you must either affirm to be ordinarily contrary to salvation, as some extreme controversialists on your side do, or else you cannot escape the inference, that ours is the safer way, the way to be chosen upon Butler's and Pascal's rule."

This being, as it is hoped, no unfair representation of the argument, I ask, Do not all generous minds feel in it, before examination, something unsatisfactory? Does it not give a cold, dry, hard interpretation to the term "safer way," reminding one rather of a dextrous diplomatist insisting on the literal terms of a treaty, than of a loyal and affectionate son and subject, committing himself unreservedly to the King and Father of all? In fact, when we come to analyse it, it clearly assumes the utilitarian theory of morals. It assumes that the greatest discernible good of the individual is the proper measure, to him, of right and wrong. Whereas if we grant a righteous Governor of the world, the "safe way" of course must be, not what is visibly best for ourselves, but what is most pleasing to Him-most apparently on His side in the great conflict between good and evil. We must bind ourselves by an unchangeable rule, never to do evil that good may come; no not for the seeming certainty of the greatest good, the eternal salvation of our brethren's souls and our own. We must make up our minds to suspect all such appearances, however plausible, and count them fallacious, if they involve a contradiction of a plain

moral duty. As the Apostle says,-(may it be permitted without irreverence so to apply sacred words ?—) “Though we, or an Angel from Heaven, preach any other Gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed."

To some this will sound as if we were fairly giving up the principle of the " safer way" but it is not really so. We are merely allowing for an additional element, which the nature of the case requires, in the calculation by which we judge of "safety:" additional, I mean, to those which Butler and Pascal had chiefly to contemplate. They had to deal in the first place with such as denied eternity and so far, the bare statement of terms was enough to indicate the "safe way." But here Eternity is granted, and we have to choose among conflicting systems, each professing to secure happiness in it. And being by supposition incompetent to decide upon the masses of direct evidence, which these systems severally allege, we look to analogy for further help in determining "the safe way;" and we find it altogether confirming the impression to which unbiassed instinct would lead us: viz. that the world being under moral government, the "safe way" in uncertain cases must be that which is most agreeable to the duties we are before certain of. "He that is willing to do His will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God."

On this principle, neither the Roman nor any other communion would be the "safe way" to a person who could not enter into it without involving himself in moral guilt: if, for instance, it were required as a condition of his baptism that he should confess a crime, whereof he knows himself to be innocent. What could such an one do, but continue formally excommunicate, and hope that in the sight of God he was virtually not so?

Cases again may be conceived affecting practice, in which the seeming logical or historical evidence may tell almost wholly on one side, yet it may be clearly right to prefer the other, by reason of some moral instinct, which comes in and will not let itself be unfelt. Suppose a man's parent accused of any great crime: let the amount of apparent proof against him be never so overwhelming, none will deny that it is the child's duty, come what will, to disbelieve his guilt if he can; to give him the benefit not only of reasonable doubt, but of any the faintest and remotest possibility of innocence; and to act accordingly, disregarding all personal consequences. Now this is but one out of a thousand instances, wherein the moral sense is mercifully empowered to correct the errors of the intellect, or supply its imperfections. Few in comparison are judges of evidence, but all may listen to the inward voice, directing them in such matters to the safer side.

C

Let us now, very briefly, apply these principles to the case before us. And by way of proving their strength more entirely, we will grant for the present far more than the truth demands. We will suppose, on the one side, a great array of facts, authorities, and arguments, which a person does not know how to refute, (though he cannot say but it is very possible some refutation may exist, as yet unknown to him, or that counterstatements equally strong might be made :) and on the other side, only the simple principle, " quieta non movere: wherever a man is called, there let him abide with God:" even this alone ought assuredly to go a good way. Mere contentment and resignation to the Divine will, which has cast our lot where it is, in spiritual and intellectual no less than in temporal respects, ought in all reason to make us slow to change. "I am where God has seen fit to place me; surely this one consideration entitles me to throw the burden of proof entirely on those who call on me to alter my profession." "Be content with such things as ye have:" be minute therefore and scrupulous in examining, (if your duty really call on you to examine,) whatever is said to separate you from your present Communion: look at it with a jealous, unfavourable eye, and shew to the other side proportional favour. For whatever else is right or wrong, this you are quite sure must be right; "in whatsoever state you are, therewith to be content,"

until you discern unequivocal manifestations of God's will calling you out of it.

Again; some questions are felt to be of a kind, which it requires a certain daring and hardihood of mind to answer in an intellectual way: and no doubt there are persons, who, when such a subject occurs to them, feel it as a kind of challenge to do their best in grappling with it. They acknowledge it as a call of Providence, a venture which they are summoned to make; but intellects of the average sort instinctively draw back; and are they not right in so doing? Doubtless, the extent and complication of an argument, the number and magnitude of the points involved in it, the quantity of information which may be accumulated on it ;— these are so many indications of its not being meant to be decided by common persons. They call on us for a wise self-distrust; and self-distrust is a temper so suitable to us and our condition, that whatever course implies most of it has so far a presumption in its favour.

Again; the same remark applies, still more strongly, to the temper of mind which is turned by grace into contrition; the inclination to magnify rather than extenuate our faults. If, on comparison of two modes of thinking and acting, one is decidedly more favourable than the other to the cultivation of this great spiritual talent; this is, so far, a declaration of Providence in favour of one rather than the other.