supplant 'The Globe,' by substituting Mr. Ritchie or anybody else as the editorial mouth-piece of Mr. Polk, is the sheerest invention that ever was conceived of."

But Mr. Tyler had more minutely and emphatically handled this matter of "The Globe" intrigue in a letter to Thomas Ritchie, published in 1851, and reproduced in the next preceding volume of this work.

CHAPTER VIII.

TEXAS AND 54° 40'-GREAT SUBJECTS BEFORE THE ADMINISTRATION - PREPARATIONS FOR WAR WITH MEXICO-GEORGE MIFFLIN DALLAS, THE ELEVENTH VICE-PRESIDENT.

TWO

WO great questions at once occupied the attention of the new Administration. Although it was not responsible for their existence, its own creation had depended, to a great extent, upon the avowed and understood direction it would give to them. These questions related to the annexation of Texas to this country, and all that annexation might involve, and the settlement of the Oregon or North-western boundary with Great Britain. During the last days of President Tyler's Administration Mr. Polk was in Washington, and was consulted as to every important step in the proceedings of the friends of the annexation or acquisition of Texas.

Although the Senate had rejected Mr. Tyler's treaty for the annexation of Texas in 1844, the result of the Presidential election had made it apparent that the will of the majority, perhaps, favored that measure. The joint resolutions of both Houses for the annexation were, in like manner, on the point of rejection, when the resolutions of Mr.

Benton, based upon the view of annexation by treaty, throwing the whole matter into the hands of the President and the Senate, where it should be, were ingrafted on the joint resolutions, and the measure carried by a majority of two votes in the Senate. At least five Senators voted for the measure, as a whole, with the full belief and understanding that the incoming Administration would carry out this feature of the measure, and thereby avoid war with Mexico. Mr. Benton's resolutions were ingrafted by the direct sanction of the President elect. And by his sanction, too, Mr. Tyler, on the third day of March started a messenger to Texas with the act of Congress providing for the annexation. Mr. Polk was exceedingly anxious that this business should be completed before the beginning of his term, and used his efforts with the outgoing Administration to effect that purpose. It was charged against him that he did not send to recall Mr. Tyler's messenger on the way to Texas. But that he had no desire to do. Mr. Tyler had done exactly what he wanted him to do. At all events, there was not the least indication of any disposition to make the annexation of Texas depend upon negotiations, and the Senators whose votes secured the passage of the measure considered themselves deceived. Their votes had been obtained by the distinct understanding that its execution would be left to the new Administration, and that they believed to be pledged to carry out Colonel Benton's addition to the resolutions. The cry of fraud may have been an exagger

ation, however. And where the blame of deception mainly rests, whether with Mr. Tyler, President Polk, or whether it was chiefly a dexterous feat of the annexation Congressmen, the reader must decide after taking a full view of the case as presented in the next preceding volume of this work. It is there shown that President Polk did not take up with the negotiation clause of the annexation act of Congress, and from what here follows, it may be seen that although he did, after a time, make some effort at negotiation, not as had been claimed he would do, by sending a commission of the ablest men of the country, but by sending a minister plenipotentiary with powers, all his acts lay in the direct way to war with Mexico. Although President Tyler did not believe that Mexico, as poor and as divided as she was, would ever go to war with this country on account of the annexation of Texas, yet he had certainly laid the foundation for the war in the face of direct warnings and threats from the accredited agents of Mexico. Mr. Polk was pledged to his annexation policy, as he was to the north-western border of 54° 40'. With the prospect of war with England he gladly shrank away from this lofty position, if he was not also influenced by the question of adding preponderant territory north of the Missouri Compromise or anti-slavery line.

That Mexico regarded the act to incorporate Texas with the United States as hostile, and a sufficient ground of war, was fully known to the new, as well as the old, Administration. In 1844, Mexico

had given notice that such a step would be equivalent to a declaration of war. And on the 6th of March, 1845, but five days after the passage of the annexation resolutions the Mexican Minister at Washington, Almonte, demanded and received his passports, protesting against the resolutions, and deeming them sufficient to break all friendly relations between the two nations. There was no indication now that Mexico had the least disposition to give up Texas without a struggle. Re-annexation, a word, a pretext, in American politics had no weight on the other side of the Rio Grande, and war they constantly said was inevitable in case the United States took such a step. Nor did these declarations and threats hinder the Administration of this Government from proceeding to the accomplishment of its purpose..

On the 4th of July, 1845, Texas passed her ordinance accepting the conditions of annexation, and then proceeded to form her constitution and make elections for admission as a State of the Union. On the 7th of July the Texas Convention called upon the United States to send an army to the defense of that country. President Polk had anticipated this request. General Z. Taylor, then in command in Louisiana, where he was watching the movements of Mexico, was ordered to move his forces into Texas, and A. J. Donelson, the representative of the United States in Mexico, was ordered to advise with General Taylor as to his movements.