APPENDIX I. PHILOSOPHICAL.

THINKING (employing that term as comprehending all our cognitive energies,) is of two kinds. It is either A) Negative or B) Positive.

A.) Thinking is NEGATIVE, (in propriety, a negation of thought,) when Existence is not attributed to an object. It is of two kinds; inasmuch as the one or the other of the conditions of positive thinking is violated. In either case, the result is

Nothing.+

It might be supposed that Negative thinking being a negation of thought is in propriety a negation therefore, absolutely, of all mental activity. But this would be erroneous. In fact, as Aristotle observes (Soph. Elench. c. xxxi. § 1.), every negation involves an affirmation, and we cannot think or predicate nonexistence, except by reference to existence. Thus even Negative thought is realised only under the condition of Relativity and Positive thinking. For example, we try to think-to predicate existence, in some way, but find ourselves unable. We then predicate incogitability, and if we do not always predicate, as an equivalent, (objective) non-existence, we shall never err.

+ (From Addenda to second edition)—(1853.) Lest in the sequel it be omitted, I shall here, in the outset, at least indicate, what, along with the philosophy of which it is the basis-the Philosophy of the Conditioned, has been strangely overlooked by metaphysicians: I mean the distinction of the Necessity of Thought into two kinds, the Positive and the Negative; the one the necessity of so thinking, (the impossibility of not so thinking,) determined by a mental Power; the other the necessity of not so thinking, (the impossibility of so thinking,) determined by a mental Impotence.

Leibnitz was the first who, articulately at least, established the quality of Necessity, (the impossibility of not so thinking), as the criterion of our native or noetic or non-experiential notions and judgments. This was more fully developed and applied by Kant; and, with a few feeble reclamations, this part of the Critical Philosophy has been generally accepted wheresoever it has been adequately understood. In fact, the doctrine of necessity, the test of unacquired cognitions, may now be laid down as an acknowledged criterion, nay almost as a commonplace, in Metaphysic-out of England.-But Leibnitz, Kant, and subsequent philosophers, have not observed, that we must distinguish this Necessity as it proceeds from the one or from the other of two, and even two counter, sources; thus dividing it into two great categories- categories which fall themselves to be afterwards subdivided. For, 1°, we may not only be able, but be positively determined, to think one alternative, whilst impotent to conceive its counter; and 2°, we may be negatively unable to think one contradictory, and yet find ourselves equally impotent to conceive its opposite. The former, from a Power, is thus primarily inclusive and secondarily exclusive; the latter, from an Impotence, is thus simply and bilaterally exclusive. And while it has always been acknowledged, that of contradictories the one or the other must be, and be thought, as indiscriminately NECESSARY; we are brought by this novel doctrine to the further confession, that even of contradictories we may, however, not be able to realise in thought the discriminate POSSIBILITY of either.

This distinction also affords us the all-important contrast of legitimate and ille

I.) If the condition of Non-contradiction be not fulfilled, there emerges The really Impossible, what has been called in the schools

Nihil purum.

II.) If the condition of Relativity be not purified, there results The Impossible to thought; that is, what may exist, but what we are unable to conceive existing. This impossible, the schools have not contemplated; we are, therefore, compelled, for the sake of symmetry and precision, to give it a scholastic appellation in the Nihil cogitabile.

B.) Thinking is POSITIVE, (and this in propriety is the only real thought,) when Existence is predicated of an object. By existence is not, however, here meant real or objective existence, but only existence subjective or ideal. Thus, imagining a Centaur or Hippogryph, we do not suppose that the phantasm has any being beyond our imagination; but still we attribute to it an actual existence in thought. Nay, we attribute to it a possible existence in creation; for we can represent nothing, which we do not think, as within the limits of Almighty power to realise. Nothing, therefore, can be more erroneous than to make, as is very commonly done, "chimerical" tantamount to "contradictory."-Positive thinking can be brought to bear only under two conditions; the condition of I) Non-contradiction, and the condition of II) Relativity. If both are fulfilled, we think-Something.

I.) NON-CONTRADICTION. This condition is insuperable. We think it, not only as a law of thought, but as a law of things; and while we suppose its violation to determine an absolute

gitimate thought; thus enabling us to explain some of the most inveterate and pervasive hallucinations in philosophy. For whilst the Positive Necessity of so thinking never illudes, is never even the occasion of illusion; the Negative Necessity of not so thinking is, even naturally, the source of deception. For if, on finding one alternative to be incogitable, we recoil at once to the conclusion, — that this is false, and the contradictory opposite therefore true, (and our right—our obligation even, to do this, has been explicitly asserted, especially in the Leibnitian school) the inference, though this be even difficult not pronely to admit, will be logically false,-the consequent containing more than the antecedent; and thus in philosophy (whether of theory or of practice) we shall be precipitated into a variety of errors. (See footnotes to Reid, p. 377, a.)

