Man not the work of Chance.

fall foul upon one another? must the sun stand still in the middle of his course, and heaven and earth drop into confusion? must a devouring fire seize upon the universe, the harmony of the creation be dissolved, and the whole frame of nature swallowed up in a dark abyss? and will nothing less than this serve to convince the world of their audacious and impertinent follies? It is not for us to say, that "these heavenly bodies are not made for us;" for in part they are so, and we are the better for their virtues and motions, whether we will or no; though, undoubtedly, the principal cause is the unalterable law of God. Providence is not moved by any thing from without; but the Divine Will is an everlasting law, an immutable decree, and the impossibility of variation proceeds from God's purpose of preserving; for he never repents of his first counsels. It is not with our heavenly, as with our earthly father. God thought of us, and provided for us, before he made us (for unto him all future events are present). Man was not the work of chance; his mind carries him above the flight of fortune, and naturally aspires to the contemplation of heaven, and divine mysteries. How desperate a phrensy is it now, to undervalue, nay, to contemn and to disclaim these divine blessings, without which we are utterly incapable of enjoying any other!

AN HONEST MAN CANNOT BE OUTDONE IN

COURTESY.

Ir passes in the world for a generous and magnificent saying, that "It is a shame for a man to be outdone in courtesy:" and it is worth the while to examine both

Virtuous emulation.

the truth of it, and the mistake. First, there can be no shame in a virtuous emulation; and, secondly, there can be no victory without crossing the cudgels, and yielding the cause. One man may have the advantages of strength, of means, of fortune; and this will undoubtedly operate upon the events of good purposes, but yet without any diminution to the virtue. The good-will may be the same in both, and yet one may have the heels of the other; for it is not in a good office as in a course, where he wins the plate that comes first to the post; and even there also, chance has many times a great hand in the success. Where the contest is about benefits, and that the one has not only a good will, but matter to work upon; and a power to put the good intention in execution. And the other has barely a good-will, without either the means, or the occasion of a requital, if he does but affectionately wish it, and endeavour it; the latter is no more overcome, in courtesy, than he is in courage, that dies with his sword in his hand and his face to the enemy, and, without shrinking, maintains his station: for where fortune is partial, it is enough that the good-will is equal. There are two errors in this proposition: first, to imply that a good man may be overcome; and then to imagine that any thing shameful can befal him. The Spartans prohibited all those exercises where the victory was declared by the confession of the contendant. The 300 Fabii were never said to be conquered, but slain; nor Regulus to be overcome, though he was taken prisoner by the Carthaginians. The mind may stand firm under the greatest malice and iniquity of fortune, and yet the giver and receiver continue upon equal terms: as we

The Giver and Receiver may be on equal terms.

reckon it a drawn battle, when two combatants are parted, though the one has lost more blood than the other. He that knows how to owe a courtesy, and heartily wishes that he could requite it, is invincible; so that every man may be as grateful as he pleases. It is your happiness to give, it is my fortune that I can only receive. What advantage now has your chance over my virtue? But there are some men that have philosophized themselves almost out of the sense of human affections, as Diogenes, that walked naked and unconcerned through the middle of Alexander's treasures, and was, as well in other men's opinion, as in his own even above Alexander himself, who at that time had the whole world at his feet: for there was more that the one scorned to take than that the other had in his power to give; and it is a greater generosity for a beggar to refuse money, than for a prince to bestow it. This is a remarkable instance of an immoveable mind, and there is hardly any contending with it; but a man is never the less valiant for being worsted by an invulnerable enemy, nor the fire one jot the weaker for not consuming an incombustible body, nor a sword ever a whit the worse for not cleaving a rock that is impenetrable, neither is a grateful mind overcome for want of an answerable fortune. No matter for the inequality of the things given and received, so long as, in point of good affection, the two parties stand upon the same level. It is no shame to overtake a man, if we follow him as fast as we can. That tumour of a man, the vain-glorious Alexander, was used to make his boast, that never any man went beyond him in benefits, and yet he lived to see a poor fellow in a tub, to whom there was nothing

A wise Friend the noblest present.

that he could give, and from whom there was nothing that he could take away.

Nor is it always necessary for a poor man to fly to the sanctuary of an invincible mind, to quit scores with the bounties of a plentiful fortune; but it does often fall out, that the returns which he cannot make in kind, are more than supplied in dignity and value. Archelaus, a king of Macedon, invited Socrates to his palace; but he excused himself, as unwilling to receive greater benefits than he was able to requite. This, perhaps, was not pride in Socrates, but craft; for he was afraid of being forced to accept of something which might possibly have been unworthy of him: beside that, he was a man of liberty, and loth to make himself a voluntary slave. The truth of it is, that Archelaus had more need of Socrates, than Socrates of Archelaus; for he wanted a man to teach him the art of life and death, and the skill of government, and to read the book of nature to him, and shew him the light at noon-day; he wanted a man, that, when the sun was in an eclipse, and he had locked himself up in all the horror and despair imaginable, he wanted a man, I say, to deliver him from his apprehensions, and to expound the prodigy to him, by telling him, that there was no more in it, than only that the moon was got betwixt the sun and the earth, and all would be well again presently. Let the world judge now, whether Archelaus's bounty, or Socrates's philosophy, would have been the greater present. He does not understand the value of wisdom and friendship, that does not know a wise friend to be the noblest of presents. A rarity scarce to be found, not only in a family, but in an age; and no where

Question of Self-Benefits.

more wanted than where there seems to be the greatest store. The greater a man is, the more need he has of him; and the more difficulty there is both of finding, and of knowing him. Nor is it to be said, that I cannot requite such a benefactor, because I am poor, and have it not. I can give good counsel; a conversation, wherein he may take both delight and profit; freedom of discourse, without flattery; kind attention, where he deliberates; and faith inviolable, where he trusts; I may bring him to a love and knowledge of truth, deliver him from the errors of his credulity, and teach him to distinguish betwixt friends and parasites.

THE QUESTION DISCUSSED, WHETHER OR NO A
MAN MAY GIVE OR RETURN A BENEFIT
TO HIMSELF.

THERE are many cases, wherein a man speaks of himself as of another. As for example-I may thank myself for this-I am angry at myself-I hate myself for that. And this way of speaking has raised a dispute among the Stoics,-Whether or no a man may give or return a benefit to himself? For, say they, if I may hurt myself, I may oblige myself; and that which were a benefit to another body, why is it not so to myself? and why am not I as criminal in being ungrateful to myself, as if I were so to another body? and the case is the same in flattery, and several other vices; as, on the other side, it is a point of great reputation for a man to command himself. Plato thanked Socrates for what he had learned of him, and why might not Socrates as well thank Plato for that which he had taught him? "That which you want,"