sponsibility of the Generals, and therefore their merits.

Lord Brougham's vindication of the Somnauth proclamation called up the Bishop of Salisbury and the Bishop of Chichester; who differed widely with his excuse of it. Lord Brougham expressed his conviction that the words of the proclamation would not bear the construction that had been generally applied to them.

Lord Minto guarded himself against being supposed to concur in the more extensive construction which had been put on the vote of thanks to Lord Ellenborough.

The resolutions were carried without opposition.

Sir Robert Peel in the House of Commons on the same day moved the same resolutions. He studiously abstained from references to merely political matters. He gave a graphic description of the operations and events in Affghanistan, beginning with the outbreak of the general insurrection in October 1841. Sir Robert Sale, sent to force the passes between Cabul and Gundamuk, was unable to return to Cabul, and therefore occupied Jellalabad. Captain Woodburn and 108 invalids were cut off in Kohistan; Sir Alex. Burnes and his brother were assassinated at Cabul. It became necessary that Lord Auckland should consider the steps to be taken: he recommended the concentration of a force of 10,000 or 12,000 men between the Sutlej and the Jumna; and writing on the 3d December, before he knew of the final disasters at Cabul, he said— "It would be in vain to speculate upon the issue of the contest at Cabul; but in the extreme event of the military possession of that

having been entirely lost, it is not our intention to direct new and extensive operations for the reestablishment of our supremacy throughout Affghanistan." On the 19th February, after hearing of General Wild's failure to force the Khyber Pass for the relief of General Sale, Lord Auckland thus expressed himself-"Since we have heard of the misfortunes in the Khyber Pass, and have become convinced, that with the difficulties at present opposed to us, and in the actual state of our prepara. tions, we could not expect, at least in this year, to maintain a position in the Jellalabad districts for any effective purpose, we have made our directions in regard to withdrawal from Jellalabad clear and positive; and we shall rejoice to learn that Major-General Pollock will have anticipated these more express orders by confining his efforts to the same object." He said at the same time, to show that he was not regardless of the state of the prisoners at Cabul, "The painful situation of the officers' families, and European and native soldiers, who are prisoners in Affghanistan, engages our most anxious thought; and any measures which we can adopt with a fair and honourable prospect of advantage for their comfort or release will be eagerly adopted by

us.

On the 10th February, Lord Auckland gave orders to General Nott, at Candahar, to "act solely so as may best, in your judgment, secure the paramount object of the safety of the troops placed under your orders, and may uphold, at the same time, the honour of the British arms." In an interview with Mr. Clerk, who had been resident at Lahore, and who recom

Jasper Nicolls, the Commander-inChief, expressed a doubt whether the British had "either army or funds sufficient to renew this contest."

Sir Robert Peel did not blame Lord Auckland; with a knowledge of the event it was easy to be military critics. But Lord Auck land's first duty was to provide for the safety of the empire entrusted to his charge; and to watch indications of hostility from without. And what was the position of the armies at Cabul and Candahar? Communication was intercepted. The army at Candahar, under General Nott, was 549 miles from the Indus-from Bukhur on the Indus. But between the army and that point there was also interposed the Bolan Pass. The army of Cabul was 540 miles from Ferozepore, the nearest town of British India. In order to afford aid to the force at Cabul, the whole Punjaub would have had to be crossed, and this too at a time when, it must be well known to many honourable Gentlemen, a feeling and aspirit prevailed among the Sikh troops not the most favourable to such a movement. Do honourable Gentlemen remember that between Ferozepore and Cabul there is the Khyber Pass that for 193 miles out of 540 the country is of a nature, as regards military communication, exceeding in difficulty any other country in the globe? I say that Lord Auckland, viewing the then state of India, acted, in my opinion, most wisely in collecting the forces in British India, and taking time to deliberate what course of policy he should pursue. In accordance with that conviction, though differing as to the original policy of

joined in voting thanks to Lord Auckland for the zeal he had manifested in directing the resources of India in aid of the military operations.

