The allied plan of personal representation has also been highly commended. As presented by Mr. Hare in an elaborate work, it contains another great idea; that those who did not like the local candidates may fill up their ticket by voting for persons of national reputation. This is sometimes done in our country on important occasions of deep interest. In 1835, a convention was called in North Carolina to reform her constitution. It was the first convention for this purpose since 1776, and deeply excited the public mind. The ablest men of the State were chosen without regard to their location or politics.

The natural tendency of representative governments, in the opinion of Mr. Mill, is to collective mediocrity. This will be increased the more the elective franchise is extended. Edmund Burke was repudiated by the electors of Bristol, in 1780, for Parliament, for his advocacy of the cause of the American colonies. He was, however, returned by another constituency, and continued during life in Parliament, contributing to its debates and to the glory of the, nation. In contrast to this, William R. Davie, who had been a gallant and successful officer in the war, governor of the State, (1798,) envoy extraordinary to France, (1799,) was defeated in popular elections in North Carolina, when a candidate for Congress and for the Legislature, by individuals without extraordinary merit or talent.

There is hardly a State of our Union in which the congressional districts are not gerrymandered in the interest of party. This adds to the deterioration of our public service, so that Mr. Mill declares "it is an admitted fact that in the American democracy, which is constructed on this faulty model, the highly cultivated members of the community, except such as are willing to sacrifice their own judgment and conscience to the behests of party and become the servile echo of those who are inferiors in knowledge, do not allow their names as candidates for Congress or the Legislature, so certain it is they would be defeated."

February, 1869.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IN ILLINOIS.

A CONVENTION authorized to frame and submit to the people, amendments to the Constitution of Illinois, met at Springfield in December, 1869, and concluded the performance of its duties and adjourned finally on the 13th of May, 1870. The amended constitution for the State, as formed by the convention, was submitted to a popular vote for adoption or rejection on the first Saturday in July following, at which time also eight additional propositions of amendment were submitted severally to a like vote. An ingenious and convenient plan was provided by the Convention for taking the sense of the people upon all the questions submitted, by means of a single ticket. The tickets or ballots properly prepared were to be distributed by the Secretary of State through the County Clerks, and upon their face were to indicate clearly and separately an affirmative vote for each of the propositions to be passed upon-first, the new or amended Constitution, and next, in their order, the several separate amendments proposed. Whenever the voter should strike off or erase from his ballot either one of the propositions, his vote was to be counted as given against it, otherwise in its favor. Thus nine distinct questions were passed upon by the people, though pre

cisely the same form of ticket was furnished to each

voter.

The work of the Convention is of peculiar interest outside of Illinois, because it included several provisions well calculated to secure electoral reform in that State, which were by strong majorities adopted by the people. These will now be given in the order in which they appear in the amended Constitution, accompanied by some observations which they respectively invite.

ELECTION OF REPRESENTATIVES IN THE LEGISLATURE.-The Seventh Section of the Fourth Article of the amended Constitution is as follows:

"The House of Representatives shall consist of three times the number of the members of the Senate, and the term of office shall be two years. Three Representatives shall be elected in each senatorial district at the general election in the year A. D. 1872, and every two years thereafter. In all elections of Representatives aforesaid, each qualified voter may cast as many votes for one candidate as there are Representatives to be elected, or may distribute the same or equal parts thereof among the candidates as he shall see fit, and the candidates highest in votes shall be declared elected."

Under this amendment a minority of voters in a district exceeding in number one-fourth of the whole vote, can elect one of the three Representatives from a district. The principle applied is simply this: that each voter shall be allowed to distribute or concentrate his three votes as he shall think proper, and that candidates highest in vote shall be declared elected. Practically, whenever one party is clearly in a majority in a district, but not able to poll a three-fourths vote, its members

will nominate and vote for two candidates only, and the minority will nominate and vote for one, and all the candidates voted for will be elected. No candidate will be beaten and both classes of voters will be fairly represented. This will be the ordinary case, but exceptional cases are fully provided for. When the majority shall be strong enough to poll a three-fourths vote they will vote for and elect three candidates, or the whole number to be chosen. When parties are about equal in strength, or each may indulge the expectation of obtaining a majority vote, each will nominate and support two candidates and whichever one shall poll a majority of votes will elect both its candidates, while the minority will elect but one. In this case it will be certain from the outset that each party will carry one of its candidates, and there will be a fair test of strength between them upon the election of a second one. Only one candidate will be beaten and both parties will be represented as nearly as may be in proportion to their respective numbers. Again, when there shall be three parties or interests in a district struggling for representation, it will probably happen that each will obtain one Representative, or that one of them will obtain two and another one Representative, whereas under the old plan of voting one party or interest would be likely to obtain the whole three upon a mere plurality vote; in other words, a minority of voters might, in many cases, elect their whole ticket and the majority of voters be left without any Representative whatever. Finally, the new plan allows the voter to discriminate between candidates in giving them his support. He can in voting

for two candidates express the relative strength of his desire for the election of each, by giving one of them two votes and the other one. In some cases this will be a valuable and convenient privilege, and its exercise will tend to the certain success of the best men among candidates where all cannot be elected.

The allowance of half-votes in the new plan is one of its best features, and will secure its convenient working and promote its ultimate popularity. This feature, however, is rather for the convenience of the majority than of the minority, and is not indispensable to the new plan. The majority can vote in either one of three ways:

1st. Give single votes to each of three candidates, which is the old plan;

2d. Give one and a half votes to each of two; or, 3d. Have one-half their voters give two votes to A and one to B, and the other half two votes to B and one to A.

Whenever their vote shall not exceed threefourths of the whole vote of the district, they cannot reasonably or safely support three candidates. If with a weaker vote than three-fourths they shall attempt to elect the whole three Representatives, the minority may take advantage of the dispersion of their vote and carry a second Representative. In all ordinary cases, therefore, the majority will support but two candidates. They will not run a third candidate simply that he may be beaten, and incur at the same time the danger of losing one of the two Representatives to which they are entitled and have power to elect.