catio naturaram in persona Christi est mutua divinae et humanae Christi naturae participatio, per quam natura divina TOû Дoyóυ particeps facta humanae naturae, hanc permeat, perficit, inhabitat, sibique appropriat ; humana vero particeps facta divinae naturae, ab hac permeatur, perficitur et inhabitatur," Hase: Hutterus, p. 234. According to this Lutheran definition, the "communication of idioms," or of properties, means far more than the Reformed divines meant by it. The latter intended by it only the communication of the properties of both natures to the person constituted of them. In the Lutheran use, it denotes the communication of the properties of one nature to the other nature. It is thus the communication of a nature to a nature, rather than of properties to a person.' Similarly, Hahn (Hase: Hutterus, p. 238) says: "Genus majestaticum continet propositiones quibus de natura humana idiomata naturae divinae praedicantur." Gerhard (Loci IV. xii.) says: "We teach that the [human] soul of Jesus in the very first moment of the incarnation was personally enriched, as with other excellences, so also with the proper omniscience of the Logos, through, and in virtue of, the intimate union and communion with the Logos. But as he did not always use his other excellences in the state of exinanition, so also the omniscience personally communicated to him he did not always exercise." Quoted by Bruce: Humiliation of Christ, p.

143.

The principal motive for the Lutheran tenet of the ubiquity of Christ's humanity is, to explain the presence of the entire Christ. The God-man promises to be with his disciples upon earth, "alway, even unto the end of the world," Matt. 28: 20. The Reformed explanation is, by the conjunction and union of the limited and local humanity with the illocal and omnipresent divinity. "Presence by way of conjunction is in some sort presence," says Hooker (V. lv.). The divine

1 Dorner so understands it. "The Reformed disown the communication of essence, of the Lutherans." Christian Doctrine, § 93, 95.

nature of Christ is present with his human nature wherever the latter may be, though his human nature is not, as the Lutheran contends, present with his divine nature wherever the latter may be. But this continual presence of the deity with the humanity is equivalent to the presence of the humanity with the deity. The humanity is in effect ubiquitous, because of its personal connection with an omnipresent nature, and not because it is in itself so immense as to be ubiquitous. Christ's deity never is present anywhere in isolation and separation from his humanity, but always as united with and modified by his humanity. But in order to this union and modification, it is not necessary that his humanity should be locally present wherever his deity is. Distance in space is no bar to the personal union between the Logos and his human nature. Suppose, for illustration, the presence of the divine nature of Christ in the soul of a believer while partaking of the sacrament in London. This divine nature is at the same moment conjoined with, and present to, and modified by the human nature of Christ which is in heaven, and not in London. This conjunction between both is equivalent to the presence of both. The whole Christ is present in this London believer's soul, because, though the human nature is in heaven and not in London, it is yet personally united with the divine nature which is both in heaven and in London. There is no separation between the two natures; so that whatever influence or effect the divine nature exerts in the believer's soul as he receives the sacrament is a divine-human influence-an influence proceeding from the union of the divine with the human in Jesus Christ.

The union of the two natures in Christ's person is denominated hypostatical, that is personal. The two natures, or substances (ovoía), constitute one personal subsistence (ÚTTÓσTaσis). A common illustration employed by the Chalcedon and later fathers is, the union of the human soul and body in one person, and the union of heat and iron,

neither of which loses its own properties. Formula Concordiae, Hase: Libri Symbolici, p. 765.

The doctrine of the two natures implies the doctrine of two wills in Christ. Either nature would be incomplete and defective, without the voluntary quality or property in it. Each nature, in order to be whole and entire, must have all of its essential elements. A human nature without voluntariness would be as defective as it would be without rationality.

The Monothelite party regarded the two natures as having only one theanthropic will between them: μία θεανδρίκη evapyeîa. From the union of the two natures there resulted a will that was not divine solely, nor human solely, but divine-human. The Monothelite contention was, that "the one Christ works that which is divine, and that which is human, by one divine-human mode of agency." Neander: History, III. 177. This was in reality a conversion of the two natures, so far as the voluntary property in the nature is concerned, into a third species which is neither divine nor human. It was thus a modified Eutychianism.

In opposition to this error, the catholic theologians asserted two wills in order to the completeness of each nature, and met the objection of the Monothelites that there must then be two persons, by affirming that by reason of the intimate personal union of the two natures neither will works without the other's participation in the efficiency. If the human will acts, the divine will submits and co-acts. This is the humiliation of the divine. If the divine will acts, the human will submits and co-acts. This is the exaltation of the human. One and the same Christ, therefore, performs the divine or the human action, as the case may be, although each action is wrought in accordance with the distinctive qualities of the will that corresponds with it, and takes the lead in it. Moreover, as the human will in Christ was sinless, there was no antagonism between it and the will of the Logos. This is taught in the words, "Nevertheless,

not my will, but thine be done," Luke 22: 42. Thus, in any agency of the God-man, although there are two wills concerned in it, a divine and a human, there is but one resulting action. Two wills are not incompatible with a single selfconsciousness, even when they are not hypostatically united in one person. The divine will works in the regenerate will "to will and to do," and yet there is not duality in the self-consciousness of the regenerate man.

We have already observed, that the personalizing of the human nature by its union with the Logos is seen in the fact, that the activities of the human nature appear as factors in the single self-consciousness of the God-man. He is conscious of finite inclination, and finite volitions; this proves that there is voluntariness in the human nature that has been individualized. He is conscious also of finite and limited perceptions, judgments, and conclusions; this proves that there is rationality in the human nature that has been individualized. These two elements or properties of human nature, the rational and the voluntary, are no longer dormant, as they are in all non-individualized human nature, but are active and effective in the one self-conscious person Jesus Christ. And one of them is as necessary as the other, to the wholeness and completeness of the human nature. To omit the will from the humanity, is as truly an error as to omit the reason; and therefore the Monothelites deviated from the true doctrine as really as did the Apollinarians.

CHAPTER V.

CHRIST'S IMPECCABILITY.

THE doctrine of Christ's person is not complete without considering the subject of his impeccability. That he was sinless is generally acknowledged.' But the holiness of the God-man is more than sinlessness. The last Adam differs from the first Adam, by reason of his impeccability. He was characterized not only by the posse non peccare, but the non posse peccare. He was not only able to overcome temptation, but he was unable to be overcome by it.

An impeccable will is one that is so mighty in its selfdetermination to good that it cannot be conquered by any temptation to evil, however great. A will may be positively holy and able to overcome temptation, and yet not be so omnipotent in its holy energy that it cannot be overcome. The angels who fell could have repelled temptation with that degree of power given them by creation, and so might Adam. But in neither case was it infallibly certain that they would repel it. Though they were holy, they were not impeccable. Their will could be overcome, because it was not omnipotent, and their perseverance was left to themselves and not made sure by extraordinary grace. The case of Jesus Christ, the second Adam, was different, in that he was not only able to resist temptation, but it was infallibly certain that he would resist it. The holy energy

1 Neander: Life of Christ, p. 77 sq. Ed. Bohn. Jeremy Taylor: Life of Christ, Sect. iii. Ullmann: Sinlessness of Jesus, III. i. ii. Trench: Studies in the Gospels (The Temptation). Ullmann is profound and thoughtful upon Christ's sinlessness, but deficient on the subject of his impeccability. Edwards (Will, III ii.) asserts Christ's impeccability.