required to be taken out by him, provided the law bears equally upon the citizens of that particular State.'

Third. Freedom of action on the part of the State to make any laws for the government of its own citizens that are not repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, or the laws made in pursuance thereof."

Fourth. That all citizens of the United States temporarily residing in any State other than that in which they have their domicil, shall not be deemed or treated as aliens and foreigners, but shall stand on an equal footing with the citizens thereof, and be entitled to the equal protection of its laws.3

Fifth. That notwithstanding the above privileges and immunities, a citizen entering any other State than his own enters only as a citizen of the United States, and not as a citizen of the State in which he may happen to have his domicil. He carries with him only his civil, and not his political rights. In leaving his own State he leaves behind him all franchises and privileges of a local nature born of that jurisdiction. Whoever voluntarily enters any State subjects himself to its laws, and can acquire no peculiar privileges, except upon the same conditions as its own citizens."

1 State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284; Welton v. State, 91 U. S. 275; State v. Robinson, 49 Me. 285; State v. Kennedy, 19 La. Ann. 397; License Cases, 5 How. 504; State v. Pinckney, 10 Rich. 474; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Sears v. Commissioners, 36 Ind. 267; Seymour v. State, 51 Alab. 52.

2 Del. R. R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206; Southern Exp. v. Hood, 15 Rich. 66; Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How, 73; People v. Thurber, 13 Ill. 554; Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Mass. 10 Wall. 566; Osborne v. Mobile, 16 Ibid. 479; Hinson v. Lott, 8 Ibid. 148.

State v. Medbury, 3 R. I. 138; Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Lemmon v. People, 20 N. Y. 562; Comm. v. Griffin, 3 B. Mon. 208; Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418; Morgan v. Neville, 74 Penn. 52; McFarland v. Butler, 8 Minn. 116; Davis v. Peirse, 7 Ibid. 13.

Lemmon v. People, 26 Barb. 270; Conner v. Elliott, 18 How. 591; Reynolds v. Geary, 26 Conn. 179; Comm. v. Milton, 12 B. Mon. 212; Austin v. State, 10 Mo. 591; Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162.

Sixth. That while a State may not impose a discriminating tax or other burthen upon non-resident traders, or citizens of other States, it may prescribe the mode of commencing and conducting suits or other judicial proceedings in its own courts, and provide extraordinary remedies for its own citizens. Hence, it may require a plaintiff who is a non-resident to furnish security for costs, or a non-resident executor or testamentary trustee to give bonds, unless the will contain an express provision relieving him from the obligation of giving security.1

Seventh. That while corporations are deemed persons, although artificial ones, and are entitled to the equal protection of the laws, they are not citizens even of the State which creates them. Not being clothed with the attributes of natural persons, and possessing only such rights as the Legislature has granted, they are not entitled to all the privileges and immunities of corporations in the several States. A franchise being the creature of local law has no extra-territorial validity. Each State is exclusively sovereign in its dealings with them.2

Eighth. This clause is a guarantee to citizens against the operation of other State laws than those of their own domicil, consequently it has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of.3

1 Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535; Haney v. Marshall, 9 Ind. 194; Baker v. Wise, 16 Gratt. 139; Burlock v. Taylor, 33 Mass. 335; Kincaid v. Francis, Cooke, 49; McGregor v. Francis, 1 Keyes, 133.

2 Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168; Bank v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519; Tatem v. Wright, 23 N. J. 429; Warren Manuf. Co. v. Etna Ins. Co., 2 Paine, 501; Phoenix Ins. v. Comm., 5 Bush, 68; F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Hurrah, 47 Ind. 236; Atty.-Gen. v. Bay State Mining Co., 99 Mass. 148; Slaughter v. Comm., 13 Gratt. 767; Firemen's Association v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511; State v. Lathrop, 10 La. Ann. 398; People v. Imlay, 20 Barb. 68.

Bradwell v. State, 16 Wall. 130.

CHAPTER VI.

THE LEGISLATURE IN ITS RELATIONS TO ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW.

THE distinctions between Legislative, Executive, and Judicial duties in the functions of government, have been apparent to all observers, from the first days of municipal organization. But it is only when viewed from an ethical stand-point that the inconsistency and danger of combining them in the same person, or in the same body, become manifest. Under patriarchal forms of society, the functions of Legislator, Judge, and Governor are necessarily united in the same person. Oftentimes, also, they descend in the order of succession to the family, and transmit an authority to rule which becomes prescriptive by lapse of time and undisputed exercise. All royal dynasties were originally private families which converted themselves into corporations, for the purpose of obtaining perpetual succession in their descendants. Whether known as Carlovingians or Plantagenets, Tudors or Bourbons or Stuarts, they all aimed at one common purpose, which was, to establish patriarchal authority in themselves, and to transmit personal sovereignty through descent. The possession of such unlimited power is always a temptation to its abuse, as history everywhere shows; and the doctrine. of the divine right of Kings to rule, by an accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judicial in their own hands, was simply an invention to cover royal iniquity with a mantle of sacredness, which none could

remove, under penalty of committing sacrilege. This doctrine may be justly pronounced the very definition of tyranny.

"There can be no liberty," says Montesquieu, "where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates." This fundamental truth in the foundation of popular government was recognized by the builders of the Republic, and carefully incorporated into the framework of our Federal Commonwealth. It marks every stage in the evolution of the Constitution as shown in the deliberations of the Convention that framed it. Nor were they content to leave that Constitution to patriotism and public opinion alone for its protection. But forecasting the possible rivalries of sovereign States, and the encroachments of competing departments whose boundaries occasionally overlapped each other, they established between them the most unique tribunal of arbitration in the world, in the form of the Supreme Court. That august tribunal, clothed with an authority above the reach of legislative or executive control, is made the sovereign source of law in our land, and endowed not only with the legal faculty of administering public justice, but with the higher power of summoning States to its Bar, of deciding controversies between them, and of determining the validity or invalidity of every Legislative Act performed in the land. It is made the special guardian of the Constitution which created it, and as such all the statutory powers of the government of the United States are subject to its judicial scrutiny.

Under a tripartite division of the powers of government, it becomes the duty of the Legislature to enact laws of the Judiciary to construe them, and of the Executive to enforce them. Therefore in the United States, the law-making power neither interprets nor

T

enforces its own acts, these duties devolving upon the Judiciary and the Executive. This separation of the departments of government by interposing constitutional barriers, is the highest expression of political sagacity when applied to the establishment of popular government. It disarms the Executive of all tyrannical power -it deprives the Legislature of the capacity of encroachment upon the territory of other departments by subjecting its labors to judicial supervision—and lastly it insures the independence of the Judiciary, by making it free in its salary and tenure from the trammels of political servitude to any other departments.

The necessity, no less than the expediency of this subdivision of power was early recognized in England, in those efforts tending towards the rise of the people, which beginning as early as the thirteenth century in certain. national assemblies termed Parliaments, finally culminated in the establishment of the Commonwealth. No one can fail to trace, in the successive privileges gained by the English people since the "good" Parliaments of 1340 and 1376, the steady ascendency of popular rights over royal prerogative. This progress in political enfranchisement has steadily continued, until it has become the foundation for that ultimate equipoise in representative government which springs alone from acknowledging the sovereignty of the people, in each branch of its tripartite administration.

Tracing the growth of legislative bodies from those primary assemblies of the people whose omnipotence we have elsewhere adverted to, it follows as a logical inference, that the legislative power has always been regarded by writers upon Government as the supreme authority in the State. And of necessity it must be so in a representative democracy—

1st, Because it represents the direct will of the people