sums contributed at such periods, the influences behind some of the contributions, and the new interest of the public in these influences make it desirable, however, to consider the matter as a single but very important section of the broader subject of party support in general.

Admitting the necessity and utility under present conditions of party organisation and party work it is certainly not unreasonable to suggest that part of the burden of campaign management should be borne by the state. In his message at the beginning of the first session of the Sixtieth Congress, December, 1907, President Roosevelt said on this subject:

"The need for collecting large campaign funds would vanish if Congress provided an appropriation for the proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties, an appropriation ample enough to meet the necessity for thorough organisation and machinery, which requires a large expenditure of money. Then the stipulation should be made that no party receiving campaign funds from the Treasury should accept more than a fixed amount from any individual subscriber or donor; and the necessary publicity for receipts and expenditures could without difficulty be provided."

It was frankly admitted that this proposal was very radical" and that until the people had time to familiarise themselves with it they would not be willing to consider its adoption. Indeed popular feeling nowadays, whether rightly or wrongly,

is strongly averse to the granting of aid to party organisations and is manifestly bent on cutting off some of their sources of supply rather than on providing others. Many objections may be made to President Roosevelt's proposal, some of them technical in character, others on the basis of principle. Legitimate expenses" might be hard to define, but the attempt has been made already by several state legislatures.1 Congress would either have to vote the same sum to each of the two principal parties, or else devise some scheme of

1Nevada was the first state to enact legislation of this character. (L. 1895, ch. 103; repealed, 1899, ch. 108.) In the same year a Minnesota law (ch. 277) presented a very detailed definition of legitimate expenses. The laws of Pennsylvania (1906, ch. 17), and of New York (1906, ch. 503), are very significant. Professor Merriam sums them up as follows: "Both provide that no expenses shall be incurred except of the classes authorised in the act. The New York list, which is rather more liberal in this respect than that of Pennsylvania, includes rent of halls and compensation of speakers, music, and fireworks, advertisement and incidental expenses of meetings, posters, lithographs, banners, and literary material, payments to agents to supervise the preparation of campaign articles and advertisements, and furnish information to newspapers; for advertising, pictures, reading material, etc.; for rent of offices and club rooms, compensation of clerks and agents; for attorneys at law; for preparation of lists of voters; for necessary personal and travelling expenses of candidates and committeemen; for postage, express, telegraph, and telephone; for preparing nominating petitions; for workers and watchers at the polls, and food for the same; for transportation of the sick and infirm to the polls." ("N. Y. State Library Review of Legis

pro rata distribution. How minor political parties would fare under the former arrangement is not discussed. Colorado met this question in 1909, by providing that the state should pay twenty-five cents for each vote cast at the preceding contest for governor. The money is distributed to the state party chairmen in proportion to the votes cast by each party. One-half of it must be handed over to the county chairmen in proportion to the number of votes cast in each county. Other contributions to campaign funds are prohibited, except from candidates, who, however, may not give

lation, 1906," p. 160.) Cf. also Virginia, L. 1903, ch. 98; South Dakota, L. 1907, ch. 146; and California, L. 1907, ch. 350.

In 1907, New York took the further step of limiting the amount of expenditure for a given purpose, ch. 398 of that year providing that not more than three carriages in a city district, nor more than six in other districts, should be used for the transportation of voters. Acting on the same principle Massachusetts in 1908 (ch. 85), prohibited the employment by political committees of more than six persons in a voting precinct or city ward. As the lavish expenditure of campaign funds for service, rents, and commodities may become nothing more than a veiled form of vote buying, the significance of the action of New York and Massachusetts is apparent. The English Act of 1883 contains similar provisions.

The New Jersey law of 1906 (ch. 208) contains a long list of prohibited expenditures, including payments for entertainment, for fitting up club rooms for social or recreative purposes, or providing uniforms for any organised club, and the payment for insertion of articles in newspapers and magazines unless labelled as paid articles.

sums in excess of twenty-five per cent of their first year's salary. What the practical outcome of the plan may be it is, of course, impossible to predict. Just how a new minor party is to get itself started, apart from the limited contributions of its candidates, does not appear. Objection might also be raised to this pro rata arrangement on the ground that it bases the financial support of parties almost entirely upon their showing at the preceding elec-. tion. So far as the strength of parties is determined by their money income the effect of the law will manifestly be to maintain the status quo ante. Theoretically party support ought to depend on the present actual standing of a party, that is, the comparative value to the state of its policies at the election for which its expenses are to be paid. Of course no agreement is possible as to just what this standing is in given cases. None the less it would seem clear that there might be a wide divergence between the relative showing made by a party at the polls two or more years ago and its present deserts. Possibly also a system of voluntary giving with restrictions of corporate contributions and other abuses might more correctly measure the current merit of parties than the pro rata state appropriation system.

The Colorado plan, with the exception of the limited contributions it permits from candidates, places the burden of election expenses entirely upon the state, and therefore prohibits contributions

both from corporations and individuals. President Roosevelt's suggestion is not so radical, involving as it clearly did the raising of funds by contributions in addition to the proposed congressional appropriations. If, however, the latter were made sufficient to provide for the "proper and legitimate expenses of each of the great national parties," one might inquire for what other purposes the campaign managers would need money. Waiving this question, a mixed system of state subsidies and private contributions has certain distinct advantages. There is considerable force in President Roosevelt's argument that publicity and the restriction of large contributions could be more easily obtained under a plan combining the two kinds of support. Public appropriations for campaign pur poses would place the state in a stronger position Togically to exercise supervision over the whole process of gathering and spending money for political purposes. However, it remains to be demonstrated that publicity and the restriction of objectionable contributions cannot be secured without the payment of party subsidies. Evidently, also, there would be difficulties in connection with the supervision of party activities necessary to determine whether or not the proposed congressional appropriations should be granted. Democratic

campaign managers would certainly feel that no Republican congress could deal fairly with them in such matters, although a bi-partisan supervisory