be regulated in accordance with the principles which prevail on the trial of causes in courts, a system of procedure as abnormal as this could be supported only by the clearest and most unmistakable language in the statute providing for it. But the board of appraisers do not sit merely as a tribunal created to determine a controversy between parties upon evidence introduced by one side or the other. Whatever may be the language of the statute, the true rule for its interpretation is to be found in the intention of its makers, and we may find that intention in the record of the proceedings which terminated in its enactment. Rector, etc., of Holy Trinity Church v. U. S., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511. The excerpts from the debates in the senate (volume 21, pt. 4, Cong. Rec. 51st Cong. 1st Sess. p. 4004 et seq.) which were submitted on the argument by the district attorney leave no doubt as to the character and functions of the board which congress intended to create. The appraisers were to be experts, with knowledge of their own as respects the values and classification of imported goods,-knowledge derived, not only from sworn evidence taken in the particular case in hand, but from countless other cases involving similar goods. A clause securing to the importer the privilege of being present before the board of general appraisers, with or without counsel, as he might elect, was stricken out before passage, with the express intent that the proceedings before the board might be to a large extent informal, and that they might sit, not as a court, but as an ex parte revenue tribunal, before which the parties were to have no right to be heard by counsel, to be confronted with witnesses, or to make argument, although the board might, if it chose, require the attendance of witnesses, and invite the importer to attend and state his case personally or by counsel. It was plainly contemplated by the framers of the act that the board would sit as experts to decide in a summary manner questions of value and classification arising under the tariff laws, reaching their decision from their own expert knowledge and from the evidence submitted to them, or such as they might obtain. A remonstrance by importers against the passage of the act in its present shape, which was presented and read in the senate, expressly criticised the pending bill because "no right is given to the importer to be present, with or without counsel, at the proceedings of the board, or to cross-examine the government's witnesses," and because "the board can fix the classification and rate upon any or even no evidence at all, in the absence of the importer and any witnesses he might be able to secure," and because "all the testimony that the board may thus obtain or choose to use is made competent evidence before the circuit court, if an appeal is taken." I do not find anything in the letter of the act itself which requires a different interpretation of its meaning, and, even if I did, should not, since the decision in the Holy Trinity Case, supra, feel warranted in abiding by its letter, in the light of such unmistakable evidence as to the intention of its makers. As the act (section 15) expressly provides that all the evidence taken by and before the appraisers shall be competent evidence before the circuit court, and as their return shows that the evidence in the two cases with which this importer was not concerned was taken by or before them, the motion to strike it out is denied. The importer has abundant opportunity to controvert any such evidence, upon the reference to which he is entitled under the fifteenth section of the act. In re Cook. (Circuit Court, E. D. Wisconsin. April 4, 1892.) 1. HABEAS CORPUS-INTERSTATE EXTRADITION. In interstate rendition, the warrant of the executive is not conclusive of the fact of flight. The courts upon habeas corpus may inquire and determine the fact, and this at any time before the actual surrender of the prisoner to the demanding state. 2. SAME. The executive warrant is, however, prima facie evidence of flight, and, being unassailed before delivery of the prisoner to the demanding state, the surrender is lawful. The executive warrant has, upon surrender of the prisoner, spent its force. He is then held in lawful custody, under process of the state, and cannot thereafter assert that he was not a fugitive from justice. 8. SAME-FUGITIVE FROM JUSTICE. One who personally, within a state, has set in motion the machinery for crime, and departs the jurisdiction, after the commission of an act in furtherance of, but before the consummation of, the offense, is a “fugitive from justice," within the meaning of the law. 4 SAME-TRIAL FOR OTHER OFFENSES. Whether one surrendered by one state to another can be tried for any other offense than that for which he was surrendered, quære? (Syllabus by the Court.) Writ of Habeas Corpus. STATEMENT BY JENKINS, DISTRICT JUDGE. On the 13th of February, 1892, upon the petition of Charles E. Cook, claiming to be restrained of his liberty by one Colden A. Hart, sheriff of the county of Dodge, state of Wisconsin, a writ of habeas corpus was issued out of this court, to which the sheriff made due return, which the petitioner duly traversed. The facts disclosed by the record, so far as essential to the determination of the matter, are substantially these: On the 5th day of March, 