1369] JUNE 5, 1811-Parliamentary Reform. Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Fox; by petitions from several counties, and by repeated declara tions from the city of London. In appealing to the avowed opinions of men of established reputation, or of distinguished rank in their country, we do not mean to strengthen the reason, or enforce the necessity of the measure we propose, so much as to obviate all personal imputations, which the enemies of the cause will be ready to throw upon those who support it. It is not that, on our own account, we dread the effect, or regard the impression, which such imputations may produce; but we think it material to the credit and success of our proceedings, to shew that we are not aiming at reforms unthought of by wise and virtuous men : that our opinions neither possess the advantage, nor are liable to the objection of novelty; and that we cannot be accused or suspected of factious purposes or dangerous designs, without extending the same accusation or suspicion to the motives of men whose situation and property, independent of their character, principles, and abilities, have given them a most important stake in the peace and good government of the kingdom. (1390 that it is our duty to wait for the return of The example and situation of another Convinced by our own reflections, by experience, and by authority, that the thing we propose to do is fit to be done, we have, with equal deliberation, weighed the reasons that may recommend or be objected to the present time, as the most or least proper for bringing it forward. On this point, we have no address to make to the determined enemies of a reform of every kind. Their objection, whether valid or not, is to the substance of the measure, and cannot be abated by circumstances. To those who concur generally in the principle, but who may be inclined, by particular reasons, to defer the attempt, we seriously wish to submit the following considerations:-That admitting this to be a season of general tranquillity in the country, it is, on that account, the more proper for temperate reflection and prudent exertions, to actions of such men complish any necessary improvement; it is the time when practical measures for that purpose are most likely to be adopted with discretion, and pursued with moderation. If we are persuaded to wait for other times, of a different complexion, for times of public complaint, or general discontent, we shall then be told, that general remedies are not fit to be proposed in the moment of particular disorder, and * Lord Bacon. But "That time is the greatest innovator; and if time, of course, alter things for the worse, and if wisdom and counsel shal not alter them for the better, what shall be the end?" inseparable from such convulsions. If there be, as it is said, in any part of this kingdom, a disposition to promote confufusion, or even to arrive at improvement by unconstitutional and irregular courses, we hold ourselves as strictly pledged to resist that disposition, wherever it may appear, as to pursue our objects by unexceptionable methods. If, on the contrary, it be true that the mass of the people are satisfied with the present state of By the reform proposed by Lord Chatham*, he declared in the House of Lords, that he meant to infuse a portion of new health into the constitution. The Duke of Richmond has declared, that "his reasons, in favour of a parliamentary reform were formed on the experience of twenty-things, or indifferent about it; if they apsix years; which, whether in or out of government, had equally convinced him, that the restoration of a genuine House of Commons, by a renovation of the rights of the people, was the only remedy against that system of corruption which had brought the nation to disgrace and poverty, and threatened it with the loss of liberty." Other authorities in favour of a parliamentary reform, as direct and explicit as these, might be quoted in abundance. The public is possessed of them. We rather wish to encounter, because we are sure we can efface, in every rational mind, the impression, which may have been made by a view of those events which have attended a total change in the constitution of France. We deny the existence of any resemblance whatever between the cases of the two kingdoms; and we utterly disclaim the necessity of resorting to similar remedies.-We do not believe that, at this day, an absolute avowed despotism in the hands of the executive power, would be endured in this country. But who can say to what conclusion the silent unresisted operation of abuses, incessantly acting, and constantly increasing, may lead us hereafter! what habits it may gradually create! What power it may finally establish! The abuses in the government of France were suffered to gather and accumulate, until nothing but an eruption could put an end to them. The discontent of the people was converted into despair. Preventive remedies were either not thought of in time, or were not proposed umil it was too late to apply them with effect. The subversion of the ancient government ensued. The inference from this compari: son is at once so powerful and so obvious, that we know not by what argument to illustrate or enforce it. We mean to avert for ever from our country the calamities Jan. 22, 1770. † Jan. 17, 1783. prove of the representation as it stands, the form of election, and the duration of, the trust; or if, condemning these things, they are determined, from indolence or despair, not to attempt to correct them,— then indeed the efforts of individuals may be ineffectual, but they cannot be injurious to the peace of the community. If the spirit of the constitution be dead in the hearts of the people, no human industry can revive it.-To affirm that extensive mischief may be done by a statement of facts or arguments which make no general, impression on the public mind, is a proposition that contradicts itself, and requires no other refutation. We trust it will be proved by experiment, that these inconsistent assertions are equally unfounded, and that the people of this country are no more disposed to submit to abuses without complaint, than to look for redress in any proceedings repugnant to the laws, or unwarranted by the constitution. Between anarchy and despotism, speaking for ourselves, we have no choice to make; we have no preference to give. We neither admit the necessity, nor can we endure the idea of resorting to either of these extremities as a refuge from the other. The course we are determined to pursue, is equally distant from both. Finally, we assert, that it must be blindness not to see, and treachery not to acknowledge, That "the instruments of power are not perhaps so open and avowed as they formerly were, and therefore are the less liable to jealous and invidious