Cambridge University Press, 23. nov. 1995 - 560 sider
This textbook provides a thorough treatment of all the central topics in public economics. Aimed at senior undergraduate and graduate students, it will also be invaluable to professional economists and to those teaching in the field. The book is entirely self-contained, giving all the equilibrium theory and welfare economics needed to understand the analyses. The author covers the Arrow-Debreu economy, welfare economics and the measurement of inequality and poverty which lay the foundations and emphasise the important role played by information. Within the competitive economy, he examines commodity taxation, income taxation and tax reform in a certain environment. He goes on to study the public economics of uncertainty, and then treats public goods, externalities, imperfect competition and tax evasion as departures from the standard competitive assumptions and looks at their implication for public economics derived.
Hva folk mener - Skriv en omtale
Vi har ikke funnet noen omtaler på noen av de vanlige stedene.
Relaxing the assumptions
Consumption TheLindahl equilibrium
Nonexistenceof pooling equilibrium Separatingequilibrium Socialsecurity 15 1 Equilibrium and stability
Andre utgaver - Vis alle
aggregate allocation alternative analysis andthe Arrow–Debreu assumed assumption axioms budget constraint bythe canbe chapter characterisation choice Coase theorem commodity taxes competitive equilibrium consider consumer consumption consumption set convex defined denoted derived determined differentiated discussion economy effect efficiency endowment equations equity equivalence scales existence expenditure externality feasible Figure firms firstorder condition follows given Hence household h identical imperfect competition implies increase indifference curves inequality measure input interpretation inthe isthe itis labour supply Lindahl equilibrium Lorenz curve lumpsum taxes maximisation Mirrlees Nash equilibrium negative normalisation numeraire ofthe onthe optimal tax optimum outcome output Pareto efficient Pareto optimality poverty poverty line preferences price vector production set profit programme Proof provides public economics publicgood Ramsey rule reform restrictions result revenue satisfy setof social security social welfare function tax incidence tax rate tax system taxation thatthe thetax tothe transfer uponthe utility function valuation willbe withthe zero