Opinion of the Court. point of objection seems to be reduced to this. In the case of ordinary real estate, it is said, when the assessor has made his valuation, it is submitted to a board of supervisors, who may change the valuation, but not so as to increase it, without notice to the tax-payer, and an opportunity for a formal hearing, upon testimony to be adduced under oath, and with a right of appeal on his part, first, to a county judge, and, again, if the amount of the tax is equal to fifty dollars, to the Circuit Court. This is contrasted with the proceeding in the case of railroad property before the board of railroad commissioners, in which it is alleged there is no notice of an intended change in the valuation returned by the company, and no appeal allowed if it is increased. The discrimination, however, is apparent rather than real. An examination of the statutes shows, that the original valuation of the assessor, in case of ordinary real estate, is conclusive upon the tax-payer, no matter how unsatisfactory; and the appeal allowed is only from the action of the board of supervisors, in case they undertake to increase the valuation made by the assessor. But in the case of railroad property, no board has authority to increase the original assessment made by the railroad commissioners, and there is, therefore, no case for an appeal similar to that of the owner of ordinary real estate. But were it otherwise, the objection would not be tenable. We have already decided that the mode of valuing railroad property for taxation under this statute is due process of law. That being so, the provision securing the equal protection of the laws does not require, in any case, an appeal, although it may be allowed in respect to other persons, differently situated. This was expressly decided by this court in the case of Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 30. It was there said by MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY, delivering the opinion of the court and speaking to this point, that," the last restriction, as to the equal protection of the laws, is not violated by any diversity in the jurisdiction of the several courts as to subject-matter, amount, or finality of decision, if all persons within the territorial limits of their respective jurisdictions have an equal right, in like cases and under Syllabus. like circumstances, to resort to them for redress." The right to classify railroad property, as a separate class, for purposes of taxation, grows out of the inherent nature of the property, and the discretion vested by the Constitution of the State in its legislature, and necessarily involves the right, on its part, to devise and carry into effect a distinct scheme, with different tribunals, in the proceeding to value it. If such a scheme is due process of law, the details in which it differs from the mode of valuing other descriptions and classes of property cannot be considered as a denial of the equal protection of the laws. We see no error in the several judgments of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in these cases, and they are accordingly Affirmed. MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD did not sit in these cases, or take any part in their decision. KNICKERBOCKER LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY v. PENDLETON & Others. IN ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE. Argued October 22, 1885.-Decided November 16, 1885. After final judgment in this case at the last term reversing the judgment below (see 112 U. S. 698), the court discovered that the writ of error was sued out and citation directed and served against P. H. Pendleton, only one of the plaintiffs below; that the preliminary appeal bond was made to him alone; but that the supersedeas bond was executed to all the plaintiffs below, and that all subsequent proceedings were entitled in the name of P. H. Pendleton & als. After notice to plaintiff in error to show cause, the court allowed the writ of error to be amended, set aside the judgment, ordered a new citation to be issued to all the plaintiffs below, and directed a reargument. On the rehearing the court adhere to the views expressed in the former opinion. Opinion of the Court. On an issue whether demand of payment of a draft had been waived by the payees in order that they might communicate with the drawer, evidence of the custom and usage of the bank holding it, if offered in support of evidence (not objected to) of the cashier of the bank of his conviction and belief (founded on such custom and usage) that the draft had been so presented, comes within the rule which allows usage and the course of business to be shown for the purpose of raising a prima facie presumption of fact, in aid of collateral testimony: and, taken together, they are sufficient to be presented to the jury. The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. Mr. James A. Dennison [Mr. Leslie W. Russell also filed a brief] for plaintiff in error. Mr. L. W. Humes and Mr. D. H. Poston [Mr. W. K. Poston was with them on the brief] for defendants in error. MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court. The judgment rendered in this case on the 5th of January last (see opinion, 112 U. S. 696) was set aside on the last day of the last term, and the cause was restored to the docket for reargument at the present term. The original action was brought by several joint plaintiffs, minors and children of Samuel