Such was the condition of affairs when Lord Ellenborough assumed the Government. The first letter that he wrote on the subject of the course to be pursued, was dated the 15th March, and from this Sir Robert Peel read a long extract. Lord Ellenborough says

"Whatever course we may hereafter take must rest solely upon military considerations, and have, in the first instance, regard to the safety of the detached bodies of our troops at Jellalabad, at Ghuz. nee, at Khelat-i-Ghilzie, and Candahar; to the security of our troops now in the field from all unnecessary risk; and, finally, to the reestablishment of our military reputation, by the infliction of some signal and decisive blow upon the Affghans, which may make it appear to them, to our own subjects, and to our allies, that we have the power of inflicting punishment upon those who commit atrocities, and violate their faith, and that we withdraw ultimately from Affghanistan, not from any deficiency of means to maintain our position, but because we are satisfied that the King we have set up has not, as we were erroneously led to imagine, the support of the nation over which he has been placed." [Lord Ellenborough objects to the suggestion of Major Rawlinson, to make over Candahar to Kamram, the nominal ruler of Herat, an incapable sovereign known only by the fame of his vices; and expresses an opinion that it is erroneous to suppose that the maintaining a forward position

the effect of controlling the Sikhs, the Belochees, or Scindians; the knowledge that we possess in India, a strong army, ready to advance, would be a much more effectual means of controul.] The letter proceeds; "We would, there fore, strongly impress upon the commanders of the forces employ. ed in Affghanistan and Scinde, the importance of incurring no unnecessary risk, and of bringing their troops into action under circumstances which may afford full scope to the superiority they derive from their discipline. At the same time, we are aware that no great object can be accomplished without incurring some risk; and we should consider that the object of striking a decisive blow at the Affghans, more espe cially if such a blow could be struck in combination with measures for the relief of Ghuznee-a blow which might re-establish our military character beyond the Indus, and leave a deep impressiou of our power, and of the vigour with which it would be applied to punish an atrocious enemy would be one for which risk might be justifiably incurred, all due and possible precaution being taken to diminish such necessary risk, and to secure decisive success. The commanders of the forces in Upper and Lower Affghanistan will, in all the operations they may design, bear in mind these general views and opinions of the Government of India. They will in the first instance endeavour to relieve all the garrisons in Affghanistan which are now surrounded by the enemy. The relief of these garrisons is a point deeply affecting the military character of the army, and deeply interesting the feelings of their

attempt to effect such relief, in any case, without a reasonable prospect of success, would be to afford no real aid to the brave men who are surrounded, and fruitlessly to sacrifice other good soldiers, whose preservation is equally dear to the Government they serve. To effect the release of the prisoners taken at Cabul, is an object likewise deeply interesting in point of feeling and of honour. That object can, probably, only be accomplished by taking hostages from such part of the country as may be in, or may come into our possession; and, with reference to this object, and to that of the relief of Ghuznee, it may possibly become a question, in the event of Major-General Pollock's effecting a junction with Sir Robert Sale, whether the united force shall return to the country below the Khyber Pass, or take a forward position near Jellalabad, or even advance to Cabul. We are fully sensible of the advantages which would be derived from the occupation of Cabul, the scene of our great disaster, and of so much crime, even for a week-of the means which it might afford of recovering the prisoners, of the gratification which it would give to the army, and of the effect which it would have upon our enemies. Our withdrawal might then be made to rest upon an official declaration of the grounds upon which we retired, as solemn as that which accompanied our advance ; and we should retire as a conquering, not as a defeated power. But we cannot sanction the occupation of an advanced position beyond the Khyber Pass by Major-General Pollock, unless that General should be satisfied that he can, without

the tribes near the Pass, which, obtained only by purchase, must under all circumstances be precarious, and without depending upon the fidelity of the Sikh chiefs, or upon the power of those chiefs to restrain their troops-upon neither of which can any reliance be safely placed-feel assured that he can, by his own strength, overawe and overcome all who dispute the Pass, and keep up at all times his communication with Peshawur and the Indus."

