Correlation with population density Furthermore, this result-the unprofitableness of the Maryland operation-correlates roughly with several significant elements in the Census Tract Study of Transportation in the Washington Metropolitan Area prepared by the Office of Planning and Programming of the Department of Highways and Traffic of the District of Columbia in cooperation with the U.S. Department of Commerce and Bureau of Public Roads, 1965. It correlates with population density (Exhibit II 4). It correlates with population income (Exhibit III 1). It correlates with Auto Availability (Exhibit IV 1). It correlates with Auto or carpool usage for work trip (Exhibit V 1). The Commission should make further inquiry into the significance of these subjects, their impact on the cost and kind of service rendered by Transit, and give some appropriate recognition to this type of data in equalizing the fare structure. Promotion of unprofitable suburban business The Maryland Service Area-the most unprofitable-is precisely where Transit's advertising and service improvement efforts are concentrated. Mr. Bell testified (Tr. 104) that "455 vehicles are now assigned to operate in the State of Maryland providing 22,105 seats... the average age of the assigned Maryland fleet is 5.48 years." Mr. Hatfield testified (Tr. 60), "The average age of buses has been reduced from 11.50 to 6.48 years. If the average age of the 1191 bus fleet is 6.48 years, and if the 455 buses serving Maryland have an average age of 5.48, then the 736 buses serving D. C., including the few in Virginia, would have an average age of 7.20 years. Thus the riding public that accounts for 86 percent of public revenue is assigned buses that are 31.4 percent older than the buses assigned to the riding public that account for 14 percent of the public bus revenues. This is clearly discriminatory in favor of the suburban riders. Mr. Hatfield (Tr. 60) indicated that 68.7 percent of Transit's fleet is air-conditioned, and Mr. Bell (Tr. 104) indicated that 399 air-conditioned buses are assigned to the 455 bus fleet in Maryland. Mr. Hatfield (Tr. 22) indicated that 818 air-conditioned buses had been purchased by D. C. Transit. Assuming these buses are all still in operation, then there are 419 air-conditioned buses assigned to the 736 bus fleet serving the District, and that figure includes whatever number are assigned to the Virginia operations. 399 out of a 455 bus fleet or 87.7 percent is air-conditioned. They serve riders who account for only 14 percent of Transit revenues. In the District, only 419 buses are airconditioned out of a 736 bus fleet, again discounting the Virginia area which is negligible. Thus, only 57.7 percent of the District fleet is air-conditioned, and the District riders are accounting for 86 percent of public Transit revenues. On the basis of income derived from Maryland vis-a-vis the District, only 14 percent of the air-conditioned buses, or 114 air-conditioned buses, should be assigned to Maryland. Thus, 285 of the 399 air-conditioned Maryland buses should be re-assigned to the District. Instead of the District being assigned only 419 air-conditioned buses, the District should be assigned 704 air-conditioned buses. But the basic discrimination, however, consists in the unbelievably disproportionate number of buses assigned to the Maryland area in relation to the passenger load. Most of the expensive equipment is applied where it is least profitably employed. The apparent assumption is, "We lose money on every deal but we make it up on the volume." The advertising dollar, the new investment in luxury, all go to enticing the rich, suburban, multi-car owner, in the most sparsely populated areas where operations are most unprofitable. Neglect of the captive center city On the other hand, the center city area, where operations are most profitable, is uncultivated. Thus, whether the Commission admits it or not, it is in effect following the Garfield and Lovejoy thesis of charging the captive customer, who has no alternative way to travel, a higher rate than those who do. In the present case, this can be roughly translated as a "soak the poor policy." People who live in the most densely populated areas, where incomes are lower, and automobiles rare, provide the highest profit margin-high enough to subsidize their richer suburban neighbors who do not care to use D.C. Transit much in the first place. There is obviously a great need for a more careful analysis of this subject. The social significance is very great, and it requires careful study. (Consider, for example, the reprint in the record from HUD's Division of Public Affairs, in January, 1967.) Trends in urban-suburban inequities Between 1963 and 1966, the population of D. C. increased by 2 percent from 792,000 to 808,000 (Ex. R-10), whereas the ridership increased by 3.2 percent from 108,802,000 to 112,320,000 (Ex. R-7), and this 3.2 percent ridership increase applied to 86 percent of public transit income. By comparison, between 1963 and 1966, the population of the Maryland service area increased by 13.4 percent from 546,000 to 622,000 (Ex. R-10) whereas the ridership increased by only 13.6 percent from 11,912,000 to 13,532,000 (Ex. R-7) and this ridership increase applied to only 14 percent of transit income. Thus while the D. C. ridership is increasing 1.6 times as fast as the increase in population, the Md. ridership is barely keeping pace with the population increase. The Commission is in error when it states that "the suburban portions of the company's service were shown in this record to be the areas where the company is experiencing a growth pattern." If we look at the 1965-1966 Maryland trend, the Maryland service area population increased by 4.7 percent from 594,000 to 622,000 (Ex. R-10) whereas the Maryland ridership increased by only 1.4 percent from 13,393,000 to 13,532,000 (Ex. R-7). Taking first the D. C. projections, in the period 19631966 the ridership per resident, a rough indicator relating population to ridership shows that the ridership per person is about constant, increasing only from 143.8 to 144.0. The projections suggest a drop to 143.0, a suggestion which is not in any way supportable by the Transit Commission's own expert's data. If we project instead, what the data does suggest, a constant ridership or a 1 percent increase in ridership, we project either 120,100,000 or 121,300,000 riders in 1970 and not the 119,300,000 as shown. Turning to the Maryland service area, however, a very different projection fits the experience data. From 1963 to 1966, there was a 4.2 percent drop in ridership per person. (21.8 to 20.9) If we project this 4.2 percent ridership drop that did occur from 1963-1966 into the 1967-1970 period, the 1970 ridership projection would be 13,890,000 and not the 14,500,000 as shown. From this same R-10 data a further and possibly more accurate projection can be made. From 1965 to 1966, the ridership per resident in the Maryland service area dropped from 22.0 to 20.9, a 5 percent drop. If we project a 5 per cent yearly ridership drop, the 1967 projected ridership would be 12,650,000 and not the 13,400,000 as shown; the 1968 projected ridership would be 12,330,000 and not 13,800,000 as shown; the 1969 projected ridership would be 11,660,000 and not 14,500,000 as shown. Thus a 5 percent yearly drop projected into 1970 would reduce this projected ridership by 20 percent. Escalation of fare inequality Not only do the central city operations now subsidize the suburban operations, but by any conceivable interpretation, interpolation or projection of the Commission's own expert data and testimony, the prospects are for a further increase and escalation of the fare inequality. This is reflected in Ex. R-9 which shows that the passengers per vehicle mile on the regular routes have increased from 1963 to 1966 in D. C. by 4.6 percent, (4.07 to 4.21) whereas in the Maryland service area there has been a decrease of 3.4 percent. (2.39 to 2.31) The logical explanation for this is that the D. C. area is a constant size so that as the population increases the density of the population per square mile increases, and thus the number of riders per bus mile travelled would naturally increase. This increases the profitability in D. C. In Maryland service area, however, opposite factors are operable. Suburban sprawl spreads bus riders out so the density factor is adverse. Thus, more miles must be travelled to carry fewer passengers, and the already considerable and substantial Maryland service area losses are increased. Cost data and statutes The Commission cannot relate to "unjust, unreasonable or unduly preferential or unduly discriminatory" fares between "riders of sections of the Metropolitan District" without relating revenues produced to costs. Article XII, |