« ForrigeFortsett »
Opinion of the Court.
license, or any regulation which would impede them "in the performance of their duties, as required by this act." The "steamer piloted as herein provided" was the steamer required to be so piloted, and it was upon such steamer that no pilot charges were to be levied by state authority. The same construction must be given to these provisions as reënacted in § 4444 of the Revised Statutes, where the words "piloted as provided by this Title" take the place of the words "piloted as herein provided." The Federal requirement as to port pilotage of coastwise sea-going steam vessels was applicable only to those "not sailing under register;" as to those which sailed under register, there were no port pilots provided for, and the regulation of pilotage in the case of such vessels entering and leaving the state ports was left to the States. The fact that a vessel of this sort had on board a pilot holding a Federal license when the services of such a pilot were not required by the Federal law, did not oust the State of the power to compel the use of a state pilot.
Nor was the proviso in § 51 of the act of 1871 (now the last sentence of R. S. § 4444) a restriction of this state authority. This proviso was as follows:
"Provided, however, That nothing in this act shall be construed to annul or affect any regulation established by the laws of any State requiring vessels entering or leaving a port in any such State, other than coastwise steamvessels, to take a pilot duly licensed, or authorized by the laws of such State, or of a State situate upon the waters of such State."
Manifestly, this did not enlarge the scope of the requirement as to Federal pilotage contained in the preceding portion of the section. The words "other than coastwise steam-vessels" did not mean that the State could not require port pilots for coastwise sea-going steam vessels sailing under register. For this would be to impute to Congress the intent to withdraw from the State the power to
act in the cases omitted from the Federal regulation. Even on the construction of the statute for which the appellees contend, it is conceded that "a coastwise steam vessel sailing under register which is not piloted by a federal pilot may be compelled by the State to take a State pilot when entering or leaving port." And, if in any case the vessel might be forced to take a pilot under the state law, it would necessarily follow that it is not excluded by the proviso from the operation of that law. The natural interpretation of the proviso is that it was intended to prevent misapprehension as to interference with local rules to declare the continued efficacy of those rules when not in conflict with the Federal authority-and not to introduce an independent limitation of state power over port pilotage with respect to registered steam vessels, where the Federal control had not been asserted. The enacting clause and the proviso are to be read together "with a view to carry into effect the whole purpose of the law." White v. United States, 191 U. S. 545, 551. So read, the words "other than coastwise steam-vessels" must be deemed to refer to those "not sailing under register," to which the requirement of Federal pilots applied. The same meaning must be ascribed to this clause. as it now appears in § 4444 of the Revised Statutes, taken as it must be in connection with § 4401.
The statute was thus construed in Murray v. Clark (1874), 4 Daly, 468, affirmed, 58 N. Y. 684, where a steamer sailing under register between New York and New Orleans, and touching at a foreign port'as was her privilege, was held to be subject to the law of the State of New York as to pilotage in entering the port of New York, although at the time she was under the control of her master who was a pilot licensed by the Federal inspectors. In Joslyn v. Nickerson (1880), 1 Fed. Rep. 133, while it was held that a libel for pilotage could not be sustained, for the reason that the law of Massachusetts,
Opinion of the Court.
in question, was not by its terms applicable, Judge Lowell said (page 135): "This statute" (referring to the Federal act of 1866) "has been modified, and the employment of such a pilot is now compulsory only upon -coasting steam vessels not sailing under a register. Rev. St., § 4401; Murray v. Clark, 4 Daly, 468, affirmed, 58 N. Y. 684. This vessel, therefore, was not bound to carry such a pilot, and was bound by any law of Massachusetts which might require her to take a local pilot. Rev. St., § 4444." In Spraigue v. Thompson, 118 U. S. 90, 96, where a claim for pilotage under the law of Georgia was disallowed, the steamer "was a coastwise sea-going steam vessel," and 'was not sailing under register." In Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U. S. 392, 394, after quoting from §§ 4401 and 4444 of the Revised Statutes, the court said: "The general object of these provisions seems to be to license pilots upon steam vessels engaged in the coastwise or interior commerce of the country, and at the same time, to leave to the States the regulation of pilots upon all vessels engaged in foreign commerce." There, the steamer was enrolled and licensed for the coasting trade under the laws of the United States and was engaged in trade between Porto Rico and New York after the treaty of cession. It was held that she was not within the pilotage laws of New York.
