Pugmire et al. v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co. promissory notes, and, after the case had been tried in a justice of the peace court and appealed to the district court, Skews moved that his wife be substituted in his place as party plaintiff, and filed an affidavit alleging that she was at the time of the commencement of the action the owner of the notes, and really the party beneficially interested in the action. The trial court sustained the motion, and permitted the substitution to be made. It will be observed that, after the action had been tried and an appeal taken to the district court, it was discovered that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest, and another person, who was an entire stranger to the action, was substituted as party plaintiff in place of Skews, who commenced the suit, and this court held that the trial court erred in permitting the amendment, and reversed the case. The reason assigned for the reversal is that, under the statutes as they existed at that time, a husband was not a competent witness for or against his wife, nor a wife a competent witness for or against her husband, and that, by reason of the substitution of the wife in the place of the husband, she was permitted to testify as a witness in the case. The court say: "The only reason apparent from the record for desiring the substitution was that Sarah Skews [wife] might be available on the trial of the case." It will be seen that the principles involved in that case are not at all similar to those now under consideration, and the majority of the cases cited by counsel for respondent are cases in which parties who were in fact strangers to the suits at the time they were commenced were asked to be substituted in place of the parties who commenced the actions, and did not come within the exception to the general rule above stated. As the appellants were entitled to the amendment asked for, and it having been denied them, it necessarily follows that they are entitled to be heard on appeal. 2 There are a number of other questions discussed State ex rel. v. Lewis. at considerable length by counsel in their briefs, but we deem it unnecessary to consider them. The case is reversed, with directions to the trial court to reinstate the case and allow plaintiffs to amend. Costs of this appeal to be taxed against respondent. BASKIN, C. J., and BARTCH, J., concur. 57 120 27 486 THE STATE OF UTAH ex relatione M. A. BREE- No. 1472. (72 Pac. 388.) 1. Constitutional Law: Construction: Power of Legislature: Presumptions as to Validity. The power of the Legislature to legislate on all subjects and for all purposes of civil government is absolute, inherent, and plenary, except as limited or controlled by the Constitution of the State or of the United States; and, unless it acts in violation of constitutional restraint, the courts have no authority to declare its enactment void, however unnecessary or unwise it may be.1 2. Same. In construing an enactment, where the question of its constitutionality is involved in difficulty and doubt, a court will be strongly inclined to resolve such doubt in favor of its validity, and it will be presumed to be valid until the contrary is shown beyond all reasonable doubt.2 3. Same: Sess. Laws, 1903, p. 50, chapter 55, Valid. Constitution, article 8, section 5, reads: "The State shall be di vided into seven judicial districts, for each of which at least one, and not exceeding three judges, shall be chosen by the qualified electors thereof." Section 6: "The Legislature may change the limits of any judicial district, or increase or decrease the number of districts, or the judges thereof." Section Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 45 L. R. A. 628; 57 Pac. 1. 'State v. Tingey, 24 Utah 225; 67 Pac. 33. State ex rel. v. Lewis. 16: Until otherwise provided by law, the judicial districts of the State shall be constituted as follows: Third District:-The counties of Summit, Salt Lake and Tooele, in which there shall be elected three district judges." Act approved March 12, 1903, Session Laws 1903, page 50, chapter 55, increases the number of judges in the Third Judicial District to four, empowers the Governor to appoint one judge, and fixes the first term of office. Held, that sections 5 and 16 were designed to have force and effect at the time of the election of officers and adoption of the Constitution, and "until otherwise provided by law;" and that the provision of section 6 was intended for permanent purposes, so that the act was a valid exercise of legislative power. (Decided May 1, 1903.) Original action in quo warranto instituted by the Attorney-General, on behalf of the State, to oust the defendant from the office of district judge of the Third Judicial District. OUSTER DENIED. Hon. M. A. Breeden, Attorney-General, and Hon. W. R. White, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State. Messrs. Frick & Edwards, Messrs. Pierce, Critchlow & Barrette, Messrs. Young & Moyle and Messrs. Sutherland, Van Cott & Allison for respondent. BARTCH, J.