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on the top of a hill on the right to prevent being surrounded No sooner had it taken post, than they made a vigorous' attack, which continued for upward of two hours, and would certainly have carried their point, had it not been for some Indians, who arrived and gave the Indian war-whoop, which was answered by the regiment with three cheers, after which the Americans soon gave way.* They then fired the fort, and retreated to Fort Ed. ward. The artillery lost by the evacuation of the northern posts, and taken or destroyed in the armed vessels at Skeensborough, was prodigious, amounting to no less than 128 pieces serviceable and unserviceable. The loss of tour, biscuit, pork and beci was also very considerable.
Gen. St. Clair joined gen. Scuyler at Fort Edward on the twelfth, after a fatiguing march, in which the army suffered much from bad weather and want of provisions. Three days after, their whole strengh did not exceed 4400 men, including militia. The day following the affair at Fort Anne, Scuyler ordered a brigade of militia to begin, as near the fort as possible, to fall trees; to take up the bridges, and burn the covering and timber; and to make the utmost obstructions. July 16.1 A continental brigade was directed to assist in destrying and completely stopping the 1:0ads. The same day gen. Scuyler took out of a canteen with a false bottom, a letter written by Mr. Levius to gen. Sullivan, Scuyler prepared an answer designedly worded so as to deceive and perplex Burgoyne ; which he signed Canteen, comniunicated to several gentlemen, and then forwarded. The British general when it was received, could not tell what to make of it. He was puzzled for two or three days, and at a loss whether to proceed or retreat ; the latter was so completely eniginatical. 7
Happily for the Americans, the British general continued for several days, with the army partly at Skeensborough, and partly spread in the adjoining country, waiting the arrival of tents, baggage and provision.. In which time no labor was spared in opening roads for advancing toward Scuyler, and in clearing Wood Creek of all impediments laid in the way, in order to open a passage for the batteaux.. Like exertions were used at Ty, in carrying gun-boats, provision vessels and batteaux over land into Lake George. By reason of the route which the general took, he did not arrive at Hudson's-River, and fix his head-quarters · * Major Forbes's account to the house of commons from Burgoyne's State.
+ When the general was prisoner, he made this acknowledgment to one of Scuyler's suit, whom he aked whether he knew any thing of it, and wio prcicaded ignorance.
pear Fort Edward, till the 30th of July. Fort Edward is no more than the ruins of a former fort, and of no consequence to any party. It could afford no cover to general Scuyler, and only ĝavé a name to the place where it was situated. The general left it several days before Burgoyne gained its neighborhood. He gave this state of his ariny on the 27th, at Moses' Creek, in an official letter--" It consists of about 27.00 continental troops
of militia from the state of Connecticut-one major---one. cap. *fain-two lieutenants--two ensigns--one adjutant-one quartermaster--six sergeants--one drummer-six sick-and three rank and filc fit for duty--the rest, after remaining three or four days, deserted-us-Of those from the county of Berkshire (in the Massachusetts) who consisted of upward of 1200, half of which were to have remained, somewhat more than 200 are left, the remainder having also deserted—Of colonel Mosely's regiment, from the county of Hampshire (Massachusetts) about ten or twelve are left, the rest having deserted-Of colonel Porter's "regiment, of the county of Hampshire, about 200 left-Of the nilitia of the county of Albany, 1050 are left, being forty-six more than half of what were upon the ground when it was resolved to let half return to their habitations.” He added, “That torpor, criminal indifference and want of spirit which so geneTally prevails, is more dangerous than all the efforts of the enemy: Nor is that jealousy and spirit of detraction which so unhappily prevails of small detriinent to our cause.” The next
day he wrote from Saratoga, twenty miles below Fort Edward : and thirty-seven above Albany,“ Every effort of the enemy would be in vain, if our exertions equalled our abilities, if our virtue was not sinking under that infamous venality which pervades throughout, and threatens us with ruin.”
The desertions above mentioned, were not to the enemy, but to their own homes; Scuyler was, for some reasons, a very
unacceptable commander to the New-England militia. They - were in general disgusted with, and would not serve under him. "There were no desertions to the royal army worth. noticing,
which argues there were no lurking seeds of disaffection to · the American cause. az Had the British commander returned immediately to Ty, and
advanced from thence in the most expeditious manner, with a few light field-pieces, instead of suffering any delay, in order to *his dragging along with him a heavy train of artillery, he might have been at Albany by the time hegot to Hudson's-River. * Your correspondent, the fifth of October, the last year, breakfasted General Gates bas repeatedly said as much in my hearing:
ake, could h. Fort Ge
inicans de semall parties George Wang resistance smal Schola
with general Gates, at Ty; sailed in company up Lake Géorge: (about 35 miles long) with their horses in batteaux ; landed, stayed a while, and reached Fort Edward (about 9 miles from Fort George) at night, a little after eight. From Ty to Lake : George is rather more than two miles. The two small schooners. on the lake, could have made no long resistance against a bri- : gade of gun-boats. Fort George was well adapted to keep offIndians and small parties, but not to stop the royal army. The : Americans there, instead of defending the fort or opposing the landing of the army, would undoubtedly have retreated to gen.. Scuyler, at Fort Edward. The latter felt himself so weak, 'that. by the first of August he drew back from Saratoga to Stillwater" (25 miles north of Albany) from whence he wrote on the 4th, “We have not above 4000 continental troops; if men, one third of which are negros, boys and men too aged for the field, or indeed any other service, can be called troops. The states from whence these troops came, can determine why such boysy: negroes and aged men were sent. A great part of the army took the field in a manner naked, without blankets, ill arned, and very deficient in accoutrements. Too many of our officers would be a disgrace to the most contemptible troops that were ever collected, and have so little sense of honor that cashiering them seems no punishment. They have stood by and suffered the most scandalous depredations to be committed on the poores distressed, ruined and flying inhabitants." He had also about : Hifteen hundred militia.
