hereafter mention. There is, it is true, a finding that Postmaster General Smith caused an investigation to be made of the financial standing of the Envelope Company and that the report thereunder was unfavorable to it. This is made a great deal of, and the fact that the contract was not signed nor the bond of the Envelope Company approved. It makes no difference that the contract was not formally signed or the bond formally approved, as counsel for the Government contends they should have been, both by the terms of the contract and by a statute of the United States (28 Stat. 279). Their formal execution, as we have seen, was not essential to the consummation of the contract. That was accomplished, as was decided in the Garfielde Case, by the acceptance of the bid of the Envelope Company and the entry of the order awarding the contract to it. Therefore, we do not follow with minute attention the argument of the Government in asserting the power of Postmaster General Smith to review and annul his predecessor's decision and that directed against the financial standing of the Envelope Company or the deception the Government asserts was practiced on Postmaster General Gary, which are made the subject of a request for findings. We may assume that the Court of Claims considered such charges and all other elements before concluding that the Envelope Company was entitled to recover. And we pass to the question of damages. The Court of Claims decided that the measure of damages was the difference between the cost to the Envelope Company of materials and the manufacture and delivery of the envelopes and wrappers in accordance with the terms of its contract and what it would have made if it had been allowed to perform the contract. For this the court cited and relied upon Roehm v. Horst, 178 U.S. 1. It is there decided that the positive refusal to perform a contract is a breach of it, though the time for performance has not arrived, and that liability for the breach at once occurs. And it is further decided that the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the cost of performance. The case was replete in its review of prior We may refer, however, to United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77, 85; United States v. Behan, 110 U.S. 338; Hinckley v. Pittsburgh Steel Co., 121 U.S. 264. cases. The judgment of the Court of Claims is NOTES Affirmed. 1. The plaintiff's bid on a sale of surplus property was to be accepted within ten days by the United States. The Government orally notified the plaintiff that his bid had been accepted within the ten day period, but the contracting officer, in mailing the required forms, neglected to sign them. The plaintiff claimed that no contract had been formed and brought suit to recover its bid deposit. The United States counterclaimed for damages for breach of contract. Held, the United States properly accepted the bid. Escote Mfg. Co. v. United States, 169 F. Supp. 483 (Ct. Cl. 1959). "Inasmuch as a contract was entered into between plaintiff and defendant, it would make no difference whether the signature of the contracting officer was on the acceptance form. Plaintiff points to no statute or regulation requiring contracts of this nature to be in writing, and we know of none. Consequently, an oral contract in this instance would be just as binding on the plaintiff as well as the Government as though it were in writing. The cases . . . holding that a bid could only be accepted by means of a written signature, were decided under a statute long since repealed, Rev. Stat. § 3744. Thus, it seems quite apparent that the contract forms were sent to plaintiff merely to meet the requirements of the Government's bookkeeping system, rather than to create a binding agreement." 169 F. Supp. at 488. Accord: Ship Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 91 Ct. Cl. 419, 456 (1940). 2. An invitation for bids stated that the successful bidder would be required to execute the standard form construction contract. The plaintiff was low bidder and was authorized by a letter signed by the contracting officer to start work. Later, the project was cancelled without the execution of the required forms. Held, a contract was formed. While a standard form was prescribed, neither the invitation for bids nor the governing regulations stated that a contract in any other form would be invalid. North American Iron & Steel Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. N.Y. 1955). But in Banking & Trading Corporation v. Floete, 257 F. 2d 765 (2d Cir. 1958), an oral agreement was invalidated where the General Services Administration had an express, established policy of contracting only on integrated forms which were to be completed by the plaintiff and submitted to the G.S.A. for approval and execution. Cf. Monroe v. United States, 184 U.S. 524 (1902). 3. 10 U.S.C. § 2305(c) (1958) provides that ". . . Awards shall be made with reasonable promptness by giving written notice to the responsible bidder whose bid conforms to the invitation and will be the most advantageous to the United States, price and other factors considered." What is the legal effect of the written award requirement? Section 4. EFFECT OF DEVIATIONS FROM STATUTES AND REGULATIONS NEW YORK MAIL & NEWSPAPER TRANSP. CO. 154 F. Supp. 271 (Ct. Cl. 1957) cert. denied, 355 U.S. 904 (1957) REED, Justice (sitting by designation). The plaintiff, New York Mail and Newspaper Transportation Company, brought this suit in this Court on April 15, 1954, against the United States to recover damages for an alleged breach by the Government of a contract between the United States and plaintiff. Various items, some variable, enter into the total damages claimed aggregating around two million dollars. That contract was for the rental by the Government of pneumatic tubes on Route 507011-A, New York, New York, for the transmission of the mails from January 1, 1951, through December 31, 1960. On December 29, 1953, defendant, having closed down this Pneumatic Tube Service during that December with notice thereof to plaintiff, advised plaintiff that it considered the contract "null and void." "The notice added, "The purported contract if valid is hereby cancelled in the public interest." Plaintiff, on January 23, 1954, notified defendant that the contract was terminated for breach by the Government. *** In preparation for handling New York mail after 1950, the Post Office Department on April 24, 1950, advertised for proposals for furnishing a pneumatic tube system generally on the same rental basis as the existing contract. The pertinent provisions of the governing statutes at that time required for pneumatic tube contracts a preliminary investigation and a favorable report on the practicalities of such service. "Advertisements shall state in general terms only the requirements of the service" calculated to invite competitive bidding. They were to run for six weeks in not less than five newspapers. The contracts were to be subject to the postal laws and regulations relating to the letting of mail contracts. 