-In this case the Attorney-General filed an information in the nature of quo warranto, demanding that the defendant be ousted from the office of district judge of the Third Judicial District. This is an original proceeding in this court. The information. states that the defendant was, on April 7, 1903, appointed to the office, by the Governor, in pursuance of an act entitled "An act to increase the number of judges for the Third Judicial District and for the appointment of one judge, pending the next general election,” which was approved March 12, 1903 (Sess. Laws 1903, p. 50, State ex rel. v. Lewis. c. 55); that such appointee qualified, is in possession and attempting to discharge the duties of the office, and claims the emoluments thereof; that his appointment was unlawful; and that he has no legal authority to exercise the functions of the office, unlawfully holds the same, and will continue to do so, if not ousted. The defendant filed an answer admitting his appointment to the office and qualification, and that he has possession and is discharging the duties thereof. It is averred that he holds the office lawfully, exercises its functions, and is entitled to the emoluments thereof, by virtue of the act of the Legislature referred to in the information, and of his appointment thereunder. The plaintiff demurred to the answer upon the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense. The contention on behalf of the State is that the act of the Legislature, above referred to, and under which the appointment was made, is ultra vires, being in conflict, as is urged, with sections 5 and 6, article 8, of the Constitution. That act is found in Sess. Laws 1903, c. 55, p. 50, and, so far as material here, reads as follows: "Section 1. That from and after the passage and approval of this act, there shall be four District Judges in and for the District Court of the Third Judicial District of this State. "Sec. 2. That the Governor be and is hereby authorized and required to appoint one District Judge, in and for the Third Judicial District, within thirty days after the passage and approval of this act, whose term of office shall be, until the first Monday in January, 1905, and until his successor is elected and qualified, as provided by law." As will be observed the first section increases the number of judges in the Third Judicial District to four, and the second empowers the Governor to appoint one judge, and fixes the first term of office. It is claimed that the Constitution limits the number of district judges in the Third Judicial District to three, and that, therefore, the act, which increases the number to four, vio 1 State ex rel. v. Lewis. lates the fundamental law, and is void. It must be conceded that, if such a limitation exists, the act is void, and must be declared so. The question, then, is whether the Legislature transcended its power in this enactment. In determining this it must not be forgotten that that body exercises the functions of a co-ordinate branch of the state government. It is within its province to make laws. Its power to legislate upon all subjects and for all purposes of civil government is absolute, inherent, and plenary, except as limited or controlled by the Constitution of this State or of the United States. Being invested with such power, unless it acts in violation of constitutional restraint, the courts have no authority to declare its enactments void, however unnecessary or unwise they may be. "It is wholly within the discretion of the Legislature to determine whether, concerning any subject, such conditions or such facts and circumstances exist as to warrant it to act. It is the sole judge as to whether an exigency, or such cause exists as requires the enactment of a law, and, in the absence of any constitutional restriction, if it makes a law, there is no authority in the government which can declare it void. Independently of any repugnance between a legislative act and any constitutional limitation or restriction, a court has no power to arrest its execution, however unwise or unjust, in the opinion of the court, it may be, or whatever motives may have led to its enactment." Kimball v. Grantsville City, 19 Utah 368, 383-384, 57 Pac. 1, 45 L. R. A. 628. So, an enactment of the Legislature embraces within itself, by implication, a construction by a co-ordinate branch of the government, of the constitutional provisions relating to the subject of the legislation. Therefore a court, in construing the enactment, where the question of its constitutionality is involved in difficulty and doubt, will be strongly inclined to resolve such doubt in favor of its validity, and out of respect to the wisdom and integrity, loyalty and patriotism of the Legislature, its enactment will be presumed to be valid, until the 2 |