« ForrigeFortsett »
an inmate of or connected with the management of a house of prostitution or practicing prostitution after such alien shall have entered the United States, or who shall receive, share in, or derive benefit from any part of the earnings of any prostitute; or who is employed by, in, or in connection with any house of prostitution or music or dance hall or other place of amusement or resort habitually frequented by prostitutes, or wherę prostitutes gather, or who in any way assists, protects, or promises to protect from arrest any prostitute, shall be deemed to be unlawfully within the United States and shall be deported in the manner provided by sections twenty and twentyone of this Act. Section 20 provides that any alien who enters the United States in violation of law, etc., shall, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, be deported to the country whence he came within three years after his entry into the United States. Section 21 provides that the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, upon being satisfied that an alien is found in the United States in violation of the act or is subject to deportation under the act or any law of the United States, shall cause such alien to be taken into custody and returned to the country whence he came within three years after landing or entry in the United States. The act also provides for a hearing before an inspector or commissioner under rules prescribed by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The inspector or commissioner reports his conclusions and the testimony on which they are based to the Secretary, who, after examination, may order a release or deportation, as in his judgment the case may warrant. Under this statute the Secretary of Commerce and Labor has provided certain instructions and rules, some of which will be hereinafter noticed.
That Congress may pass laws forbidding aliens or classes of aliens from coming within the United States and may provide for the expulsion of aliens or classes of aliens from
Opinion of the Court.
its territory, and may devolve upon the executive department or subordinate officials the right and duty of identifying and arresting such persons, is settled by previous decisions of this court. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, 237.
A series of decisions in this court has settled that such hearings before executive officers may be made conclusive when fairly conducted. In order to successfully attack by judicial proceedings the conclusions and orders made upon such hearings it must be shown that the proceedings were manifestly unfair, that the action of the executive officers was such as to prevent a fair investigation or that there was a manifest abuse of the discretion committed to them by the statute. In other cases the order of the executive officers within the authority of the statute is final. United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253; Chin You v. United States, 208 U. S. 8; Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673.
In the case of Yeung How v. North, 223 U. S. 705, decided at the present term, this court dismissed the appeal in a per curiam opinion. An examination of that case shows that it was in all respects like the case at bar, so far as the status of Yeung How, the person deported, is concerned, she being a Chinese woman who had married a Chinaman of American birth, except that the husband of Yeung How was dead, so that at the time of the deportation order she was the widow of an American citizen. An examination of the briefs in that case show that it was contended in behalf of the petitioner that the statute and procedure thereunder, the case being one of the deportation and not of the admission of an alien, deprived the petitioner of due process of law under the Constitution of the United States, inasmuch as there was no provision by which the petitioner could procure or compel the attendance of witnesses, and because the statute made no provision for the punishment of a witness giving false
testimony against the detained person, and because such alien, lawfully within this country could not be deported without a hearing of a judicial character. Notwithstanding these alleged infractions of constitutional right, this court dismissed the appeal.
In the case now under consideration, the proceedings and order for deportation were attacked by a writ of habeas corpus filed in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of California. The case was decided upon demurrer, and the question, therefore, arises whether, upon the allegations well pleaded, a case' was made for the discharge of the prisoner. The petition abounds in conclusions of law. We will examine such of the allegations advanced as a basis for the relief sought as state facts. The petitioner, Low Wah Suey, who instituted the proceedings in behalf of his wife, Li A. Sim, alleged that he was a resident of the city and county of San Francisco, California, born in the United States of parents regularly domiciled therein; that consequently he is a citizen of the United States and of the State of California; that he was married to Li A. Sim on the tenth of March, 1910, in Hong Kong, a British province, and that they have since been and were at the date of the filing of the petition husband and wife; that they entered the United States on the fifteenth of September, 1910; that the entry was lawful, and that until the commencement of proceedings for deportation they continuously lived and cohabited together as husband and wife; that they had a son, Low Sang, born to them on February 9, 1911, at their home in the State of California; and that both Low Wah Suey and Li A. Sim are citizens of the State of California. The arrest and hearing before the Commissioner of Immigration at the port of San Francisco are recited, as is the approval of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor and the warrant for deportation. It is further alleged that Li A. Sim was refused the right to be repre
Opinion of the Court
225 U. S.
sented by counsel during all stages of the preliminary proceedings, and was examined without the presence of her counsel and against her will by the immigration officer at the port of San Francisco, and before she had been advised of her right to counsel and before she was given an opportunity of securing bail, and that afterwards an examination was conducted by the immigration officer, acting under the orders of the Commissioner of Immigration, at which she was questioned by the immigration inspector against her will and without the presence of counsel, who was refused permission to be present, and that at certain stages of the proceedings she was refused the right to consult with counsel. This objection, in substance, is that under examination before the inspection officer at first she had no counsel. Such an examination is within the authority of the statute, and it is not denied that at subsequent stages of the proceedings and before the hearing was closed or the orders were made she had the assistance and advice of counsel.
It is next averred that the Secretary of Commerce and Labor and the Commissioner of Immigration refused to take the necessary steps to enforce the attendance of witnesses to testify on behalf of the petitioner, although it is said that the immigration officers did use their power to procure witnesses to testify against her; and that had such witnesses as she wished been produced, she says, upon information and belief, that the testimony in the record would have been such as to require a different order by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and sufficient to prevent the issuing of the order of deportation. The statute does not give authority to issue process to compel the attendance of witnesses. It does not appear from the record that any witnesses offered on behalf of the petitioner were not heard or that anything was done to prevent the production of such witnesses, and the nature and character of the proposed testimony offered is not set forth. This
Opinion of the Court.
objection was urged in the Yeung How v. North case, and the lack of power to compel witnesses by the immigration officer was alleged as depriving the appellant of due process of law. This court dismissed the case upon reference to other cases which indicate its view that no constitutional right was thereby taken from the petitioner. The former cases have sustained the right to provide for such hearing, and nothing was done to prevent the production of such witnesses as the petitioner might have seen fit to produce.
It is further alleged that the executive officer acted in bad faith and arbitrarily in receiving a report based on hearsay information, the name of the informer being withheld from Li A. Sim and no opportunity being given her to offset or disprove such hearsay evidence. The nature and character of this testimony is not set forth, and we have no means of knowing it was not such as might properly have been considered in such a hearing.
It is alleged that the rules of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor are arbitrary and illegal, particularly certain sections of Rule 35. From these rules, it appears, that, while provision is made for an examination in the absence of counsel, it is provided that a hearing shall be had at which the alien shall have full opportunity to show cause why he should not be deported, and that, at such stage of the proceedings as the person before whom the hearing is held shall deem proper, the alien shall be apprised that he may thereafter be represented by counsel, who shall be permitted to be present at the further conduct of the hearing, to inspect and make a copy of the record of the hearing so far as it has proceeded and to meet any evidence that theretofore has been or may thereafter be presented by the Government, and it is further provided that all the papers, including the minutes and any written argument submitted by counsel, together with the recommendations, upon the merits, of the examining officer and the officer in charge shall be forwarded to the Department as