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ple all departures from the Constitution by either. It was intended that this body should hold the Government, in all its branches, responsible to public opinion; that thereby the system of republican rule then established should be preserved from abuse, and, especially, that all minority and individual rights under the Constitution, should be preserved from invasion. But that body had no power to enforce its decisions, and from this cause, and from its breaking into factions on account of the number of its members, it fell into disrepute, and was not continued in existence by the Constitution of 1790.

But, the objects in view in constituting the Council of Censors, were laudable and proper, and can be attained, to a great extent, by the Protective Veto now proposed. Thereby an officer, of the first rank of ability, would be placed in a suitable position to check and limit the action of the Legislature; to defend the principles of the fundamental law against invasion; to baffle the agents of corruption in their attempts to prostitute the Government to their purposes; and to protect those interests of society which would, otherwise, be sacrificed or injured by partisan injustice. Whenever objectionable measures were proposed by the dominant party, it would be the interest and desire of the minority represented by the President of the Senate, to have them sent to the people for examination and discussion, which could be effected by this veto, operating as it would in the nature of an appeal to them from the legislative majority; while, at the same time, there would be no motive for interposing this power of appeal upon measures of real merit, the discussion of which, before the people, would strengthen, instead of weakening the party proposing them. And if a proper measure were vetoed, its discussion would secure a two-thirds vote for it in the Legislature, or an abandonment of objection to it by the President of the Senate. It would only be delayed, and it would, eventually, go into effect with an increased weight of public sentiment in its favor.

That "the world is governed too much," and that "that government is best which governs least," are maxims of common acceptation. And with us, in view of our experience, there is good cause for holding, that laws are supplied to the community beyond its wants and to its injury; that the influences in favor of legislation are unduly strong in the absence

of effective checks; and that constitutional limitations and declarations of rights, will not be duly observed in the absence of power distinctly and suitably provided for their enforcement. A majority will be apt to construe the principles and provisions of a constitution according to their interests and passions, and there must be, therefore, powerful checks upon them, to prevent over-action, or wrong action of the government they control.

Our Election Boards in Pennsylvania represent both political parties, and exemplify some of the advantages of minority representation. A single Inspector is voted for by each elector, but the two candidates highest in vote are chosen; thus securing in all ordinary cases the representation of both parties in the board. This arrangement has proved most useful in practice, and is justly esteemed to be a valuable guard against partisan injustice, as well as fraud. It has, no doubt, contributed greatly to preserve our popular elections from degeneracy.

By the division of the State into districts for the election of Senators and Representatives, minority representation is obtained, to some extent, in the Legislature. For the majority party in the State will not have a majority in all the districts into which it is divided; and a plurality rule for elections somewhat disturbs the regularity of results. Upon the whole, however, it is nearly certain that the party in a majority in the State will control the Legislature and act its pleasure in the enactment of laws. And it will so district the State by Apportionment laws that the opposing party will be deprived of its due share of representation. And it is certain that in most cases of conflict between parties in the Legislature, the representation of the minority, resulting from district apportionment, is quite illusory; except where the two Houses happen to differ politically, the power of the majority will be as complete as its exercise will be unscrupulous.

Representation of the minority by a negative power or veto, then, stands vindicated by all the considerations detailed in the present paper. And it does not depart from principles already in the Constitution, but only gives to them a new and necessary application. The principle of the veto, and the principle of minority representation, we already possess.

What is proposed is that these be combined in a new provision, simple in character, but effective in action, which shall stand as a bulwark of defence against great and notorious evils. Political parties, considered as embodiments of all the main interests and opinions of society, are to be regarded in the distribution of power, and one of them be made to check another. And as such parties are inevitable, and as they thoroughly and permanently divide the mass of the people, what objection can there be to a recognition of their existence in the Constitution? In fact, is it not necessary that these, the most powerful forces which act upon the government, shall be dealt with and regulated, or at least put under a measure of control, by the fundamental law? If this be not done, we hazard nothing in saying that they will pervert the action of the government, and eventually destroy it. There being no actual balance of political powers, but on the contrary unchecked party domination, violence, injustice, and corruption will come in as a flood, until discord and passion reign supreme, and a divided and exasperated people be prepared to abandon free government and accept the rule of a master.

NOTE. The election of a Lieutenant Governor would complete the proposition discussed in this paper. But being a subordinate question it is omitted.

[EDITOR'S NOTE.-The date of the foregoing Essay shows the early inclination of the author's mind in matters of electoral reform. The proposition of a minority veto, contained in it, is quite novel, but may deserve consideration and development hereafter. It is believed that the writer intended it to be accompanied by provisions looking to the choice of alternates for both the Governor and President of the Senate, so that their offices would always be fitly filled and controlled by the proper political interest.]

INDEX.

BERWICK BOROUGH, act for free vote in, 237.

Bloomsburg, town of, act to organize, 233; its practical operation, 153,
163, 180, 246, 247.

253.

Bloom Poor District, election of Directors for, 154, 237,
Borough Supplement, act, 229; speech on, in Senate of Pennsylvania, 157.
Boroughs in Pennsylvania, act for free vote in elections of Councilmen

for, 229; acts for same in boroughs of Northumberland County, 235;
in Berwick, 237; Chambersburg, 242; Hulmeville, 241; Milton, 236;
Northumberland, (election in,) 251; Shamokin, 211; Snydertown,
240; Sunbury, 238; Uniontown, 239.

CAIRNS, LORD, amendment to reform bill, 41, 273; his remarks thereon,
117, 274.

Chambersburg borough, act for election of Councilmen in, by free vote, 242.
Columbia County rules of nomination, 258.

Committee of Senate, Report on representative reform, 65.

Convention, act of Pennsylvania, 1872, manner of electing members, 230;
of New York in 1867, ibid., 40, 91, 155.

Councilmen in Pennsylvania boroughs, manner of electing, general act,
229. For special acts see Boroughs.

County Commissioners and Auditors, bill for election of, 151, 162.
Corruption in English boroughs, 22, 23.

Crawford County plan of nomination for office condemned, 256, 257.
Cummings, Alexander, presides at Philadelphia meeting, 64, n.
Cumulative Vote. See Free Vote.

DIRECTORS or Managers of incorporated companies, choice of, by free
vote, 224, 226.

Dutcher, Salem, citation from, xi.

ELECTORAL COLLEGES, their defects and remedies for, 209. See Presi-
dential Electors.

FRACTIONAL VOTES, their utility and convenience, 145; manner of count-
ing, 148, 223, 224, 255.

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