lation, and contribute to the developement of intellect; but they cannot create such lasting distinctions and peculiarities, as we are in the habit of claiming for the national literature of a people.

"America has not passed through the different stages of civilization, each of which leaves its historical monuments and a distinct impression on the people. There was no community of religion, and hardly of feeling, previous to their common resistance against England. It was the genius of liberty which gave America a national elevation; and it is to this genius, therefore, we must look for national productions. It is the bond of union, the confession, the religion, the life of Americans; it is that which distinguishes them above all other nations in the world.

"But the genius of liberty, though it has chosen America for its permanent dwelling, overshadows, also, a portion of Europe. England, France, and Germany, are roused by its summons; and the poet of Europe, inspired by the same muse, kneels at the same altar, and worships the same God. Thus, the Americans, instead of being a distinct people, have become the representatives of liberty throughout the world. Their country has become the home of the banished; the asylum of the persecuted; the prospective heaven of the politically damned. Every people of Europe is represented in the United States; every tongue is spoken in the vast domain of freedom; the history of every nation terminates in that of America.

"But this gigantic conglomeration, while it prognosticates the future sway of the United States, while it promises to revive the history of all ages and of every clime, is, nevertheless, one of the principal causes why America possesses, as yet, no national literature. Yet there is sufficient of English leaven in this enormous mass, to penetrate even its uttermost particles. The fructifying principle is everywhere visible, and the fruits are not tardy of coming. But the seed is English, though the soil and climate may give it a different developement." pp. 105-108.

The last part of this extract is of unusual eloquence, both of thought and language. In the anticipations in which the author indulges with regard to the literature of this country, we join with pride and cordiality. "All other nations," he says, "have conquered by the sword, and their traces were marked by ruin and desolation; America alone vanquishes her foes by civilization, and marks her course by moral and religious improvements. There is poetry in her national developement, and the settlements of her early colonies." It

may be observed, that in literature and science, the Americans are as yet the imitators of Europe. But for how many years, we would ask, did all Europe imitate the ancients, receiving from them the forms of expression, and the rules of thought and investigation? Centuries elapsed before Galileo discovered, before Bacon promulgated, or rather enforced by his recommendation and example, the new philosophy, and before Shakspeare wrote. A people does not suddenly change its character, political or literary. The influence of the past is stronger than that of the present; and we must wait till our national character has settled into the permanent shape, which properly harmonizes with the magnificent scenery in which we are placed; till traditions have accumulated, and the history of our own continent sufficiently fills the mind, without allowing it to wander, for dearth of interest here, to the opposite shores of the ocean. Then may we expect new fountains of literature and intellectual effort to be opened. The inspiring genius of our institutions may preside over the forms of statuary, and the breathings of the canvass. The poet's lyre may sound a higher strain than has yet been reached; and the tongue of the orator burn with a more powerful eloquence. Another forest-born Demosthenes may

"With thunder shake the Philip of the seas;"

and the muse of history may find a great and untried theme in recording the progress of liberal institutions and the career of a free people.

ART. VII. Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United States, January Term, 1837. By RICHARD PETERS, Counsellor at Law, and Reporter of the Decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Volume XI. Philadelphia; Desilver, Thomas, & Co. 1837. 8vo. pp. 674.

THIS last volume of the published decisions of the Supreme Court of the Union is one of unusual, and, in certain respects, even of singular interest. Such it must surely be to those, who as general jurists, and as lovers moreover of constitutional jurisprudence, those, that is to say, whose pur

suits or inquiries are not confined to any mere professional round, have yet been accustomed to observe the train of judgments of that eminent tribunal, for the last more than third of a century; and who have been instructed out of them, if from no more intimate acquaintance, to reverence the great and venerable name of the late Chief Justice Marshall. Nor can there be more ample means of knowledge of his mind and character, than are supplied by these authentic materials. His saltem accumulem donis et fungar inani munere is the more than melancholy sentiment inscribed by the present volume, in a variety of expressive significations, to his judicial memory. Indeed, the very strikingly diversified traits of doctrine and opinion upon constitutional topics, which are manifested throughout the principal cases reported, may be reckoned to be among the recorded honors, that already thicken round it with no unmeaning tribute; all mingled at the same time, as they most unquestionably are, with a sincere sense of his virtues. And although drawing, as these differences do, their various hues from previous casts of mind and turns of thinking, or from peculiar circumstances, and perhaps somewhat opposite points in the present composition of the court, yet as they are touched by the mild and mellow glories of the just sinking orb, they equally blend, in a living though saddened beam, that may long continue to shed its salutary radiance, and send the cheering and sustaining influence of its reflection through the solitary night-watch of the constitution.

