Statement of the Case.

225 U.S.

ess of law, whether such preparation contain any poisonous or deleterious element or ingredient, to disclose the formulæ by which they are compounded, and the ingredients and proportions thereof, which embody valuable trade secrets; and that if the act is enforced against the complainant he will be deprived of his property contrary to the said Amendment.

That the statute also violates § 8 of Art. I of the Constitution of the United States as an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce in which the complainant is engaged.

That further, the statute is invalid under § 19 of Art. IV of the constitution of the State of Indiana in that the title does not express the requirement that manufacturers or dealers shall disclose the formulæ by which their products are manufactured or the ingredients or proportions.

That for many years the complainant's preparation has been offered for sale in packages of different sizes, holding respectively 24 ounces, 3 pounds, 6 pounds and 25 pounds; that under the terms of the statute the complainant would be required to pay the same amount of tax for a package of 24 ounces that other commodities and manufacturers thereof pay for a package of one hundred pounds; and that this discrimination is unreasonable and unconstitutional.

That the enforcement of the requirement as to the affixing of stamps and payment therefor is a tax upon the complainant's property and business, and is not a license fee determined by any reasonable requirement, or for the purpose of carrying out the inspection required, but, on the contrary, under the guise of a police regulation constitutes a measure for raising revenue for the general work and expense of the Indiana Agricultural Experiment Station. That the act is contrary to § 10 of Art. I of the Constitution of the United States, that no State shall without the consent of Congress lay any imposts or duties on imports,

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Argument for Appellant.

except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection law.

The bill prays that the defendant may be enjoined from taking any action against the complainant, interfering with his right to vend and convey his preparations in the State of Indiana, from instituting any proceedings to punish him for failure to comply with the defendant's demands, from giving out orally or in writing to the various prosecuting officers of the State, or to any other agents thereof charged with the enforcement of its law, or to the public, any threats of prosecution or information upon which prosecutions are requested, or may be based, and from otherwise seeking to prevent the conduct of the complainant's business in the State or to discredit the reputation of his remedy.

The defendant demurred to the bill upon the ground that it was wholly without equity, and that the court was without jurisdiction. Upon the former ground the bill was dismissed.

Mr. M. H. Boutelle for appellant:

Appellant is entitled to equitable relief. Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481.

The constitutional question presented establishes the right of direct appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court to this court. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58; Penn Ins. Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 694; Holder v. Aultman, 169 U. S. 88; Loeb v. Columbia Twp., 179 U. S. 472; Spreckels Sugar Ref. Co. v. McClain, 192 U. S. 397; Mississippi R. R. Comm. v. Ill. Cent. Ry., 203 U. S. 335.

Every question arising upon the record is open for consideration on the present appeal. Carey v. Hudson Ry. Co., 150 U. S. 181; Horner v. United States, 143 U. S. 576.

The Indiana statute constitutes an unlawful interference with and attempted regulation of interstate commerce. In so far as applicable to the subjects or commodities VOL. CCXXV-33

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Argument for Appellant.

of interstate commerce it is both regulatory and restrictive of that commerce. Its action and effect in this behalf is direct, as contradistinguished from indirect, in that by its terms it undertakes to impose as conditions precedent to the free and unrestricted enjoyment of the privileges of interstate commerce, the fulfillment of certain requirements. No State can impose conditions of this character. Vance v. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 438.

The power of the State is limited and measured by the constitutional inhibition against direct restriction or regulation of commerce amongst the several States. Robbins v. Shelby District, 120 U. S. 489; West v. Kansas Gas Co., 221 U. S. 229.

It is no answer to say that the attempted exercise of such powers is referable to considerations appertaining to local police regulation and that their validity is attested by this circumstance. As applied to interstate commerce, the question still remains, whether, in the attempted exercise of otherwise concededly valid powers, that commerce has been directly regulated or restricted. Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 254, 255; Atlantic Coast Line v. Wharton, 207 U. S. 328, 334; Walling v. Michigan, 116 U. S. 446; Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 214 U. S. 218;. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1.

While the act does not contain an express prohibition against importation and sale, prohibition is implied and its equivalent effected, by making compliance a condition to the right of importation and sale and visiting failure of compliance with criminal responsibility. If, under the guise of restricting the importation and sale of adulterated commodities, legislation may be adopted. restricting and limiting the right of importation and sale of all commodities and conditioning the exercise of that right upon such formalities as each State may see fit to impose, the results would be to bring within the police power any article of

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Argument for Appellant.

consumption that a State might wish to exclude. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545; Bowman v. Chicago Ry., 125 U. S. 465; Collins v. New Hampshire, 171 U. S. 30.

The law in question is not an inspection act. The inspection features are evasions and the law itself primarily a revenue measure. The general powers of the States, with respect to the adoption of inspection laws, is referable to Art. I, § 10 of the Constitution. As originally interpreted, the power thus indicated was confined to foreign, as contradistinguished from interstate, commerce. Turner v. Maryland, 107 U. S. 38 Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, and cases cited.

Inspection laws act upon the subject before it becomes an article of foreign commerce or commerce among the States and prepare it for that commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1; Bowman v. Chicago Ry., supra.

As to the right of the States to adopt inspection laws with respect to personal property imported from abroad or from another State, see Voight v. Wright, 141 U. S. 62; Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345; Pabst Brew. Co. v. Crenshaw, 198 U. S. 17.

Inspection which is virtually delegated to the foreign manufacturer who is required to file a verified analysis of his product, is not inspection at all. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 93, 99; Vance v. Vandercook, supra; and see dissenting opinion in Pabst Brew. Co. v. Crenshaw, supra.

In the ascertainment of the natural effect and intendment of the act this court is neither concluded by its selfstyled objects nor its local interpretation. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623; Railroad v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251.

The imposition of the tax must be rested upon the assumption that the act is a valid inspection act and the charge imposed with the bona fide purpose of defraying the cost of such inspection. Otherwise any such imposition

Argument for Appellee.

225 U.S.

falls under the inhibition against taxation of interstate commerce. Robbins v. Shelby District, supra; Postal Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64; Postal Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 192 U. S. 55; Atl. & Pac. Tel. Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160; McLain v. Denver Ry., 203 U. S. 38.

The act in question as applied to interstate commerce is superseded and annulled by the act of Congress of June 30, 1906, known as the Pure Food and Drug Act.

Where jurisdiction with respect to a subject-matter is vested in Congress by the Constitution, the laws of Congress, enacted in the exercise of the power thus delegated, constitute the supreme law of the land, and, of necessity, supersede and annul local legislation in the same field. Chicago Ry. v. United States, 219 U. S. 486; Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 255.

The exclusive power as respects the regulation of interstate commerce is vested in Congress and the delegation of this authority to the Federal Government excludes its exercise by the States. This result obtains even in the absence of direct or affirmative legislation by Congress. Bowman v. Chicago Ry., supra, and cases cited; Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S.

137.

Legislation of the character of that presented by the Indiana law, contravening as it does the provisions of the Federal enactment, must be held null and void.

Mr. Edwin Corr, with whom Mr. Thomas M. Honan, Attorney General of the State of Indiana, was on the brief, for appellee:

Appellant shows by his bill that he cannot be injured, except incidentally, by the operation of this law. It must appear that the law operates upon him or his property directly and not incidentally. Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U. S. 534; Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 160; Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 419.