225 U. S. Argument for Appellee. The class to whom protection is guaranteed by that provision of the Constitution giving Congress the right to regulate commerce among the several States, is necessarily the class who engage in interstate commerce. Unless a person belongs to that class he would have no interest in a law regulating such commerce and would have no right to attack a state law undertaking to regulate interstate commerce on the ground of its unconstitutionality. Appellant has not engaged in and does not engage in interstate commerce. In determining the validity of this law, it should be considered in its entire scope, and not in detached paragraphs. It should be considered as a whole. Thus considered it will be seen to be a valid exercise of the police power, which is reserved to the States. The act is simply an inspection law designed to protect the public against the sale of adulterated concentrated commercial feeding stuff. It does not directly undertake to regulate interstate commerce. It does not undertake the regulation of importation of commodities into the State. It is only where the police power of a state law undertakes directly to regulate interstate commerce that it is invalid. McLean v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 203 U. S. 50. The grant to Congress of authority to regulate foreign and interstate commerce did not involve a surrender by the States of their police powers. Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 471; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 546. In exercising its right to protect persons and property within its borders, a State has a right to require that any article of commerce, whether harmful or not, be sold for just what it is, and may require it to be labeled showing of what it is composed. In its regulations to prevent fraud and deceit and adulteration in the sale of articles, it may require an inspection not only of adulterated articles but of those which may not be adulterated. Inspection laws are not founded on the theory that the things on which Argument for Appellee. 225 U.S. they act are dangerous or noxious in themselves. Bowman v. Chicago Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 488; Heath & Milligan v. Worst, 207 U. S. 338; Stilz v. Thompson, 44 Minnesota, 271; Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 345. The Indiana law does not require the manufacturer or vendor of concentrated commercial feeding stuff to disclose any of his secret formulas. It only requires him to state the ingredients that enter into its composition. See Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 113 Fed. Rep. 616-627, aff'd 191 U. S. 405. Unless the inspection fee is so unreasonably large as to show on its face the lack of good faith in the enactment of the law, the question of the amount of such inspection fee is a legislative and not a judicial question. McLean v. Denver & R. G. R. Co., 203 U. S. 55; Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U. S. 355; Neilson v. Garza, 2 Woods, 287. The Indiana law is supplemental or complemental to the Federal Pure Food and Drug Act and does not in any way conflict therewith. Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 190. Appellant is not entitled to equitable relief upon the allegations of his bill. Francis v. Flinn, 118 U. S. 388; Arbuckle v. Blackburn, supra. The contention that the standard by which the constituents of commercial feeding stuffs is to be determined is indefinite and might vary, even if conceded, would not affect the validity of this law, for it only goes to the defect or incompleteness of the legislation, not to its legality. Heath & Milligan v. Worst, 207 U. S. 358. Inaccuracies in a law may be removed in the administration of the same or by legislative modification. Appellant does not come into court with clean hands. He gives his product a false name. He calls that a food which he says is a medicine. His product is misbranded and he is not entitled to the aid of a court of equity. MR. JUSTICE HUGHES, after making the above statement, delivered the opinion of the court. The principal contention in support of this appeal is that the statute of Indiana (Acts 1907, chapter 206), the provisions of which have been set forth, is an unce stitutional interference with the complainant's right to engage in interstate commerce. A preliminary question arises with respect to the jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the allegation of the bill that the complainant's product is not a "concentrated commercial feeding stuff" within the true meaning of the act, and that so interpreted the statute would not apply. But it was also alleged that the State Chemist, who was authorized to enforce the statute, had construed it to be applicable to the commodity, which is commercially known as "International Stock Food;" and thus charged by the officer with the duty of obedience, the complainant in his bill challenged the constitutionality of the legislation. The grounds for the attack were not found in the conclusions reached by the officer, as to the nature of the article, in administering an act otherwise conceded to be valid (Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 191 U. S. 405, 414), but in the provisions of the statute itself as applied to the articles within its purview while in the course of interstate commerce. A general demurrer, for want of equity, was sustained, and in view of the substantial character of the contention the case must be regarded as one in which the law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States. Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826, c. 517, § 5; Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Austin, 168 U. S. 685, 694; Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 U. S. 472, 478; Lampasas v. Bell, 180 U. S. 276, 282. It is said that the complainant is not entitled to invoke the constitutional protection, in that he fails to show in Opinion of the Court. 225 U.S. jury. Southern Railway Co. v. King, 217 U. S. 524, 534. The argument rests upon the averment in the bill that his sales were made at Minneapolis, the goods "to be delivered free on board of cars" at that point, "and delivered to purchasers and consumers within the State of Indiana in the original unbroken packages, freight being paid thereon by the consumers and purchasers." In answer, it must again be said that "commerce among the States is not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from the course of business." Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398; Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512. It clearly appears from the bill that the complainant was engaged in dealing with purchasers in another State. His product manufactured in Minnesota was, in pursuance of his contracts of sale, to be delivered to carriers for transportation to the purchasers in Indiana. This was interstate commerce, in the freedom of which from any unconstitutional burden the complainant had a direct interest. The protection accorded to this commerce by the Federal Constitution extended to the sale by the receiver of the goods in the original packages. Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100; In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 559, 560; Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461, 473; Vance v. Vandercook Co. (No. 1), 170 U. S. 438, 444, 445; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1, 22–25; Heyman v. Southern Railway Co., 203 U. S. 270, 276. An attack upon this right of the importing purchasers to sell in the original packages bought from the complainant, not only would be to their prejudice, but inevitably would inflict injury upon the complainant by reducing his interstate sales, a result to be avoided only through his compliance with the act by filing the statement and affixing to his goods the labels it required. According to the bill, the State Chemist had threatened the complainant that in default of such compliance he would cause the arrest and prosecution of every person dealing in the article within the State and had distributed broadcast throughout the State warning circulars. If the statute of Indiana, as applied to sales by importing purchasers in the original packages, constitutes an unwarrantable interference with interstate commerce in the complainant's product, he had standing to complain, and was entitled to relief against enforcement by the defendant of the illegal demands. Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 107, 112; Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 159, 160; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 216 U. S. 146; Hopkins v. Clemson College, 221 U. S. 636, 643-645; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605, 620, 621. We are thus brought to the examination of the statute. The question of its constitutional validity may be considered in two aspects, (1) independently of the operation and effect of the act of Congress of June 30, 1906, c. 3915 (34 Stat. 768), known as "The Food and Drugs Act," and (2) in the light of this Federal enactment. First. The statute relates to the sale of various sorts of food, for domestic animals, embraced in the term "concentrated commercial feeding stuff" as defined in the act. It requires the filing of a statement and a sworn certificate, the affixing of a label bearing certain information, and a stamp. By § 1 it is provided, in substance, that before any such feeding stuff is sold, or offered for sale, in Indiana, "the manufacturer, importer, dealer, agent or person," selling or offering it, shall file with the State Chemist a statement that he desires to sell the feeding stuff, and also a sworn certificate, for registration, stating (a) the name of the manufacturer, (b) the location of the principal office of the manufacturer, (c) the name, brand or trade-mark under which the article will be sold, (d) the ingredients from which it is compounded, and (e) the minimum percentage of crude fat and crude protein, allowing one per cent. of nitrogen to equal six and twenty-five hundredths |