Although this was not the first meeting, it may be mentioned, of that august tribunal, whose opinions are annually given to the public through this regular channel, since the disappearance of that illustrious luminary of law and equity, — we mean in their high constitutional sense,- - to whom we have just referred, and whom we follow with so much regret ; yet, we may allow ourselves to say, that no night had fallen. And we were only admonished of some indefinite approaching change, by circumstances which began to cast their coming shadows. The indications were of a nature not to be unheeded; nor could they fail to make an impression in regard to the uncertainty, in which the condition of that tribunal was suspended. We allude to that dense mass of vapors continually rising, and gathering around our highest seat of judicature, which assumes the endless and ever-shifting shape of constitutional questions. Cases of that now familiar denomination,

for they have long created a distinct class, and compose a large chapter in American jurisprudence, involving principles of the utmost moment, were understood to be lying over without any progress. No arguments had been allowed, for a year or two, upon such questions. Former arguments in questions depending before the court went for nothing; and cases, that had been fully heard and argued, were ordered to stand for further hearing, when the bench should again be full. This state of things had commenced, it is well known, before the decease of the late chief justice. Then, the vacant central chair, needing no crape to cover it; auguries of various kinds, in the political state of the community, filling and affecting the mind with a solemnity corresponding to their importance, (in the apprehension of those who could comprehend the crisis,) to an extent beyond the mere conflicting interests of litigant parties; signs and omens of alteration in the system, all but organic in their tone and character; — all these things together conspired to produce a species of portentous pause, as it were, in the elements that were involved in the pending questions, and to prepare the way, by a gradual process, for the reversal of that powerful charm, which had hitherto held and controlled them in their civil combination, and which had served to communicate a sort of vital efficacy to the fundamental sanctions of law and order.

It can hardly have failed to strike the dullest observation, after a survey of the present volume, that some considerable change has come over the spirit of our supreme national judicature, upon this great class of questions; and conclusions press themselves upon the mind, which we are loth to assume as entirely foregone, which we may not disregard, and which we cannot quite dismiss as without significance and force. This, we confess, is the last quarter to which we should have looked for any cause of concern. Perditio ex te would indeed be the deepest sigh of the constitution. But as the prospect is charged, perhaps to our too anxious apprehension, with shades which have not hitherto seemed to rest upon it, and we find ourselves insensibly using a tone to which neither the public ear nor our own is altogether accustomed, and are dealing, moreover, with topics with which we may well presume all our readers are not entirely familiar, we may be called upon to go further, and explain more fully and clearly the grounds of our misgivings; so as to be able to decide whether

they have any just and serious foundation. We certainly feel some hesitation how to proceed with due respect to the important interests, and proper deference to the distinguished individuals, concerned in this discussion.

We did propose to pause before entering particularly upon the themes presented by this last volume, in order to take a cursory retrospect, as well as to survey the present condition also, of the most admirable structure, of a judicial character, of which the world, as we believe, has ever seen the example. But we are admonished of the limited space that can be allowed, in a publication like this, to subjects even of the most acknowledged importance, too limited to permit the scope. to which our remarks would be necessarily extended; and we must therefore reserve those remarks for a fitting opportunity. We may premise to the further observations which we propose to make, upon the principal matter of the present volume, that among the first and most pressing objects of the Constitution for the well-being of society, in its present advanced state of civilization and freedom, were those which related to commerce, contracts, and currency. Next to that instinctive sense of the intrinsic value of union, in and of itself, to the peace and prosperity of the community, which comprehended intuitively all the interests which that union intended to secure, these main points were seized as having most immediate bearing upon the general concerns of the social league, and were made the subjects of distinct and specific provisions. Union may be said, indeed, to have been one broad, comprehensive term, for all these interests. These important provisions may be considered among the direct details of its obvious principles. They may be regarded, in fact, as among the cardinal points of the Constitution. They extended, in the first place, to commercial intercourse in all its relations, whether with foreign nations, or among the different States, as well as with the interior native communities. They included, also, the coinage and regulation of the circulating medium. And, in connexion with the general power to establish a universal standard of value, may be mentioned the further authority given, of a similar character, to regulate weights and measures. Besides the express investiture of Congress with control over these concerns, its powers were supported and guarded against encroachments, or even approaches to interference, on the part of the States, by special and decisive interdicts upon the VOL. XLVI. No. 98.

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