reflections; but they are not the weaker upon that account. In short, our national debts and taxes have, in their natural consequences, thrown such a weight of power into the executive scale of government, as we cannot think was intended by our patriot ancestors, who gloriously struggled for * Blackstone. the abolition of the then formidable parts | of the prerogative, and by an unaccountable want of foresight, established this system in their stead." Our general object is to recover and preserve the true balance of the constitution. These are the principles of our Association, and on our steady adherence to them, we look with just confidence to the approbation and support of the people in the prosecution of our object. A measure, so likely to be opposed by the united strength of various interests, can never succeed but by the declared and hearty concurrence of the nation. Resolved unanimously, That a motion be made in the House of Commons, at an early period in the next session of parliament, for introducing a Parliamentary Reform. Authentic Copy of a Petition praying for a Reform in Parliament, presented to the House of Commons by Charles Grey, · Esq. on Monday, 6th May, 1793; and signed only by the Members of the Society of the Friends of the People, associated for the Purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform. To the Honourable the Commons of Great Britain in Parliament assembled. Sheweth, That by the form and spirit of the British constitution, the king is vested with the sole executive power. That the House of Lords consists of lords spiritual and temporal, deriving their titles and consequence either from the crown, or from hereditary privileges. That these two powers, if they acted without controul, would form either a despotic monarchy, or a dangerous oli garchy. That the wisdom of our ancestors hath contrived, that these authorities may be rendered not only harmless, but beneficial, and be exercised for the security and happiness of the people. That this security and happiness are to be looked for in the introduction of a third estate, distinct from, and a check upon the other two branches of the legis lature; created by, representing, and responsible to the people themselves. That so much depending upon the preservation of this third estate, in such its constitutional purity and strength, your Petitioners are reasonably jealous of what ever may appear to vitiate the one, or to impair the other. That at the present day the House of Commons does not fully and fairly represent the people of England, which, consistently with what your Petitioners conceive to be the principles of the constitution, they consider as a grievance, and therefore, with all becoming respect, lay their complaints before your honourable House. That though the terms in which your petitioners state their grievance may be looked upon as strong, yet your honourable House is intreated to believe that no expression is made use of for the purpose of offence. Your Petitioners in affirming that your honourable House is not an adequate representation of the people of England, do but state a fact, which, if the word "Representation" be accepted in its fair and obvious sense, they are ready to prove, and which they think detrimental to their interests, and contrary to the spirit of the constitution. How far this inadequate representation is prejudicial to their interests, your Petitioners apprehend they may be allowed to decide for themselves; but how far it is contrary to the spirit of the constitution, they refer to the consideration of your honourable House. If your honourable House shall be pleased to determine that the people of England ought not to be fully represented, your petitioners pray that such your determination may be made known, to the end that the people may be apprized of their real situation; but if your honourable House shall conceive that the people are already fully represented, then your petitioners beg leave to call your attention to the following facts: Your Petitioners complain, that the num ber of representatives assigned to the different counties is grossly disproportioned to their comparative extent, population, and trade. Your Petitioners complain, that the elective franchise is so partially and unequally distributed, and is in so many instances committed to bodies of men of such very limited numbers, that the ma jority of your honourable House is elected by less than fifteen thousand electors, which, even if the male adults in the kingdom be estimated at so low a number as three millious, is not more than the two hundredth part of the people to be represented. Your Petitioners complain, that the right of voting is regulated by no uniform or rational principle. -Your Petitioners complain, that the exercise of the elective franchise is only renewed once in seven years. Your Petitioners thus distinctly state the subject matter of their complaints, that your honourable House may be convinced that they are acting from no spirit of general discontent, and that you may with the more ease be enabled to enquire into the facts, and to apply the remedy. none of which the number of voters exceeds fifty. And this your Petitioners are ready to prove. They affirm, that in addition to the hundred and sixty so elected, thirty-seven more of your honourable members are elected by nineteen places, in none of which the number of voters exceeds one hundred. And this your Petitioners are ready to prove. They affirm, that in addition to the hundred and ninety-seven honourable members so chosen, fifty-two more are returned to serve in parliament, by twentysix places, in none of which the number of voters exceeds two hundred. And this your Petitioners are ready to prove. They afirm, that in addition to the two hundred and forty-nine so elected, twenty more are returned to serve in parliament for counties in Scotland by less than one hundred electors each, and ten for counties in Scotland by less than two hundred and fifty each. And this your Petitioners are ready to prove, even admitting the validity of fictitious votes. They affirm, that in addition to the two hundred and seventy-nine so elected, thirteen districts of burghs in Scotland, not containing one hundred voters each, and two districts of burghs, not containing one hundred and twenty-five each, return For the evidence in support of the first complaint, your Petitioners refer to the return book of your honourable House. Is it fitting, that Rutland and Yorkshire should bear an equal rank in the scale of county representation; or can it be right, that Cornwall alone should, by its extravagant proportion of Borough members, outnumber not only the respresentatives of Yorkshire and Rutland together, but of Middlesex added to them? Or, if a distinction be taken between the landed