1 Cor. 15: 22 supports traducianism. "In Adam (T (r 'Adàμ) all die." The article shows that Adam here, as in Gen. 1: 17, denotes Adam and Eve inclusive of the species. To "die in Adam" implies existence in Adam. The nonexistent cannot die. Merely metaphorical existence in Adam is non-existence. Merely physical existence in Adam without psychical, would allow of physical death in Adam, but not of spiritual. To die in Adam, both spiritually and physically, supposes existence in Adam both as to soul and body.

The same remark is true respecting Eph. 2:3: "We were by nature (púσe) children of wrath." Here the term púois denotes a real nature derived from foregoing ancestors; as in Gal. 2:15, ἡμεῖς φύσει Ἰουδαῖοι. And this nature is the whole nature of man, not a part of it. The apostle does not mean to teach that men are exposed to the divine displeasure, because of a sensuous and physical corruption which belongs to the body in distinction from the soul; but because of a corruption that is mental as well as physical.

The word uapтov in Rom. 5: 12 strongly supports the traducian view. The invariable usage in both the Old and New Testaments makes it an active verb. There is not a single instance of the alleged passive signification. Had the apostle meant to teach that all men were "regarded” as having sinned, he would not have said Távтes μaρтov, but πάντες ημαρτηκότες ήσαν, as in Gen. 44:32; 43:9. But if all "sinned" in Adam in the active sense of ημaρтov, all must have existed in him. Nonentity cannot sin; and merely physical substance cannot sin. Shedd: On Romans 5:12.

These Scripture texts support the traducian position, that the individual man is propagated as an entire whole consisting of soul and body, and contradict that of the creationist, that a part of him is propagated and a part is created. These Biblical data countenance the view, however difficult it may be to explain it, that man being a unity of body and

soul is begotten and born as such a unity. "To be the son of a woman," says Edwards (Against Watts's notion of the Pre-existence of Christ's Human Soul), " is to receive being in both soul and body, in consequence of a conception in her womb. The soul is the principal part of the man; and sonship implies derivation of the soul as well as the body, by conception. Not that the soul is a [material] part of the mother as the body is. Though the soul is no [material] part of the mother, and be immediately given by God, yet that hinders not its being derived by conception; it being consequent on it according to a law of nature. It is agreeable to a law of nature, that when a perfect human body is conceived in the womb of a woman, and properly nourished and increased, a human soul should come into being: and conception may as properly be the cause whence it is derived, as any other natural effects are derived from natural causes and antecedents. For it is the power of God which produces these effects, though it be according to an established law. The soul being so much the principal part of man, a derivation of the soul by conception is the chief thing implied in a man's being the son of a woman." In saying that the soul is "no part of the mother as the body is;" that it is "immediately given by God;" and yet that this "does not hinder its derivation by conception," Edwards evidently means that the soul is not physical substance like the body, and has a psychical in distinction from physical derivation or generation that is peculiar to itself.

Samuel Hopkins (Works, I. 289) follows Edwards, in saying that "the mother, according to a law of nature, conceives both the soul and body of her son; she does as much towards the one as towards the other, and is equally the instrumental cause of both." Says Nitzsch: "That the individual dispositions of the soul are propagated by generation, will scarcely be disputed.' Why not their generic

Compare, As you Like It, I. i. "I know you are my elder brother: the courtesy of nations allows you my better, in that you are the first born: but the

dispositions also? Hence, we cannot but maintain the doctrine of derivation, together with creation." Christian Doctrine, § 107. Weiss (Theology of the New Testament, § 67) explains St. Paul as teaching that "the soul is begotten.'

The few texts that are quoted in favor of creationism are as easily applicable to traducianism. Isa. 57:16, "The souls which I have made." The context does not imply a distinction of the soul from the body. On the contrary, "soul" here is put for the whole person. Traducianism equally with creationism holds that God is the maker of the soul. The body, certainly, is propagated, yet God is its maker. Augustine (On the Soul, xvii.) remarks that God may as properly be said to "make" or "create" in the instance of the propagation of the soul, as in that of its individual creation. "Victor wishes the passage, 'Who giveth breath to the people,' to be taken to mean that God creates souls not by propagation, but by insufflation of new souls in every case. Let him, then, boldly maintain, on this principle, that God is not the creator of our body, on the ground that it is derived from our parents; and that because corn springs from corn, and grass from grass, therefore God is not the maker of each, and does not give each a body as it hath pleased him."

