§ 34. Where a verdict in an action of ejectment called to run from one fixed object to another, with the meanders of the stream, not located upon the plats; it was considered by the Court so entirely uncertain, whether it was within the lines of the tract claimed and defended or not, that no judgment could be entered upon it, nor writ of possession executed under it.1 § 35. In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Maine, it appeared that a lot of land, being one of several fronting on the river, was sold by reference to a plan, without other description; and it also appeared that the surveyor, in laying out a large number of river lots, measured the front lines and marked the corners of the river, but never surveyed the sides nor the rear lines; nor did he correctly lay down the course of the river, but represented the place in question as a regular curve, and laid down the rear lines of the lots from corner to corner, as part of a larger concentric circle, when in fact the course of the river at that place was irregularly serpentine. It was held that the lots were to be located by laying off the side lines by the courses and distances from the river, according to the plan, and then drawing the rear lines from one corner to another, thus making them conform to the true course of the river, as originally designed, though not so delineated by the surveyor.2 § 36. Whenever the beginning of a tract of land is ascertained, and the lines from thence are to terminate · 1 Miles v. Knott, 12 G. & Johns. (Md.) R. 442. 2 Loring v. Norton, 8 Greenl. (Me.) R. 61. The Court cited as authority, Bowman v. White, decided in Maine in 1801; and Proprietors of Ken. Purchase v. Tiffany, 1 Greenl. (Me.) R. 210. at a watercourse, if the course and distance given will not extend the line to the watercourse, the course and distance must be disregarded; and the line, notwithstanding these, must be extended to the watercourse, that being a natural boundary. Where a line was described as running S. W. by S., to the head of " Howard's Branch," it was held that it must run in a straight line from its beginning to that boundary.2 § 37. In Harramond v. McGlaughan, in North Carolina, it appeared that about fifty years before the year 1798, the State had granted to the defendant a tract of land beginning at a hickory, standing not far from a river, and running thence down the river a certain course and distance; but the course run obliquely from the river, leaving between it and the river a triangular piece of land. The State claimed this triangle, and, in 1787, granted it to the plaintiff, who sued in ejectment. The Court held that the river was the boundary of the first grant, and decided against the claim of the State; and they used the following language: "When a deed, patent, or grant describes a boundary from a certain point down a river, mentioning also courses and distances, should the latter be found not to agree with the course of the river, it ought to be disregarded, and the river considered the true boundary." § 38. One of the lines in a deed of conveyance was thus described: "Beginning at the mouth of Black Brook, on the south side of the brook, and running from thence up said brook, due west, until it strikes 1 Pollock v. Harris, 1 Hay, (N. C.) R. 252; and see cases referred to in 1 Ire. (N. C.) Dig. 107; and Ante, § 22. 2 Howard v. Moale, 2 H. & Johns. (Md.) R. 249. 3 Harramond v. McGlaughan, Taylor, (N. C.) R. 196. the common land." The brook was very crooked, running sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other side of a due west line. It was held that the brook was not designated as a monument with sufficient certainty to control the point of compass.1 § 39. A grant of land extending to a certain distance on each side of a river, (and no courses are given,) is to be located in such a manner that every point in the exterior line shall be exactly that distance from the nearest point of the river. The words of the grant in Winthrop v. Curtis, in Maine,2 were "the space of fifteen miles on each side of the Kennebec river, and it was held by the Court that the location of the land was to be made in the mode just mentioned. The same is the established rule in New York, and prevailed in the Court of Errors in that State, in the location of the Catskill patent, which was to extend four English miles" from five great plains." That Court held the true construction of the patent to be, that its boundaries were to be ascertained by lines four miles distant, in every direction from the five plains mentioned in the patent, so as to make the exterior lines correspond as far as possible with the sinuosities of the plains. The location of the Hoosack patent, which extended for two miles on each side of the river by that name, was the subject of controversy in the same Court; and DE WITT CLINTON, Senator, in delivering his opinion, in which a majority of the Court concurred, states, that "the mode now adopted by the State, and considered the only practicable one in cases 1 Bowman v. Farmer, 8 N. Hamp. R. 402. like the present, is to run the bounds, so that every point in them shall be exactly the given distance from the point nearest to it in the creek or river." In the case of Jackson v. Lunt, in New York, Staat's patent was under consideration. This patent was to run up the river Hudson as that river runs, from a certain point, two hundred chains; thence up into the woods, north-west twenty chains, to the mountain; thence along said mountain, parallel with the Hudson river, to a certain rivulet; thence down that rivulet to the place of beginning. SPENCER, J., in delivering the opinion of the Court, observed, that in running a line parallel with a river, it is only requisite that the distance, where that is to control, should be such that the river in some one point is not further off than is required. In other words, the west line of Staat's patent, without reference to the mountain, if run parallel with the general course of the river, might in some places be at a greater distance than twenty chains, and yet be correctly run. But if particular courses are given in a grant of a tract of land bounding on a river, to the exterior side lines, the location must be determined accordingly. Thus, where a tract of land was granted fronting on a brook, and extending back by a given course, two miles; it was held, that by this description each side line should be two miles in length, and that the rear line must be parallel with the front.3 § 40. An entry of Virginia military lands, in Ohio, read as follows: "Churchill Jones enters 1,000 acres of land, part of a military warrant, 2,311, on the north 1 Williams v. Jackson, 5 Johns. (N. Y.) R. 489. west side of the Ohio, beginning at the mouth of Brush or Eighteen Mile Creek, running up the river 50 poles, thence from the beginning down the river 500 poles when reduced to a straight line, thence at right angles from the general course of the river, for quantity." The true construction of this entry, it was held, was to give a base on the Ohio river of 500 poles, including the 50 poles above the creek. Another entry of the same kind called for 1,000 acres on the lower side of Brush Creek, "beginning at a marked cherry-tree, supposed about ten miles above Tod's Road, running thence west 400 poles, and from each end of this line for quantity." The distance was understood to be in a direct line, and not by the meanders of the creek, it being a small stream, and the usual line of travel not upon its banks.2 5. Difference between a Boundary on a Watercourse, and a Boundary on a Lake or Pond. § 41. When land is conveyed bounding upon a lake or pond, if it is a natural pond, the grant extends only to the water's edge; but if it is an artificial pond, like a mill pond, caused by the flowing back of the water of a river, the grant extends to the middle of the stream, in its natural state. In Bradley v. Rice, in Maine, it was contended, that a certain lot which was conveyed bounding on a natural pond raised by artificial means, was not limited by the margin of the 1 Hastings v. Stevenson, 2 Ohio R. 8. * Buckley v. Gilmore, 12 Ohio R. 63. 3 State v. Gilmanton, 9 N. Hamp. R. 461; Hathorn v. Stinson, 1 Fairf (Me.) R. 238; see also Smith v. Miller, 25 Mason, (Cir. Co.) R. 196. 4 Bradley v. Rice, 1 Shep. (Me.) R. 198. |