The development and application of the latter of these Necessities, (in combination however always with the former,) constitutes the Philosophy of the Conditioned; the Philosophy of the Conditioned is, therefore, the unexclusive complement of a recognised and of an overlooked principle of mind.-So much it is here requisite to hint by way of preparation.

impossibility, we suppose its fulfilment to afford only the Notimpossible. Thought is, under this condition, merely explicative or analytic; and the condition itself is brought to bear under three phases, constituting three laws: i)—the law of Identity; ii.)—the law of Contradiction (more properly of Non-contradiction); iii.)—the law of Excluded Middle (i.e. between two contradictories). The science of these laws is Logic; and as the laws are only explicative, Logic is only formal. (The principle of Sufficient Reason should be excluded from Logic. For, inasmuch as this principle is not material (material--non-formal,) it is only a derivation of the three formal laws; and inasmuch as it is material, it coincides with the principle of Causality, and is extra-logical).

Though necessary to state the condition of Non-contradiction, there is no dispute about its effect, no danger of its violation. When, therefore, I speak of the Conditioned, the term is used in special reference to Relativity. By Existence Conditioned, is meant, emphatically, existence relative, existence thought under relation. Relation may thus be understood to contain all the categories and forms of positive thought.

II.) RELATIVITY. This condition (by which, be it observed, is meant the relatively or conditionally Relative, and, therefore, not even the Relative, absolutely or infinitely,)-this condition is not insuperable. We should not think it as a law of things, but merely as a law of thought; for we find that there are contradictory opposites, one of which, by the rule of Excluded Middle, must be true, but neither of which can by us be positively thought, as possible.-Thinking, under this condition, is ampliative or synthetic. Its science, Metaphysic, (using that term in a comprehensive meaning,) is therefore material, in the sense of nonformal. The condition of Relativity, in so far as it is necessary, is brought to bear under two principal relations; the one springing from the subject of knowledge—the mind thinking, (the relation of Knowledge); the other (which is subdivided) from the object of knowledge-the thing thought about, (the relations of Existence).

(Besides these necessary and original relations, of which alone it is requisite to speak in an alphabet of human thought, there are many relations, contingent and derivative, which we frequently employ in the actual applications of our cognitive energies. Such for example (without arrangement,) as-Absolute and Relative,

One and Other, Same and Different, True and False, Good and Bad, Perfect and Imperfect, End and Mean, Easy and Difficult, Desire and Aversion, Simple and Complex, Unity and Plurality, Uniform and Various, Singular and Universal, Whole and Part, Similar and Dissimilar, Congruent and Incongruent, Equal and Unequal, Orderly and Disorderly, Beautiful and Deformed, Material and Immaterial, Natural and Artificial, Organised and Inorganised, Young and Old, Male and Female, Parent and Child, &c. &c. These admit of classification from different points of view; but to attempt their arrangement at all, far less on any exclusive principle, would here be manifestly out of place.)

i.) The relation of Knowledge is that which arises from the reciprocal dependence of the subject and object of thought, SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE, including Self and Not-Self, or Ego and Non-Ego. Whatever comes into consciousness, is thought by us, either as belonging to the mental self, exclusively, (subjectivo-subjective,) or as belonging to the not-self, exclusively, (objectivo-objective,) or as belonging partly to both, (subjectivoobjective). It is difficult, however, to find words to express precisely all the correlations of knowledge. For in cognizing a mere affection of self, we objectify it; it forms a subject-object or subjective object, or subjectivo-subjective object; and how shall we name and discriminate a mode of mind, representative of and relative to a mode of matter? This difficulty is, however, strictly psychological. In so far as we are at present concerned, it is manifest that all these cognitions exist for us, only as terms of a correlation.

The relations of Existence, arising from the object of knowledge, are twofold; inasmuch as the relation is either Intrinsic or Extrinsic.

ii.) As the relation of Existence is Intrinsic, it is that of SUBSTANCE AND QUALITY, (Quality being variously styled, Form, Accident, Property, Mode, Affection, Phænomenon, Appearance, Attribute, Predicate, Denomination, &c.) It may be called Qualitative.

Substance and Quality are, manifestly, only thought as mutual relatives. We cannot think a quality existing absolutely, in or of itself. We are constrained to think it, as inhering in some basis, substratum, hypostasis, subject or substance; but this substance cannot be conceived by us, except negatively, that is, as the un