1891, one George W. Morse complained to a justice of the peace of the county of Dodge that the petitioner, Charles E. Cook, and one Frank Leek, on the 7th of May, 1889, opened a bank at Juneau, in the county of Dodge, styled the "Bank of Juneau," and entered upon and engaged in a general banking business, having a pretended capital of $10,000, and continued in such business, soliciting and receiving deposits up to and including the 20th day of June, 1890, upon which day the bank closed its doors and failed. That Cook was the principal owner of such bank, owning nine-tenths interest therein, Leek owning one-tenth interest therein. That Cook was an officer of the bank, and had the general supervision of the business, which was transacted either by him personally, or, under his order and direction, by one Richardson, acting as his agent. That from January 6, 1890, to v.49F.no.10-53 June 20, 1890, Cook, by the inducements and pretenses so held out by him, received and accepted on deposit, from citizens of the county, money to the amount of $25,000. That this was done by the express order and direction of Cook, and with his full knowledge; and that no part of said amount has been paid or returned to the depositors. That on the 6th day of January, 1890, Cook and Leek and the bank were severally insolvent, and have since so continued, and that such insolvency of the parties and of the bank was well known to Cook on and ever since the 6th of January, 1890; and that, at the time of receiving all the deposits stated, Cook knew, and had good reason to know, that he and Leek and the said bank were each and all of them unsafe and insolvent. That on the 20th of June, 1890, at Juneau, in the county of Dodge, Cook, as such banker, did accept and receive a deposit in said Bank of Juneau from one Herman Becker, a resident of the county of Dodge, of $175, which has never been paid or returned; and that, at the time of receiving such deposit, Cook knew, and had good reason to know, that he and the said Frank Leek and the said Bank of Juneau were each and all of them unsafe and insolvent, and that such deposit from Becker, and all the other deposits mentioned, were received by Cook with intent to cheat and defraud, contrary to the statute of Wisconsin. Thereupon the justice of the peace to whom the affidavit and complaint had been presented issued the usual warrant for the arrest of Cook, upon which, accompanied with several affidavits in support of the principal charge; and also upon an affidavit of the then sheriff of the county of Dodge, who states certain ineffectual attempts to find Cook in the city of Chicago, and who states "that he knows that said Charles E. Cook was at said times, and now is, a fugitive from justice;" and also upon the application of the district attorney for the county of Dodge, who states that "said Charles E. Cook is a fugitive from justice, and has fled from the justice of the state of Wisconsin, and avoided arrest," the governor of the state of Wisconsin, on the 9th day of March, 1891, issued his requisition upon the governor of the state of Illinois, requiring the apprehension of the said Cook, and his delivery to an agent deputed to receive and convey him to the state of Wisconsin. That requisition was honored by the executive of the state of Illinois, who issued his warrant on the 10th day of March, 1891, to the proper peace-officers of that state, reciting that the executive authority of the state of Wisconsin had demanded the apprehension and delivery of Charles E. Cook, "represented to be a fugitive from justice," and had produced and laid before him authenticated copies of the charge herein before recited, and requiring the officers to whom the warrant was addressed to arrest and secure the said fugitive, Charles E. Cook, if to be found within the limits of the state, and to deliver him into the custody of the agent of the executive authority of the state of Wisconsin, appointed to receive the said fugitive. Under such warrant Cook was arrested by the sheriff of the county of Cook, in the state of Illinois, and delivered to the agent of the executive authority of Wisconsin, who conveyed him to the county of Dodge, in the state of Wisconsin, where he was examined before the magistrate issuing the warrant, and held to answer to the charge. Subsequently, and in November, 1891, the district attorney filed his information against the petitioner, Cook, setting forth the offense charged in the original complaint before the magistrate, upon which he was arraigned, and to which he was compelled to plead, and held to bail in the sum of $5,000. Afterwards, and prior to the writ of habeas corpus, Cook was surrendered by his bail, and was held by the sheriff of the county of Dodge under process issued out of the said court, to answer the charge. At the February term, 1891, of the circuit court of Dodge county, the grand jury of the county presented seven indictments against the petitioner, Cook, charging him with different violations of the criminal laws of the state of Wisconsin, some for larceny, some for embezzlement, and some for receiving deposits in the bank, knowing the bank to be unsafe and insolvent. All these offenses are charged to have been committed in connection with this business of banking; the times of the alleged offenses varying, but all charged to have been committed between the 3d and 20th