H. Pendleton, deceased, against the Knickerbocker Life Insurance Company, on a policy of insurance on the life of said Samuel, taken out by him for the benefit of his said. children; and judgment was rendered for the plaintiffs, some of whom had, in the mean time, come of age. The writ of error in this case was brought to reverse this judgment, and a judgment of reversal was pronounced on the 5th of January last. It was subsequently discovered by the court (a fact not noticed by any of the counsel) that the writ of error was sued out, and the citation was directed and served, against only one of the plaintiffs below, to wit, P. H. Pendleton. The preliminary appeal bond for costs was also made to P. H. Pendleton alone; but the bond for supersedeas, subsequently executed, was made to all the plaintiffs by name, and the subsequent proceedings were generally entitled in the name of P. H. Pendleton & als. This court, in view of the defect in the Opinion of the Court. writ of error, entered a rule on the plaintiff in error to show cause why the judgment previously rendered should not be vacated and the writ of error dismissed. On consideration of the special circumstances of the case, we allowed the writ to be amended, and a new citation to be issued to all the plaintiffs below, set aside our previous judgment, and directed the cause to be restored to the docket for reargument. The case has now been reargued, all the parties being represented. We do not find occasion, however, to render a different decision from our former one. The only question which we have deemed it necessary to consider more fully, being more fully discussed by counsel than before, is, whether the evidence adduced to show a presentment of the draft in question for payment was sufficient to be submitted to the jury. The defendants in error now strenuously contend that it was not. It will be remembered that the draft was dated July 14, 1871, and was payable three months after date without grace, and contained a condition that if not paid at maturity the policy should become void. We held that if the insurance company wished to avail itself of this condition, it must present the draft for payment at its maturity, but that protest for non-payment was not necessary. On the trial, which took place nearly ten years after the transactions referred to, it was shown that about three weeks before the maturity of the draft, it was sent from Memphis by the Union and Planters' Bank to the Louisiana National Bank at New Orleans, to be presented for acceptance, with directions not to have it protested; that the latter bank did so present it to the drawees, Moses Greenwood & Son, and that it was not accepted by them; that it was then returned to the Memphis bank, which, about the 5th of October, again sent it to the New Orleans bank for demand of payment. Luria, the cashier of the latter bank, was examined on interrogatories. After stating the facts relating to the presentment of the draft for acceptance, and the usage and custom of his bank with regard to the presentment of bills and notes for acceptance and payment, he was asked this question: "From your examination of the indorsements upon the draft" (which was exhibited to Opinion of the Court. him), "in connection with your knowledge of the course of business of the Louisiana National Bank, as stated by you, would you say whether or no said paper has been presented for acceptance and payment as other commercial paper sent to you for collection through your corresponding banks?" To which he answered: "Yes, it was presented for acceptance and for payment, as in all similar cases [of] paper sent to us for collection, which is the custom on the part of the Louisiana National Bank in giving prompt attention to all business intrusted to its care.” It was not pretended that the draft was paid. The witness being asked, on cross-examination, if he knew, of his own knowledge, that said draft was presented for either acceptance or payment, he answered: "Yes, for both, from the fact that the rules of the bank make it necessary, in the ordinary course of business, to present both for acceptance and payment." Being asked if he presented the bill in person, or was present, he said: "No, for the reason that, as cashier of the bank, it is not my duty to present drafts either for acceptance or payment." He also stated that it was the custom of the bank to give notice to drawees of time drafts of the maturity of the same; and that the drawees, in this case, Moses Greenwood & Son, had a regular business office in the city of New Orleans. Luria further testified that the bill was entered on the books of the bank as maturing on the 14th-17th October, 1871, the three days of grace being added according to the laws of Louisiana. It further appeared that on both occasions, when the bill was sent to the Louisiana bank for presentment, and when it was sent for payment, it was with instructions not to have it protested; which accounts for the fact of there having been no regular protest of the draft. Two letters of Moses Greenwood & Son to S. H. Pendleton were produced in evidence, one dated September 29, 1871, and the other November 4, 1871. In the first they say: "Your draft for life policy (some $330), due 14th of next month, was presented this day for acceptance. Not finding any advice of it, we requested them to hold till we got an answer from you. Please write at once if you want it paid." By the letter of November 4, they |