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may bestow those votes at his discretion upon the whole number of persons to be chosen, giving one vote to each, or upon any less number, cumulating his votes upon one, two, three, or any other number less than the whole. That is simple in its statement, although its effect, the practical character of the proposition, requires some reflection and prolonged experience to its entire comprehension. What is its effect? It is that any political interest in a community, whether in a State or in a division of a State, if it can ascertain about the relative proportion which its strength bears to the whole mass of the vote, or to the vote of an opposing interest, may cast the suffrages of its members in such manner that they will tell upon the result; and it will happen that every man, or about every man who votes, will vote for a candidate who will be chosen, and there will be no such thing as unrepresented minorities left. They will be wiped out of the system; they will no longer exist. To speak of this as a plan for the representation of minorities is an abuse of terms, because it conveys no idea which attaches to the plan. Far be it from us to arm a minority with power which we know even majorities abuse! The proposition now submitted to us is not that there shall be majorities and minorities known in election returns, but that the men who vote shall vote for those who will be chosen, and who will in point of fact represent them.

I cannot better illustrate the scheme than by the case of Vermont, which I have used on another occasion. There are 60,000 voters in Vermont, of whom 40,000 are members of the Republican party

and 20,000 of the Democratic party. I speak in round numbers. By law that State is entitled to three Representatives in Congress, because her population, under the Constitution of the United States, authorizes the allotment of that number to her. Now, what ought to take place there? The majority should elect two Representatives, having 40,000 voters, and the minority should elect one, having 20,000 voters; but can that be so in point of fact at present? If the electors of that State vote for three Representatives by general ticket the majority would elect the whole three. If the State be divided up into single districts, it is a matter of chance how the result will be, whether all three districts will have majorities of the same political complexion or not. I say it is a matter of chance; nay, more than that, it is a matter of honesty in the Legislature of the State, and any political majority that has control of the Legislature will very likely form the districts to suit its own interests. We know that these things occur everywhere. By cumulative voting, by authorizing the 20,000 minority electors of that State to give each three votes to one candidate, that candidate would receive 60,000 votes, and the majority cannot defeat him. The majority voting for two Representatives can elect them, but they cannot elect the third. Suppose they attempt to vote for three candidates, they can only give each of them 40,000 votes, and the minority candidate has 60,000. If they attempt to vote for two, as they ought to do, that being the number they are entitled to, they can give them 60,000 votes each, the same number that the minority candidate has. If they

attempted to vote for one they would give that one candidate 120,000; but of course they would not throw away their votes in that foolish manner. The practical result would be that the 40,000 majority electors in that State would vote for two candidates and elect them, and the 20,000 minority electors would vote for one and elect him, and results analogous to this would occur all over the United States if this system were applied. In every State the freemen, each possessing an equal right with his neighbor, would each vote for a Representative or Representatives in Congress who would speak his voice and obey his will, and thus you would obtain throughout the country, in each State, an actual representation of the whole mass of people on both sides; honest representation instead of a sham; a government by the majority in point of fact in Congress instead of an accidental result, which may be one way or the other, and is just as likely to be minority rule as anything else, and always and under all circumstances unjust rule.

Oh! gentlemen, what would happen then? Some little men in the State Legislature, destitute of honor but greedy of gain and of personal objects, would no longer gerrymander your States [applause], would no longer sit in quiet chambers concocting injustice by law, studying how they can prevent their neighbors from being represented in the government and get an undue share of public power for themselves and for their friends. That iniquity would be ended, and would be no more heard of among us. Why, gentlemen, at this moment, from the British possessions upon the northeast to the

Golden Gate of the Pacific, there is probably not one honest apportionment law for members of Congress, and you will scarcely ever have one, unless in an exceptional case where one political interest shall have control of the upper branch of a Legislature and another of the lower, holding each other in check, and compelling some degree of fairness in the formation of the law.

I do not desire to speak on any topic which may. bear a partisan complexion. I am almost afraid to cite cases lest I shall be thought to have an object or purpose not openly avowed. Let me tell you the difficulty in this case is in human nature, and you must frame your system so that mischief will not result. "It is necessary," said a great and wise man, "that by the very constitution of things power should be a check to power." What said Dr. Priestly? "There is no earthly power that has not grown exorbitant when it has met with no control." Take these words of men who thought wisely and profoundly, and then look at your existing political action and see whether it is not a struggle for power instead of a struggle for justice; whether it is not a struggle by each interest to obtain all it can and to retain all it can, and to keep away from an opposing interest anything like a fair distribution of power or fair treatment.

It is necessary, then, gentlemen, that by your fixed arrangements in your constitutions and laws you shall curb the injustice of human nature; that you shall so arrange your system that evil and selfish men cannot pervert it to their own purposes and to the injury of others. A system of cumulative

voting secures the government of the real majority of the people. Instead of striking off a part of them in the popular elections, they are all represented in the representative body, whether Congress or the State Legislature, and there by a single operation the vote is taken, the majority pronounced, and a proposed law is enacted or defeated. Instead of unjust representation and an eventual decision by a representative majority moved and governed by a caucus, you will have fair, equal, extended, complete representation of the whole mass of the people and the proper voice of the majority pronounced in the representative body.

I repeat, this is no plan for minority representation merely; it is a plan for the representation of the whole people, a device by which the majority shall rule and shall pronounce its voice in a fair and honest manner. Again, a system of cumulative voting would secure to you in your legislative bodies men of high ability, and secure them for long periods of time, because elections would not be subject to the uncertainties which attend ordinary elections under the majority rule. A political party in Pennsylvania, constituting about or near one-half its electors, assuming that the State would be permanently entitled say to twenty-four members (the present number), can keep about a dozen men continuously in Congress for a long period of time Just as long as they retain the confidence of their constituents they will be elected, because the meri of this plan is that one part of the community cannot vote down another. Each will get its due share of Representatives, and can keep it always simply

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