The provisions of the Political Code of the State of California, set forth in the certificate, do not apply to coastwise sea-going steam vessels "not sailing under register" and are not in conflict with the statutes of the United States. Their enforcement is simply a recognition of the limits which Congress has thus far set to the exercise of the unquestioned Federal power. The criterion is not whether the stops of registered vessels at foreign ports may be deemed en route between domestic ports, and is not to be found in the length of such stops or in the relative amount of foreign trade. The statute made the dis
tinction, in the light of the well-known conditions of trade which existed at the time of its enactment, between coastwise sea-going steam vessels, not sailing under register, and those which did sail under register. Whether or not it is wise to establish Federal rules as to port pilotage for the registered vessels exempted from this regulation is a question for Congress to determine.
We conclude that each one of the questions certified should be answered in the negative.
It is so ordered.
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND GUARANTY COMPANY v. BRAY.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.
No. 111. Argued December 15, 1911.-Decided May 27, 1912.
Section 7 of the Court of Appeals Act of 1891, as amended April 14, 1906, 34 Stat. 116, c. 2627 provides for an appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals from certain interlocutory decrees of the Circuit Court, and in this respect establishes an exception to the general rule in Federal courts that an appeal lies only from a final decree. Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is invoked not solely on the ground of diverse citizenship but also because the case is one arising under an act of Congress, an appeal lies from the Circuit Court of Appeals to this court, and by § 6 of the Act of 1891 the time within which to take the appeal is one year; the limitation of thirty days under §7 applies only to appeals to the Circuit Court of Appeals from the Circuit Court.
A distinct purpose of the Bankruptcy Act is to subject the administration of estates of bankrupts to the control of tribunals having authority and charged with the duty of proceeding to final settlement and distribution in a summary way, as are bankruptcy courts. Under the Bankruptcy Act, the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court in all proceedings in bankruptcy is intended to be exclusive of all other courts; such proceedings include matters of administration, such as allowance and rejection of claims, reduction of the estate.
to money and its distribution, preferences and priorities to be accorded to claims and supervision and control of the trustee. The Circuit Court cannot entertain a bill in equity which invokes a reconsideration of the referee's order allowing claims as preferred and of determinations of the bankruptcy court as to rights of holders of claims and as to charges that the trustee was speculating in claims; those matters are for the bankruptcy court and fall within its exclusive jurisdiction; nor can it surrender its control thereover or confide them to another tribunal.
A bill in equity attempting to seek an adjudication on matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court cannot be sustained as to matters dependent upon the principal matters alleged and which could not have been made the subject of a separate bill within the jurisdiction of that Circuit Court.
170 Fed. Rep. 689, affirmed.
THE facts, which involve the distribution of funds in the hands of a trustee in bankruptcy of a government contractor, are stated in the opinion.
Mr. B. M. Ambler, with whom Mr. W. W. Van Winkle and Mr. M. G. Ambler were on the brief, for appellant.
Mr. V. B. Archer and Mr. William M. Hall, with whom Mr. J. A. Dupuy and Mr. L. T. Michener were on the brief, for appellees.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the court.
This appeal brings up for review a decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversing a decree of the Circuit Court for the Northern District of West Virginia in a suit in equity which was intended, inter alia, to affect a fund of $26,000 in the hands of the trustee of a bankrupt's estate then in the course of administration in the District Court of that district. The decree reversed was an interlocutory one granting an injunction, but the decree of reversal was final, for it directed not only dissolution of the injunction but also the dismissal of the bill.
The complainant, the United States Fidelity and