days of June, 1890. To the several indictments Cook was required to plead, and under them he was held to bail, and subsequently, and before this writ of habeas corpus, by his bail surrendered to the sheriff, in whose custody he was at the time of the issuance of the writ. The sheriff justified his detention of Cook under the writs issued upon the information and the several indictments stated. It was established upon the hearing, to the satisfaction of the court, that Cook, for some years prior to the 20th of June, 1890, and for some years prior to his arrest upon the warrant of the executive of Illinois, had been, and still is, a resident of the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois; that he had made occasional visits to the state of Wisconsin in connection with his banking business at Juneau and elsewhere; that he left Chicago on the 17th day of June, and went to Hartford, in the county of Washington, state of Wisconsin, where he spent the whole of the 18th day of June, thence proceeding to Beaver Dam, in the county of Dodge, where he was engaged during the whole of the 19th of June in business not connected with the Bank of Juneau; that early on the morning of the 20th of June, he left Beaver Dam, and made a continuous journey to Chicago, arriving there at 2 P. M. of the 20th, and did not, on the occasion of that visit to Wisconsin, visit or pass through the village of Juneau, and had not been at Juneau for some three weeks prior to the closing of the doors of the bank on the 20th of June. It was also conceded at the hearing that the particular deposit by Herman Becker, charged in the complaint upon which the requisition proceedings were had, was actually made at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the 20th of June, and after the petitioner's arrival in Chicago. It is also proper to state that the petitioner testified at the hearing that he was a large stockholder in the Park National Bank of Chicago, which was closed by the comptroller of the currency on the 20th day of June, 1890; that he left Beaver Dam for Chicago upon a telegram stating that trouble existed with reference to that bank; that that bank was in fact solvent, and has paid all its debts, and that it should not have been closed by the comptroller; that the closing of that bank compelled the closing of the doors of the Bank of Juneau; that up to that time, as he claims, not only the Bank of Juneau, but that he and Mr. Leek, were solvent, and that their subsequent insolvency was brought about by the improper closing of the Park National Bank. Chas. H. Aldrich and Jos. V. Quarles, for petitioner. W. C. Williams and P. G. Lewis, Dist. Atty., for respondent. JENKINS, District Judge, (after stating the facts as above.) The record presents for consideration several grave and important questions: First. Whether it be competent for the judicial tribunals to review the action of the executive of Illinois in issuing his warrant. Second. If his action be subject to review, whether that action can be inquired into after the surrender of the alleged fugitive from justice, and when he is held under state process. Third. Whether the petitioner was a fugitive from justice. Fourth. Whether, assuming the legality of the proceeding for his rendition, he can be held or tried upon any other charge than that for which he was surrendered. Undoubtedly, as between independent sovereignties, the surrender of fugitives rested merely in comity, and was confined to those whose crimes "touched the state," or were so enormous as to make them hostes humani generis. Vattel, book 1, c. 19; Vattel, book 2, c. 6. If there existed any moral obligation, it was quite imperfect, and was not recognized by the law of nations. The surrender could not be demanded as of right; but as Mr. Marcy observes in his Hulsemann letter, "comity may sometimes yield what right withholds." So, also, before the Revolution, a criminal fleeing from one colony found no protection in another. He was arrested wherever found, and sent for trial to the place of his offending; and this without formal compact, treaty, or agreement between the colonies. Com. v. Deacon, 10 Serg. & R. 129. In all such cases the manner in which he was brought within the jurisdiction could not be pleaded by the prisoner as a defense to the crime with which he was charged, or as ground for his discharge without trial. Each sovereignty had the right to determine for itself whether a fugitive from the justice of another sovereignty should find refuge within its jurisdiction; and, if it so pleased, to deliver the fugitive to the sovereignty whose justice he had offended. Every independent nation possesses, in absence of positive law, or of treaty obligation, the inherent right of expulsion of undesirable inhabitants. So, also, the prisoner could not rightly urge, by way of defense or in abatement, that he was forcibly and by abduction brought within the jurisdiction from a foreign country. The violation of the sovereignty of an independent nation is matter which touches the political relations of the two countries, and is of no concern to him. He may have, it is true, recourse in the law for the forcible abduction, but the manner of his subjection to the jurisdiction does not impair that jurisdiction, nor avail the prisoner against responding for his offense. Ex parte Scott, 9 Barn. & C. 446; State v. Brewster, |