39 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) § 423, 39 U.S.C.A. § 423. See finding 4. Furthermore, 39 U.S.C. § 429, 39 U.S.C.A. § 429, directed: "All contracts for carrying the mail shall be in the name of the United States and shall be awarded to the lowest responsible bidder tendering sufficient guaranties for faithful performance in accordance with the terms of the advertisement." There is no contention that these requirements were not followed in the April 1950 advertisement for bids. However, plaintiff in its proposals to the United States in answer to the advertisement did not make its offer to contract in accordance with the terms of the advertisement. Instead, it submitted a proposal which specifically stated, "Conditions and requirements in your advertisement not specifically included in our proposal are intended to be excluded from our proposal." Finding 13. [1] Without detailing in extenso the variations between the invitation to bid and plaintiff's proposal and eventual contract, which appear in findings 12 to 23, inclusive, the conclusion is necessary that the variations were material. * * * The Government's defense, in accordance with its notice, is twofold (1) that the contract is void because of its material departure from the terms of the advertised invitation to bid, * * * 2. We now consider the first defense-the nullity of the contract because of the material departure of the contract from the advertised invitation. We think that the variations, previously listed herein, between the invitation, plaintiff's proposals, and the contract actually signed, demonstrate that the April advertisement could not be treated as a compliance with the essential provisions of 39 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) §§ 423 and 429, 39 U.S.C.A. §§ 423 and 429, set out on p. 2, supra. Those sections remained the governing law as to advertising of postal requirements. Neither the Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 1163, nor of 1950, 64 Stat. 1118, made any change. After the 1950 Act the statutory requirements for advertisements were the same as before its passage. The 1950 Act, § 2, as theretofore, made the newly authorized contract "subject to the provisions of laws relating to the letting of mail contracts." [4, 5] The authority of an officer to enter into a contract binding the United States must be found in some legally enacted provision of law. That rule has been long recognized. In re Floyd Acceptances, 7 Wall. 666, 19 L.Ed. 169; see Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322, 334, 31 S. Ct. 85, 54 L.Ed. 1055; Eastern Extension Australasia & China Tel. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 355, 363, 40 S. Ct. 168, 64 L.Ed. 305; United States v. Goltra, 312 U.S. 203, 208, 61 S. Ct. 487, 85 L.Ed. 776; Fries v. United States, 6 Cir., 170 F. 2d 726, 730. When the statutes on contracts for the carriage of the mails call for prior advertisement, the execution of a contract without such advertisement is invalid. Cf. United States v. Ellicott, 223 U.S. 524, 543, 32 S. Ct. 334, 56 L.Ed. 535. If this contract had been drawn in accordance with the April 1950 advertised requirements for proposals, it may be that a second advertisement under the December 1950 Act would be unnecessary even though it called for compliance with the laws relating to letting mail contracts obviously including those imposing advertisement. 64 Stat. 1118. It was unlikely that any other bidder would compete, as there was no other tube system. A second advertisement was thought by the Attorney General to be unnecessary in a case where former bids, after advertisement, met the requirements of the advertisement. Here there was no attempt to meet the terms of the advertisement. The contractor secured material modifications by negotiation. The Postmaster General did not rely on a rule of necessity to maintain postal functions. Cf. 41 U.S.C. § 5, 41 U.S.C.A. § 5. There is no indication of exigency. Trucks were used in 1953. United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77, 83, 19 L.Ed. 449. Nothing appears to indicate the use of the system could not have been extended for the time necessary to advertise. The history of the 1950 Act does not show any direction by or intention of Congress to have this contract executed by the Postmaster General, without complying with previous provisions for advertisement. In fact his request for legislation and the Act really changed nothing except the limit on rent per mile. [6] It need hardly be said that the general requirements of advertising for government contracts is a true rule of necessity to avoid the dangers of over-pricing goods or services, with the accompanying dangers of corruption in a governmental organization. Variations from that requirement should be and are limited. Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 2304, 10 U.S.C.A. § 2304; See Report on Study of Armed Services Procurement Act, June 15, 1957. Here, although there was and is no suggestion of improper influence or unfair dealing, we conclude that the failure to meet by this contract the advertisement for proposals or to advertise again under the new Act makes the contract of 1950 invalid. [7, 8]. 3. The next problem is what effect such invalidity has upon the services rendered by plaintiff and the expenses incurred by it on account of its undertaking. When the United States contracts, its rights and liabilities are the same as those of an individual, except it cannot be sued without its consent. When an individual or the Government rescinds a contract, the parties are to be placed, as far as possible, in the position they would have occupied without the transaction. So, in United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 258 U.S. 321, 42 S. Ct. 334, 66 L.Ed. 639, a contract implied in fact rather than a tortious use of a patent was found. In Clark v. United States, |