and the trading interests, must it not ap-fifteen more honourable members. And pear monstrous that Cornwall and Wiltshire should send more borough members to parliament, than Yorkshire, Lancashire, Warwickshire, Middlesex, Worcestershire and Somersetshire united? and that the total representation of all Scotland should but exceed by one member, the number returned for a single county in England? The second complaint of your Petitioners is founded on the unequal proportions in which the elective franchise is distributed, and in support of it, They afirm, that seventy of your honourable members are returned by thirty five places, where the right of voting is vested in burgage and other tenures of a similar description, and in which it would be to trifle with the patience of your honourable House, to mention any number of voters whatever, the elections at the places alluded to being notoriously a mere matter of form. And this your Petitioners are ready to prove. - They affirm that in addition to the seventy honourable members so chosen, ninety more of your honourable members are elected by forty-six places, in this your Petitioners are ready to prove. And in this manner, according to the present state of the representation, two hundred and nine-four of your honourable members are chosen, and, being a majo rity of the entire House of Commons, are enabled to decide all questions in the name of the whole people of England and Scotland. The third complaint of your Petitioners is founded on the present complicated rights of voting. From the caprice with which they have been varied, and the ob scurity in which they have become involved by time and contradictory deci sions, they are become a source of infinite confusion, litigation, and expence, Your Petitioners need not tender any evidence of the inconveniences which arise from this defect in the representation, because the proof is to be found in your journals, and the minutes of the different committees who have been appointed un der the 10th and 11th of the king. Your honourable House is but too well acquainted with the tedious, intricate, and expensive scenes of litigation which have been brought before you, in attempting to settle the legal import of those numerous distinctions which perplex and confound the present rights of voting. How many months of your valuable time have been wasted in listening to the wrangling of lawyers upon the various species of burgagehold, leasehold, and freehold! How many committees have been occupied in investigating the nature of scot and lot, pot wallers, commonalty, populacy, resiant inhabitants, and inhabitants at large! What labour and research have been employed in endeavouring to ascertain the legal claims of borough-men, aldermen, port men, select men, burgesses, and council-men! And what confusion has arisen from the complicated operation of clashing charters, from freemen resident and non resident, and from the different modes of obtaining the freedom of corporations by birth, by servitude, by marriage, by redemption, by election, and by purchase! On all these points it is however needless for your Petitioners to enlarge, when your honourable House recollects the following facts; namely, that since the twenty-second of December 1790, no less than twenty-one committees have been employed in deciding upon litigated rights of voting. Of these, eight were occupied with the disputes of three boroughs, and there are petitions from four places yet remaining before your honourable House, waiting for a final decision to inform the electors what their rights really are. But the complaint of your Petitioners on the subject of the want of an uniform and equitable principle in regulating the right of voting, extends as well to the arbitrary manner in which some are excluded, as to the intricate qualifications by which others are admitted to the exercise of that privilege. Religious opinious create an incapacity to vote. All Papists are excluded gene rally, and, by the operation of the test laws, Protestant Dissenters are deprived of a voice in the election of representatives in about thirty boroughs, where the right of voting is confined to corporate officers alone; a deprivation the more unjustifiable, because, though considered as unworthy to vote, they are deemed capable of being elected, and may be the representatives of the very places for which they are disqualified from being the electors. per annum, or any other sum, arising from copyhold, leasehold for ninety-nine years, trade, property in the public funds, or even freehold in the city of London, and many other cities and towns having peculiar jurisdictions, is not thereby intitled to vote. Here again a strange distinction is taken between electing and representing, as a copyhold is a sufficient qualification to sit in your honourable House. A man paying taxes to any amount, how great soever, for his domestic establishment, does not thereby obtain a right to vote, unless his residence be in some borough where that right is vested in the inhabitants. This exception operates in sixty places, of which twenty-eight do not contain three hundred voters each, and the number of householders in England and Wales (exclusive of Scotland), who pay all taxes, is 714,911, and of householders who pay all taxes, but the house and window taxes, is 284,459, as appears by a return made to your honourable House in 1785; so that even supposing the sixty places above mentioned to contain, one with another, one thousand voters in each, there will remain 939,370 householders who have no voice in the representation, unless they have obtained it by accident or by purchase. Neither their contributions to the public burdens, their peaceable demeanor as good subjects, nor their general respectability and merits as useful citizens, afford them, as the law now stands, the smallest pretensions to participate in the choice of those, who, under the name of their representatives, may dispose of their fortunes and liberties. In Scotland, the grievance arising from the nature of the rights of voting, has a different and still more intolerable operation. In that great and populous division of the kingdom, not only the great mass of the householders, but of the landholders also, are excluded from all participation in the choice of representatives. By the remains of the feudal system in the counties, the vote is severed from the land, and attached to what is called the superiority. In other words it is taken from the substance, and transferred to the shadow, because, though each of these superiorities must, with very few exceptions, arise from lands of the present, annual value of four hundred pounds sterling, yet it is not necessary that the lands should do no more than give a name to the superiority, the possessor of which |