This letter made it evident, that on the 15th March, Lord Ellenborough's main objects were to relieve the garrisons, to rescue the prisoners, and to reestablish the military supremacy of the British arms, if even only for a time, in Cabul and Affghanistan, but that he did not contemplate a permanent occupation of Affghanistan. Those objects had been accomplished, and the policy had been practically carried out. On the 19th April he issued an order to General Nott to withdraw from Candahar; but under what circumstances? with recent news of several reverses. In further justification, Sir Robert Peel referred to a letter by General Pollock, dated Jellalabad, April 20th, in which the General said, "That he had no confidence in Affghan support, and that he saw too many difficulties to warrant an advance on Cabul: "but," he added, "to withdraw from this place at the present moment, would enable the enemy to concentrate all their strength in the vicinity of Candahar; which until the junction of General England, would embarrass Major-General Nott." General Nott, writing on the 18th April, stated that in the event of field

men, ammunition, carriages, and money. These two letters written almost in the same day, completely justified the order of the 19th April; and, on another occasion, Lord Ellenborough said most justly-"True it is, I might conciliate public favour by directing an advance; but if, by a precipitate act of that kind, if by the want of true courage to recede when retreat was for the public interest, I compromised the safety of India, I never during my existence should cease to upbraid myself." Lord Ellenborough, however, took steps towards the provision of the armies, and providing them with carriage; saying, in a despatch of the 16th of September, that General Pollock's and General Nott's armies must be supplied, cost what it might: and that it was better to have a thousand camels too many than one hundred too few. How the field for supply had been exhausted, might be understood from the fact that the loss between November, 1838, and November, 1839, was not less than 32,000 beasts of burthen; yet 16,500 were collected. Ultimately, Lord Ellenborough had the satisfaction of seeing that army, a portion of which was once dispirited, retire behind the Sutlej, full of spirit, full of joy, and in a state of the greatest efficiency. Lord John Russell had commented on a former occasion on Lord Ellenborough's supposed misconduct to a public servant of the East India Company, Mr. Amos, who was said to have been insulted;; as a caution against acting on erroneous statements and impressions, Sir Robert Peel read a letter from Mrs. Amos, addressed to a friend, and dated "St. Ibbs, Hitchen,

this statement. "You probably may have noticed in Lord John Russell's speech on Thursday last, that he asserted that Mr. Amos resigned his appointment in Calcutta in consequence of having been insulted by Lord Ellenborough. Now, as there is not a word of truth in this statement (loud cheers), I think it right to contradict it, at least amongst Mr. Amos's old and valued friends. When he went out to India five years ago, Mr. Amos always intended to resign in 1843, and I am sure nothing would induce him to remain at Calcutta another year, now that all his family are here, his children just springing into manhood, and requiring all a father's care and example. As to Lord Ellenborough's conduct, it has been one of unvaried politeness and civility. I believe they were mutually pleased with each other, and when Mr. Amos wrote to Lord Ellenborough in the autumn, when he was up the country, saying it was his intention to resign, Lord Ellenborough replied, that he was extremely sorry to lose so very agreeable a colleague."

Sir Robert Peel, then, amidst the cheers of the House, reviewed with admiration the particular achievements of, the several Generals. He dwelt on General Pollock's humane attention to the soldiers under his command, and his skill in cheering the dispirited Sepoys; which he likened to Alexander's exhortation to the Macedonian phalaux, when, terrified at the aspect of the passes in those very regions, "illi demissis capitibus tacere perseverarent." On the 4th of July, Lord Ellenborough offered to General Nott, the option of advancing; stating

culties he must encounter in such a movement, and after fully considering all the advantages and disadvantages of an advance, the General stated that he had made up his mind to incur the responsibility of such a measure, and to make a decisive attempt to reestablish the British name and authority in Affghanistan. He also said to Lord Ellenborough, "I am most anxious, notwithstanding the conduct of the Affghan chiefs, that our army should leave a deep impression on the people of this country of our character for forbearance and humanity. Sir Robert also related the exploits of Sir Robert Sale, so well known. He quoted the letter of Lady Sale, whose name and her husband's would long be familiar words in the mouths of the people in this country; spoke with honour of Colonel Dennie and Lieutenant Sturt (both dead), and of Lieutenant Mein and Serjeant Deane, who rescued Sturt, after his mortal wound.

Sir R. Peel concluded, amid loud and general cheering, by expressing a hope that the decisive proofs which we had given that our energies and our military virtues are unabated, would constitute a great additional guarantee of continued peace.

Lord John Russell concurred in the vote of thanks for the military operations; to the conductors of which he paid some further compliments; but the question occurred, whether Lord Ellenborough was the director of those operations? Much of what Sir Robert Peel had said was due to Lord Auckland, who on hearing of the misfortunes of Cabul, had ordered two bodies of troops to be collect