same effect as an estoppel as against subsequent suits on the same

cause of action. Held that:
Although one of two joint tort-feasors may be individually interested

in the result of a suit against the other, the result is merely that
of precedent and not of res judicata, and the courts of another

State are not under obligation to follow the decision.
Assistance by one of two joint tort-feasors in the defense of a suit

against the other, because of interest in the decision as a judicial
precedent affecting a case pending against him in another State,

does not create an estoppel as to the one so assisting in the defense.
Where the cause of action against joint tort-feasors is ex delicto, and

several as well as joint, one of the tort-feasors not sued is not a
privy to one that is sued so that a judgment dismissing the case

against the latter is a bar to another suit against the latter.
Where the remedy of the plaintiff in a suit against one of two joint

tort-feasors depends upon the defendant's own culpability, failure
to recover in a prior suit on the same facts against the other is not

a bar.

When dealing with the estoppel of a judgment, privity denotes mutual
general law whether or not such judgment is a bar to suits against
the other tort-feasor. Ib.

or successive relationship to the same right of property, and while
there is diversity of opinion as to whether the estoppel can be ex-
panded so as to include joint tort-feasors not parties, the sounder
reason, as well as weight of authority, is that failure to recover
against one is not a bar to a suit or an individual cause of action
against the other. Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 111.

20. Full faith and credit clause; status of judgment of Federal court in

court of State other than that in which the Federal court sits.
Where the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of the United States de-

pends entirely upon diversity of citizenship, that court administers
the law of the State, and its judgment is entitled to the same sanc-
tion as would attach to a judgment of a court of that State, and is
entitled in the courts of another State to the same faith and credit
which would be given to a judgment of the court of the State in
which the Circuit Court which rendered it was sitting. Ib.

21. Full faith and credit; right of court in which judgment of court of

another State is set up to determine its effect as a bar.
Although a judgment dismissing the bill against one of two joint tort-

feasors may be a bar in the State where rendered against a suit on
the same cause of action against the other joint tort-feasor, the
courts of another State may, without denying full faith and
credit to such judgment, determine for itself under principles of


22. Full faith and credit; status of judgment of court of one State when

sued upon or pleaded in estoppel in court of another State.
Under $ 1 of Art. IV of the Constitution and $ 905, Rev. Stat., the

judgment of a court of one State when sued upon or pleaded in es-
toppel in the courts of another State is put upon the plane of a do
mestic judgment in respect to conclusiveness of the facts adjudged;
otherwise it would be reëxaminable as only prima facie evidence of
the matter adjudged as is the case with foreign judgments. Ib.

23. Full faith and credit clause; how construed.
The full faith and credit clause is to be construed in the light of the
27. Slates, effect of Fourteenth Amendment on right of municipality to

other provisions of the Constitution, none of which it was intended
to modify or override. Ib.

24. Full faith and credit; right of court where judgment set up to inquire as

to jurisdiction of court rendering it.
The courts of one State are not required to regard as conclusive any

judgment of the court of another State which had no jurisdiction
of the subject or the parties; and the courts of the State in which
the judgment is set up have the right to inquire whether the court
rendering it had jurisdiction to pronounce a judgment which would
conclude the parties themselves or those claiming that the judg-
ment was effective as an estoppel. Ib.

25. Governmental powers; retrospective legislation; validity of naturaliza-

tion act of 1906.
The act of June 29, 1906, is not unconstitutional as an exercise of

judicial power by the legislative branch of the Government, nor is
it unconstitutional because retrospective. Johannessen v. United

States, 227.

Naturalization of Aliens. See IMMIGRATION, I.

26. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment on power to regulate useful

While the Fourteenth Amendment protects the citizen in his right to

engage in any lawful business, it does not prevent legislation in-
tended to regulate useful occupations, which because of their
nature and location, may prove injurious or offensive to the public.
Murphy v. California, 623.

prohibit harmfu busincss.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a municipality from

prohibiting any business which is inherently vicious and harmful.