The evacuation of Tyconderoga and Mount Independence, surprised gen. Washington, and spread astonishment and terror through the New England states. The general was led to believe that the garrison was much stronger. The Massachusetts genee' sal court were faulty in not having seasonably forwarded their quota of troops, agreeable to the requisition of congress. The'. apprehensions of the Massachusetts people were the greater, as. their military friends with gen. Washington's army, informed them that the expedition which Sir William Howe had under. taken, and for which he was embarking his troops from Staten Island, was meant against Boston. But amid all the disasters : which had happened, and the consequent terrors, no sort of disposition to comply with British propositions, appeared in any quarter. Notwithstanding the success that had attended the north, ern army, and the military storm that was gathering at Sandye Hook, and no one state knowing where it would fall, yet 'eachdiscovered a determination to remain independent. The Améa • rican commander in chief received information that the com mon report among the sailors and soldiers was, that the fleet w283 Goy going to the Delaware, but as Howe's conduct was to him puz
zling beyond measure, so were the införniations he obtained:
One time the ships were standing up toward the North-River. In Pou à little while they were going up the Sound, and in an hour This after, they were sailing out of the Hook. Before their sailing, 5:28 à spirited adventure took place on the side of Rhode Island, brom which not only fully retaliated the surprisal of general Lee, but
ů procured an indemnification of his person. Lieutenant colonel Big Barton, of a militia regiment belonging to that state, with sevev tál other officers and volunteers, to the number of förty, passed 25, 2 by night [lulý 10:) from Warwick Neck to Rhode-Island, and LiTa thought they liad a passage of ten miles by water, eluded the this watchfulness of the ships of war and guard-boats which surcena founded the island. They conducted their enterprize with such he silence and dexterity, that they surprised general Prescot in his
quarters, about one mile from the water side, and five from car Newport, and brought him, with one of his aids-de-camp, safe Bu to the continent, which they had nearly reached before there was 100 åný alarm among the enemy. This adventure, which with im
partial judges must outweigh col. Harcourt's capture of gen. Lee, ale produced much exultation on the one side, and much regret on stions the other, from the induence it would necessarily have on Lee's
destination. But more than a'month before, congress had received information that Lee was treated by gen. Howe with kind. ness, generosity and tenderness, which had led them to desire
that col. Campbell and the five Hessian officers should be treated hot in a similar manner, consistent with the confinement and safe
o custody of their persons. They resolved, within a few days hot after hearing of Prescot's being taken, that an elegant sword
should be provided and presented to colonel Barton.
The British fleet and army which làý át Sandy-Hook, were destined for the reduction of Pennsylvania, particularly of Philadelphia, in pursuance of a plan which had been settled between Sir William Howe and lord George Germain, but did not sail till the 23d of July. The land force consisted of thirty-six British and Hessian battalions, including the light-infantry and grenadiers, with a powerful artillery, a New-York corps called the queen's rangers, and a regiment of light-horse, estimated altogether, at about 16,000. The fleet consisted of-267 sail. General Washington, upon the fleet's sailing, marched his army toward Pennsylvania, and halted' it at Corriel's ferry, Howel's ferry, and Trenton. He wrote from Corriel's ferry on the 30th---“Howe's (in a manner) abandoning Burgoyne, is so unaccounta.
ble a matter, that till I'am fully assured it is so, 'I cannot help it casting my eyes continually behind me." . He mentioned his
halting the army till the fleet should appear in the Delaware, - and put the maiter out of doubt; and that he had ordered gei, Sullivan's division to halt at Morristown, that it might march southward or northward, upon the first advice of the enemy's throwing any force up the North-River.
General Washington's perplexity for some days, cannot be so well conceived of as by extracts from his own letters ; read then, and judge for yourself. “July 31. The enemy's feet arrived at the Capes of Delaware yesterday, therefore order the two brigades thrown over the river, to march immediately.” “Chester, August 1. I had proceeded thus far to look out for a proper place to arrange the arıny, when I received the provoking account, that the enemy's ficet left the Capes yesterday, and steered eastward. I shall return with the utmost expedition to the North-River; a sudden stroke is certainly intended by this manoeuvre. Call in every man of the militia to strengthen the Highland posts.” “August 1. The enemy's flect put to sea yesterday morning at eight o'clock, and were out of sight three hours when the express came away. It appears gen. Howe has been practising a deep feint to draw our whole force to this point. Counter-march your division, and proceed with all possible expedition to Peek’s-kill.” “ August 3. The conduct of the enemy is diíficult and distressing to be understood.” “August 11. On the seventh the enemy was off Sinepuxent Inlet, about lo Jeague's to the southward of the Capes of Delaware, on which I have halied for further intelligence.” “ August 22. The enemy's. fileet have entered Chesapeake. There is not now the least danger of Howe's going to New-England; forward this account to governor Trumbull, to be by him sent on to the eastward.”...
Sir William Howe, while off the Capes, received that information which led him to judge it most advisable to proceed to Chesapeake-Bay instead of going up the Delaware. Such in formation could not relate to the measures taken for rendering the navigation of the river impracticable. These measures were matters of so great notoriety, that he must have been strangely deficient in procuring intelligence, if he did not know them before he left the Hook. Beside, the obstructions in the river did not reach so low down as either Newcasle or Wilmington; as high as either of which places the fleet might have come with satety; and had he landed at the first of them, he would have been within 36 miles of Philadelphia, and fourteen' miles nearer than the Head of Elk. The information most probably related to gen. Washington's having marched the continental army within a certain distance. of Philadelphia ; and perhaps, to a prospect of his being joined by a number of disaffected Americans