Reform. On the following day Mr. Morton reported the Joint Resolution without amendment, stating that the report of the Committee in its favor was unanimous. (Globe, 674-704.) That Resolution will be found at length in this volume, ante, page 104, in the general report of the Committee on Representative Reform as made to the Senate on the second of March following. February 9, House Joint Resolution No. 402, proposing the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in relation to colored suffrage being under consideration in the Senate in Committee of the Whole, Mr. Morton moved to amend by adding the above amendment, reported by him as an additional amendment to the Constitution to be numbered xvi. His motion was lost, yeas 27, nays 29. Afterward, however, the same day, the House Resolution having been reported to the Senate and being under further consideration, he renewed his amendment and it was carried after debate by a vote of 37 to 19. A motion to reconsider it * Congressional Globe, 3d Sess. 40th Cong., 1287.

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