R. Cas. Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. City of Chicago. question, and use the land for purposes other than for a right of way, the jury could not properly have taken into consideration the possibility that at some future time the company would adopt that course, and thereby put itself in condition, if no street were opened across it, to sell its land for what it was worth as land, freed from any public easement. Such a possibility was too remote and contingent to have been taken into account. There was nothing in the evidence, introduced or offered and excluded, suggesting any probability that the company intended to use, or would in the near future use, the land within the crossing for any other purpose than as a right of way. While, as held in Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U. S. 403, 408, the general rule is that compensation is to be estimated by reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business and wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future," it is well settled that "mere possible or imaginary uses, or the speculative schemes of its proprietor, are to be excluded." Pierce, R. R. 217, and authorities cited; Worcester v. Great Falls Manuf'g Co., 41 Me. 159, 164; Dorlan v. Railroad Co., 46 Pa. St. 520, 525. 66 The company must be deemed to have laid its tracks within the corporate limits of the city subject to the condition-not, it is true, expressed, but necessarily implied that new streets of the city might be opened and extended from time to time across its tracks, as the public convenience required, and under such restrictions as might be prescribed by statute. Suppose the city had many years ago acquired the land in question by purchase or condemnation for the purpose of extending, and had extended, a street over it, and that the railroad company had thereafter acquired by condemnation the right to lay its tracks across the street upon making just compensation to the city. In ascertaining, in such a case, the compensation due the city, would it not be assumed, the street having.once been opened, that the convenience of the public would always require it to be Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. City of Chicago. (N. S.) kept open, and that, therefore, compensation was to be ascertained, not upon the basis of the value of the city's land, as land, when crossed by the railroad tracks, but upon the basis that the land would always be a part of a public street? Both branches of this question must be answered in the affirmative. But they should not be so answered if the position of the railroad company be sound; for, according to its contention, the jury, in the case supposed, must have taken into account the possibility that the city might at some future time discontinue the street, and sell the land, or devote it to other purposes. There was and is no more probability that the city, in the case supposed, would close the street, than, in this case, that the railroad company will take up its tracks from the land in question. Such a probability was too remote to be regarded as an element in the inquiry as to compensation. When these proceedings were instituted the railroad company had an exclusive right to use the land in question for tracks. upon which to move its cars, and the city did not propose to interfere in any degree with the enjoyment of that right, otherwise than by the opening of a street across the tracks for public use. To what extent was the value of the company's right to use the land for railroad tracks unduly diminished by opening across it. a public street? Under all the circumstances, in view of the purpose for which the railroad company obtained. the land, for which the land was in fact used, and for which it was likely to be always used,-which purpose is the most valuable one for the railroad company, that was the only question to be determined by the jury. As the right to open a street across the railroad tracks was all that the city sought to obtain by the proceeding for condemnation, it was not bound to obtain and pay for the fee in the land over which the street was opened. If, prior to the institution of these proceedings, the railroad company had constructed upon the land embraced within the crossing buildings to be used in its business, it would have been necessary for the jury, in ascertaining the just compensation to be R. Cas. Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. City of Chicago. awarded, to take into consideration the value of such buildings. But no such case is before us. The case is simply one of the opening of a street across land with no buildings upon it, and used only for railroad tracks. Same. It is next contended that error of law was committed by the refusal of the court to allow the company to prove that in the event of the opening of the street it would be necessary in order that the railroad be properly and safely operated, to construct gates and a tower for operating them, plank the crossing, fill between the rails, put in an extra rail, and to incur an annual expense of depreciations, maintenance, employment of gatemen, etc. It was not claimed that the railroad company could recover specifically on account of such expenditures, but that the proof of their being made necessary by the opening of the street was admissible for the purpose of showing the compensation due to the company. There are some authorities that seem to support the view taken by the railroad company, but we are of opinion that no error was committed in excluding the evidence offered. road. The plaintiff in error took its charter subject to the power of the state to provide for the safety of the public, in so far as the safety of the lives and persons of the people were involved in the operation of the railThe company laid its tracks subject to the condition, necessarily implied, that their use could be regulated by competent authority as to insure the public safety. And as all property, whether owned by private persons or by corporations, is held subject to authority of the state to regulate its use in such manner as not to unnecessarily endanger the lives and personal safety of the people, it is not a condition of the exercise of that authority that the state shall indemnify the owners of property for the damage or injury resulting from its exercise. Property thus damaged or injured is not, within the meaning of the constitution, taken for public use, nor is the owner deprived of it without due process of law. The requirement that compensation be made for private the the Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. City of Chicago. (N.S.) property taken for public use imposes no restriction upon the inherent power of the state by reasonable regulations to protect the lives and secure the safety of the people. In the recent case of New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Town of Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 567, 60 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 577, this court declared it to be thoroughly established that the inhibitions of the constitution of the United States upon the impairment of the obligation of contracts, or the deprivation of property without due process or of the equal protection of the laws, by the states, are not violated by the legitimate exercise of legislative power in securing the public safety, health, and morals. "The governmental power of self-protection," the court said, "cannot be contracted away, nor can the exercise of rights granted, nor the use of property, be withdrawn from the implied liability to governmental regulation in particulars essential to the preservation of the community from injury." See New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & Heat Producing & Manuf'g Co., 115 U. S. 650, 10 Am. & Eng. Corp. Cas. 639. In Railway Co. v. Deacon, 63 Ill. 91, the supreme court of Illinois said: "The state has reserved to itself the power to enact all police laws necessary and proper to secure and protect the life and property of the citizen. Prominent among the rights reserved, and which must inhere in the state, is the power to regulate the approaches to and the crossing of public highways, and the passage through cities and villages, where life and property are constantly in imminent danger by the rapid and fearful speed of railway trains. The exercise of their franchises by corporations must yield to the public exigencies and the safety of the community." And in Railroad Co. v. Willenborg, 117 I11. 203, 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 358, where the question was whether a railroad company could be required to construct a farm crossing over its road years after the road had been built, the court said: The point is made, however, that these provisions. are not obligatory on this corporation because they R. Cas. Chicago, &c., R. Co. v. City of Chicago. were enacted many years since it received its charter from the state. This is a misapprehension of the law. The regulations in regard to fencing railroad tracks, and the construction of farm crossings for the use of adjoining landowners, are 'police regulations,' in the strict sense of those terms, and apply with equal force to corporations whose tracks are already built, as well as to those to be thereafter constructed. They have reference to the public security both as to persons and to property. **** No reason is perceived why, upon the same principle on which a railroad corporation may be required to fence its track and construct cattle guards, it may not be required also to construct farm crossings." In Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 140 Ill. 309, 317-319, 50 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 150, the question was whether, in a case where a city institutes a condemnation proceeding to open or extend a street across a railroad already constructed, the company owning such railroad was entitled to be allowed, as a part of its just compensation, the amount of its expenses in constructing and maintaining the street crossing. In that case it appeared that the railroad was constructed prior to the above act of 1872 for the incorporation of cities and villages, and before the pas sage of the act of 1874, which required that thereafter at all railroad crossings of highways "and streets" the railroad companies should construct and maintain such crossings, and the approaches thereto, within their respective rights of way, so that at all times they should be safe as to person and property. 2 Starr & C. Ann. St. p. 1927. The court said: Government Owes to its citizens the duty of providing and preserving safe and convenient highways. From this duty results the right of public control over public highways. Railroads are public highways, and in their relations as such to the public are subject to legislative supervision, though the interests of their shareholders are private property. Every railroad company takes its right of way subject to the right of the |