28. States; effect of Fourteenth Amendment on power to regulate or pro-

hibit business.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent a State from regulating

or prohibiting a non-useful occupation which may become harmful
to the public, and the regulation or prohibition need not be post-
poned until the evil is flagrant. Ib.

29. States; when statute not revenue measure in disguise so as to render it

Where the fair import of the provisions of a state police statute is that

the fees exacted are for necessary expenses of inspecting an article
properly the subject of inspection, and the bill alleges no facts
warranting a conclusion that the charges are unreasonable as.
compared with the cost, this court will not condemn the statute as
an unconstitutional revenue measure. Standard Stock Food Co.
v. Wright, 540.

30. States; when statute not regenue measure in disguise.
Where a state police statute involving inspection of goods is enforced

by the affixing of stamps, it will not be held unconstitutional as a
revenue measure in disguise if the bill does not allege any facts to
show that the charge for stamps is unreasonable and the total sale
is so much in excess of the cost of inspection as to impute bad
faith. Savage v. Jones, 501.

See SUPRA, 1, 2, 3, 11, 12, 13;





See TRIAL, 1.

See CRIMINAL LAW, 6, 7, 14, 22.


1. Rescission of contract for sale of mining properties; practice in this

court; res judicata.
One of the parties interested in and having control of a mining com-

pany purchased a neighboring group of mines and agreed that the
company should have the opportunity of taking them on reim-
bursing him for outlay; if not availed of, he to keep them for his
own. Subsequently the combined groups being sold he claimed the
agreement had by reason of certain resolutions been rescinded and
that he was entitled to the proceeds of the purchased group. The
case was twice before the Supreme Court of the Territory: on the
first appeal that court held that the agreement had been rescinded.

Held that:
The findings of fact sent up from the territorial court must alone be the

basis of the judgment of this court.
In interpreting the action of stockholders in passing resolutions regard-

ing the relative rights of the corporation and one of the stock-
holders and officers in property of the corporation, the surround-

ing facts and circumstances may be considered.
The agreement that the company could acquire the purchased group

was carried out and not rescinded.
Whatever effect the decision of the Supreme Court of a Territory may

have, as the law of the case, on the lower court or on the Supreme
Court itself, prior to an appeal to this court, it is not the law of the

case for this court.
, Under the circumstances, the appointment of a receiver and his con-

tinuance for final settlement of the affairs of the company was

proper. · Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 445.
2. Reality and substance of unrecorded instrument; power of creditors to

inquire as to.
The mere form of an instrument transferring property of a debtor can-

not exclude the power of creditors to inquire into the reality and
substance of a contract unrecorded although required by law to be
recorded in order to be effective against third parties. Valdes. v.
Central Altagracia, 58.

3. Transfer of property of corporation as contract other than of condi-

tional sale.
Under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the existence of

an equity of redemption under prior transfers, held, that a transfer
of all the property of a corporation to one advancing money to en-
able it to contique its business was not a conditional sale of the

property but a contract crcating security for the money advanced,
and on liquidation of the assets the transferee stood merely as a
secured creditor. Ib.


See ADMIRALTY, 2, 3, 4.



See CONTRACTS, 2, 3.

When to be deemed of state and not Federal creation.
A corporation which was organized in the Indian Territory while the

statutes of Arkansas were, under authority of Congress, in force in
that Territory is not for that reason a Federal corporation, but is
to be regarded for jurisdictional purposes as one of Oklahoma.
(Kansas Pacific R.R. Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. R. Co.,
112 U. S. 414.) Shulthis v. McDougal, 561.





See COURTS, 3.

1. Duty to apply will of Congress.
Where Congress has power to pass an act and its provisions are plain,

the court must apply it even in a hard case. Low Wah Sucy v.
Backus, 460.

2. Duty of this court to give effect to purpose of Congress in creating

special tribunal.
Where Congress creates a special tribunal for a special class of cases

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