on this strip can be deemed to have introduced the liquor "into the Indian country" within the meaning of the act of 1897. Was the strip "Indian country so that the District Court of the United States can be said to have had jurisdiction of the alleged offense?

The act of June 30, 1834, c. 161, 4 Stat. 729, thus defined "the Indian country":

“That all that part of the United States west of the Mississippi, and not within the states of Missouri and Louisiana, or the territory of Arkansas, and, also, that part of the United States east of the Mississippi river, and not within any state to which the Indian title has not been extinguished, for the purposes of this act, be taken and deemed to be the Indian country."

This portion of the act of 1834 was not reënacted in the Revised Statutes, though other parts of the statute were, and hence was repealed by § 5596 of the revision. But, as has frequently been stated by this court, the definition may still "be referred to in connection with the provisions of its original context which remain in force, and may be considered in connection with the changes which have taken place in our situation, with a view of determining from time to time what must be regarded as Indian country where it is spoken of in the statutes." Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 561; United States v. LeBris, 121 U. S. 278, 280.

The proper criterion to be applied was considered in Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204, where Mr. Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the court, said (id., pp. 207, 208): "Notwithstanding the immense changes which have since taken place in the vast region covered by the act of 1834, by the extinguishment of Indian titles, the creation of States and the formation of territorial governments, Congress has not thought it necessary to make any new definition of Indian country. Yet during all this time a large body of laws has been in existence,

Opinion of the Court.

225 U.S.

whose operation was confined to the Indian country, whatever that may be.

"The simple criterion is that as to all the lands thus described it was Indian country whenever the Indian title had not been extinguished, and it continued to be Indian country so long as the Indians had title to it, and no longer. As soon as they parted with the title, it ceased to be Indian country, without any further act of Congress, unless by the treaty by which the Indians parted with their title, or by some act of Congress, a different rule was made applicable to the case."

It must be assumed that, in the act of 1897, Congress used the words "Indian country" in the accepted sense. And this is confirmed by the provision bearing witness to the policy which had been adopted looking to the dissolution of tribal relations and the distribution of tribal property in separate allotments. Thus, the act provides that the term Indian country "shall include any Indian allotment while the title to the same shall be held in trust by the Government, or while the same shall remain inalienable by the allottee without the consent of the United States." United States v. Sutton, 215 U. S. 291; Hallowell v. United States, 221 U. S. 317, 323, 324.

That the effect of a cession by the Indians might be qualified by a stipulation in the treaty that the ceded territory, although within the boundaries of a State, should retain its original status of Indian country so far as the introduction into it of intoxicating liquors was concerned was decided in United States v. Forty-three Gallons of Whiskey, &c., 93 U. S. 188; 108 U. S. 491. But, as was pointed out in Bates v. Clark, supra, that decision proceeded upon the hypothesis that "when the Indian title is extinguished it ceases to be Indian country, unless some such reservation takes it out of the rule." The same principle of decision was recognized in Dick v.

United States, 208 U. S. 340. There, the plaintiff in error had been convicted of introducing intoxicating liquor into the Nez Perce Indian Reservation within the State of Idaho. The offense was committed, if at all, in the village of Culdesac, which, although within the boundaries of the reservation as established before Idaho was admitted into the Union, was at the time specified in the indictment an organized village of that State. The lands upon which the village was located were part of those ceded to the United States by an agreement with the Indians in which it was stipulated that the ceded lands, as well as those retained, should be subject for the period of twenty-five years to all Federal laws prohibiting the introduction of intoxicants into the Indian country. It was held that this was a valid stipulation based upon the treaty-making power of the United States and upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce with the Indians, and was "not inconsistent, in any substantial sense, with the constitutional principle that a new State comes into the Union upon entire equality with the original States" (p. 359). Upon this ground the judgment of conviction was affirmed.

While the Dick Case was thus found, owing to the stipulation in the agreement, to be within the exception, the court explicitly recognized the rule which governs in the absence of a different provision by treaty or by act of Congress. The court said (p. 352): "If this case depended alone upon the Federal liquor statute forbidding the introduction of intoxicating drinks into the Indian country, we should feel obliged to adjudge that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict for the defendant; for that statute, when enacted, did not intend by the words 'Indian country' to embrace any body of territory in which, at the time, the Indian title had been extinguished, and over which and over the inhabitants of which (as was the case of Culdesac) the jurisdiction

of the State, for all purposes of government, was full and complete. Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204; Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556, 561."

In the present case there was no provision, either in the treaty with the Indians, or by act of Congress, which limited the effect of the surrender of the Indian title. We have been referred to certain statements made by the representative of the United States in the course of the negotiations with the Indians which preceded their agreement, but these were of an informal character and cannot be regarded as qualifying the agreement that was actually made. The Indian title or right of occupation was extinguished, without reservation; and the relinquished strip came under the jurisdiction of the then Territory and later under that of the State of Montana. It was not "unappropriated public land," or land "owned or held by any Indian or Indian tribe." (Enabling Act, supra.)

To repeat, the plaintiff in error was not charged with "attempting to introduce" the liquor into Indian country, but with the actual introduction. If having the liquor in his possession on the train on this right of way did not constitute such introduction, it is immaterial so far as the charge is concerned whether or not he intended to take it elsewhere. Nor is it important that the plaintiff in error was an Indian. The statute makes it an offense for "any person" to introduce liquor into Indian country.

Our conclusion must be that the right of way had been completely withdrawn from the reservation by the surrender of the Indian title and that in accordance with the repeated rulings of this court it was not Indian country. The District Court therefore had no jurisdiction of the offense charged and the judgment must be reversed. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to quash the indictment and discharge the defendant.

225 U.S.

Syllabus.

SHULTHIS v. McDOUGAL.

BERRYHILL v. SHULTHIS.

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT.

Nos. 156, 157. Argued January 23, 24, 1912.-Decided June 7, 1912.

Where a petition of intervention is entertained and disposed of in virtue of jurisdiction already invoked, if the decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is final in respect of the original suit, it is equally so in respect of the intervention. Whether jurisdiction depends alone on diverse citizenship or on other grounds as well, must be determined from complainant's own statement in the bill of his cause of action, regardless of what may be brought into the suit by answer or in subsequent proceedings. Jurisdiction of the Federal court can only rest on grounds distinctly and affirmatively set forth; grounds of jurisdiction, other than those of diverse citizenship alleged, cannot be inferred argumentatively from statements in the bill.

A case is not one arising under the laws of the United States unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such a law upon the determination whereof the result depends. This rule applies peculiarly to suits respecting rights to land acquired under laws of the United States; otherwise all suits to establish title to land which had been part of the public domain would be cognizable in the Federal courts. The fact that the controversy might have arisen under the laws of the United States does not give the Federal court jurisdiction, if the bill does not allege the facts in that particular, and the controversy might have arisen in another way independent of those laws. A corporation which was organized in the Indian Territory while the statutes of Arkansas were, under authority of Congress, in force in that Territory is not for that reason a Federal corporation, but is to be regarded for jurisdictional purposes as one of Oklahoma. Kansas Pacific R. R. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fé R. R. Co., 112 U S. 414.

The action of Congress in putting the laws of Arkansas in force in the Indian Territory by the act of February 18, 1901, 31 Stat. 794, VOL. CCXXV-36