Zechariah 12:1, God "formeth the spirit of man in him." The verb (7) in this place favors the traduction of the soul. See Lewis's Note, in Lange's Genesis, p. 164. Job 33: 4, "The spirit of God hath made me, and the breath of the Almighty hath given me life." This is true also from the traducian position. Numbers 16: 22, "The God of the spirits of all flesh." The context shows that "spirit," here, is put for the whole man: "Shall one man sin, and thou be wroth with the whole congregation." Heb. 12:9,"Father of spirits." The antithesis is not between the body and soul of man, but between man and

same tradition takes not away my blood, were there twenty brothers betwixt us: I have as much of my father in me as you."

spirits generally. If we are subject to our earthly fathers, ought we not to be subject to the universal Father? See page 24. John 5:17, "My father worketh hitherto." God works perpetually in preservation and providence. Another explanation, favored by the context, refers the statement to the exertion of miraculous power. Christ asserts that he works miracles, like his Father.

2. Secondly, the theological argument strongly favors traducianism. (a) The imputation of the first sin of Adam to all his posterity as a culpable act, is best explained and defended upon the traducian basis. The Augustinian and Calvinistic anthropologies affirm that the act by which sin came into the world of mankind was a self-determined and guilty act, and that it is justly chargeable upon every individual man equally and alike. But this requires that the posterity of Adam and Eve should, in some way or other, participate in it. Participation is the ground of merited imputation; though not of unmerited or gratuitous imputation. Shedd: On Romans 4:3, 8. The posterity could not participate in the first sin in the form of individuals, and hence they must have participated in it in the form of a race. This supposes that the race-form is prior to the individual form; that man first exists as a race or species, and in this mode of existence commits a single and common sin. The individual, now a separate and distinct unit, was once a part of a greater whole. The Westminster Shorter Catechism, 16, asserts the commission of a common sin, in the following terms: "All mankind, descending from Adam by ordinary generation, sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression." The term "mankind" denotes here the human nature before it was individualized by propagation. This nature sinned. Human nature existing primarily as a unity in Adam and Eve, and this same human nature as subsequently distributed and metamorphosed into the millions of individual men, are two modes of the same thing.

Again, that a participation of some kind or other in the first sin is postulated in the Westminster formula, is proved by the fact that the first sin is called "a transgression." "Every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, doth bring guilt upon the sinner." Confession, VI. vi. This agrees with Rom. 5:15; where the first sin of Adam is denominated παράπτωμα. But a transgression supposes a transgressor; and the transgressor in this instance must be the "all" who "sinned," spoken of in Rom. 5:12; and who are the "mankind descending by ordinary generation "—that is to say, the human nature existing in Adam and subsequently individualized by propagation. Anselm (De conceptu virginali, X.) reasons as follows: "Each and every child of Adam is man by propagation, and a person by that individuation whereby he is distinguished from others. He is not responsible for original sin because he is man, or because he is a person. For if this were so, it would follow that Adam would have been responsible for original sin before he sinned, because he was both man and a person prior to sin. It remains, therefore, that each and every child of Adam is responsible for original sin because he is Adam. Yet not merely and simply because he is Adam, but because he is fallen Adam." Anselm, here, uses "Adam" to designate the "human nature" created in Adam and Eve.

The doctrine of the specific unity of Adam and his posterity removes the great difficulties connected with the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, that arise from the injustice of punishing a person for a sin in which he had no kind of participation. This is the Gordian knot in the dogma. Here the standing objections cluster. But if whatever is predicable of Adam as an individual is also predicable of his posterity, and in precisely the same way that it is of Adam, the knot is not cut but untied. No one denies 1. That the individual Adam committed the first sin prior to its imputation to him, and that it was right