SENATE COMMITTEE REPORT.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES.

MARCH 2, 1869.

Mr. BUCKALEW, from the Select Committee on Representative Reform, submitted the following

REPORT.*

[To accompany bill S. No. 772.]

THE bill referred to the committee, and now reported by them, presents a question which deserves deliberate examination both because it is important and because it is new. It proposes to secure fair and complete representation to every important political interest in the country; to strike an effectual blow at corruption in popular elections; to secure more of harmony and contentment than now exist among the people, and to improve the composition of the popular branch of Congress by facilitating the introduction and continuance of men of ability and merit in that body. That these results may to a great extent be secured by it is, by the friends of the measure, most positively affirmed. If the claim made by them on its behalf be substantially true,

* Congressional Globe, 3d Sess. 40th Cong., Appendix, p. 268. Sen. Com. Report, same sess., No. 271.

or true to any considerable extent, and the plan be capable of convenient application, it will merit strong commendation and prompt adoption.

THE PLAN.

Representatives being assigned to a State under the constitutional rule of distribution, each elector in the State shall possess as many votes as there are representatives to be chosen. He shall possess his due and equal share of electoral power as a member of the political body or State. Thus far we deal with familiar ideas which have heretofore obtained. It is next proposed that the elector shall exercise his right of suffrage according to his own judgment and discretion, and without compulsion of law. He shall bestow or distribute his votes upon or among candidates with entire freedom, and shall be relieved from that legal constraint to which he has been heretofore subjected. He may select his candidate or candidates anywhere within the limit of his State from among all its qualified citizens, and he may exert his political power upon the general representation of his State instead of the representation of a particular district within it. Here is unquestionably a large and valuable extension of privilege to the citizen, a withdrawal from him of inconvenient and odious restraint, and a more complete application of that principle of self-government upon which our political institutions are founded. what is material for consideration is, that while all the advantages of a plan of election by general ticket are secured, all its inconveniences and evils are avoided.

And

FORMER PLANS-THEIR IMPERFECTIONS.

Formerly when elections of representatives in Congress were had by general ticket, a great inconvenience resulted which became at last offensive and intolerable. For a political majority in a State, organized as a party, and casting its votes under a majority or plurality rule, secured in ordinary cases the entire representation from the State and the minority were wholly excluded from representation. To avoid this inconvenience and evil which had become general throughout the country, Congress interposed, and by statute required the States to select their representatives by single districts, that is to divide their territory into districts, each of which should elect one member. This contrivance, dictated by Congressional power, ameliorated our electoral system, mitigated the evil of which general complaint had been made, and was an unquestionable advance in the art of government amongst us. But retaining the majority or plurality rule for elections and restricting the power and free action of the elector, it was imperfect in its design and has been unsatisfactory in practice. It has not secured fair representation of political interests, and it has continued in existence in a somewhat mitigated form the evils of the plan of election by general ticket which it superseded. Still, one body of organized electors in a district vote down another; electoral corruption is not effectually checked, and the general result is unfair representation of political interests in the popular house of Congress. Besides, the single district plan has called into existence incon

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veniences peculiar to itself and which did not attach to the former plan.

It excludes from Congress men of ability and merit whose election was possible before, and thus exerts a baneful influence upon the constitution of the House. Two causes operate to this end. In the first place no man who adheres to a minority party in any particular district can be returned, and next, great rapidity of change is produced by fluctuation of party power in the districts.

Again, the single district system gives rise to gerrymandering in the States in the formation of districts. Single districts will almost always be unfairly made. They will be formed in the interest of party and to secure an unjust measure of power to their authors, and it may be expected that each successive district apportionment will be more unjust than its predecessor. Parties will retaliate upon each other whenever possible. The disfranchisement suffered through one decade by a political party may be repeated upon it in the next with increased severity, but if it shall happen to have power in the legislature when the new apportionment for the State is to be made, it will take signal vengeance for its wrongs and in its turn indulge in the luxury of persecution.

MODES OF VOTING DESCRIBED.

The manner in which the right of suffrage shall be exercised, always a question of high importance, is one of difficulty also. It has been regulated in various ways in our States and in foreign countries, but must be considered in many respects as still open to debate. We have pretty generally adopted

the vote by secret ballot for popular elections, but whether votes be given by secret or open ballot, or by voice, a question will remain as to the manner in which they shall be bestowed upon or distributed among candidates. Where but one representative or other official is to be chosen by a constituency, it is readily understood that a single vote is to be given by each elector to the candidate of his choice, and such is the uniform regulation. But where more than one person is to be chosen by a constituency, the manner of bestowing votes upon candidates is a question of more difficulty, and various regulations have been made or proposed concerning it. Several of these it is necessary to mention and describe before proceeding to the main matters to be examined in this report.

The vote by general ticket.-By the general ticket plan of distributive voting the elector has assigned to him a number of votes equal to the whole number of persons to be chosen, and is authorized to bestow them singly upon a like number of candidates. Upon this plan presidential electors are chosen in all the States except Florida.

The vote by single districts.-By the single district plan the general constituency is divided into parts by territorial lines and each part constituted a sub-constituency to vote separately and choose one person. The voter casts a single vote for his candidate and has no participation in the action of the general constituency beyond the giving of his district vote. Upon this plan, prescribed by statute, representatives in Congress are now chosen.

The limited vote.-The limited vote obtains