amounts adjudged to creditors severally, this court has jurisdiction
only over such as appeal from a decree for payment to a creditor of a
sum exceeding the sum or value of $5000. As to all others the appeal
must be dismissed. Ib.
3. Where a sale of the lands of a bankrupt estate has been made and con-
firmed by order of the bankruptcy court, and the lands have been
conveyed by the assignee, the Circuit Court of the United States is
without jurisdiction at the suit of the purchaser to enjoin a sale of the
same lands about to be made upon the order of a State court. Sargent
v. Helton, 348.
See ADMIRALTY;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
See UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION, 9.
The mode in which fines and penalties shall be enforced, whether at the
suit of a private party, or at a suit of the public, and what dispo-
sition shall be made of the amounts collected, are matters of legisla-
tive discretion. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes, 512.
See PATENT FOR INVENTION;
PATENT FOR PUBLIC LAND.
1. The act of June 11, 1864, 13 Stat. 123, "That whenever, during the ex-
istence of the present rebellion, any action, civil or criminal, shall ac-
crue against any person, who, by reason of resistance to the execution
of the laws of the United States, or the interruption of the ordinary
course of judicial proceedings, cannot be served with process, ...
the time during which such person shall so be beyond the reach of
legal process shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time
limited by law for the commencement of such action," applies to
cases in the courts of the States as well as to cases in the courts of
the United States; and, as thus construed, is constitutional. May-
field v. Richards, 137.
2. To bar a suit for the foreclosure of a mortgage in Arkansas, there must
not only be an adverse possession for such length of time as would
bar an action in ejectment, but an open and notorious denial of the
mortgagee's title: otherwise the possession of the mortgagor is the
possession of the mortgagee. Smith v. Woolfolk, 143.
3. Although it is true that when the relation of trustee and cestui que trust
exists, and is admitted by the trustee, lapse of time is no bar to relief
in equity against the trustee in favor of the cestui que trust, yet when
the trustee repudiates the trust in unequivocal words, and claims to
hold the trust property as his own, and such repudiation and claim
are brought to the notice of the beneficiary in such manner that he is
called upon to assert his equitable rights, the statute of limitation
begins to run from the time when they thus come to his knowledge.
Phillippi v. Phillippe, 151.
4. In Alabama, even in the absence of a statute of limitation, if twenty
years are allowed to elapse from the time when proceedings could have
been instituted for the settlement of a trust, without the commence-
ment of such proceedings, and there has been no recognition, within
that period, of the trust as continuing and undischarged, a presump-
tion of settlement would arise, operating as a continuing bar. Ib.
5. When the lapse of twenty years raises in Alabama the presumption of
payment and satisfaction of an equitable claim, the provision of § 2,
Ordinance 5, of the Constitutional Convention, adopted September
27, 1865, that "in computing the time necessary to create the bar of
the statutes of limitation and non-claim, the time elapsing between
the 11th of January, 1861, and the passage of this ordinance shall not
be estimated" does not affect the presumption unless within that
period there has been some recognition of the liability which it is
sought to enforce. Ib.
6. Under § 3 of the act of July 27, 1868, ch. 276, 15 Stat. 243, now em-
bodied in § 1059 of the Revised Statutes, in an action of trover
brought against a former Secretary of the Treasury of the United
States, in a court other than the Court of Claims, to recover a sum of
money as the value of certain cotton alleged to have been the private
property of the plaintiff, the defendant pleaded that the cotton had,
in an insurrectionary State, been taken, received, and collected, as
captured or abandoned property, into the hands of a special agent
appointed by the defendant while such Secretary, to receive and col-
lect captured or abandoned property in that State under § 1 of the
act of March 12, 1863, ch. 120, 12 Stat. 820; that the provisions of
that act were carried out in regard to the cotton, as being captured
or abandoned cotton; that all the acts done by the defendant respect-
ing the cotton were done by him through such agent, in the adminis-
tration of, and in virtue and under color of, the act of 1863; and that,
by force of § 3 of the act of 1863 and of § 3 of the act of 1868, the
action was barred, and was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Court of Claims. It appeared that the cotton had been taken, so far
as the defendant was concerned, as being captured or abandoned
property, under a claim made by him in good faith to that effect, in
the administration of, and under color of, the act of 1863. Held,
That, without reference to the question whether the cotton was in
fact abandoned or captured property within the act of 1863, the fact
that it was taken as being such, under such claim, made in good
faith, was a bar to the action, under the act of 1868 and § 1059 of the
the Revised Statutes. Lamar v. McCulloch, 163.
See BANKRUPTCY, 1;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 7;
LOCAL LAW, 1, 3.
1. The Mississippi Code of 1871, § 2173, by which any action to recover
property because of the invalidity of an administrator's sale by order
of a probate court must be brought within one year, "if such sale
shall have been made in good faith and the purchase money paid,"
does not apply to an action brought by the heir to recover land bid
off by a creditor at such a sale for the payment of his debt, and con-
veyed to him by the administrator, and not otherwise paid for than
by giving the administrator a receipt for the amount of the bid. Clay
v. Field, 260.
2. Under the Mississippi Code of 1880, §§ 2506, 2512, a tenant in common
who has been ousted by his co-tenant may maintain ejectment against
him and recover rents and profits in the same action. Ib.
3. Under the Civil Code of Louisiana, a widow, even where she has
accepted the succession of her husband without benefit of inventory,
is not liable in solido with the surviving partners for the payment of
a note made by the firm of which her husband was a member; and
payments made on the note by the surviving partners cannot be given
in evidence to show interruption of prescription running in her favor.
Henderson v. Wadsworth, 264.
4. A single verdict and judgment in ejectment in Pennsylvania, not be-
ing conclusive under the laws of that State, is not conclusive in the
courts of the United States, although entitled to peculiar respect,
when the questions decided arise upon the local law of the State.
Gibson v. Lyon, 439.
5. The sanction of the court to a conveyance under proceedings and
judgment for foreclosure of a mortgage in the Orphans' Court of
Philadelphia, being a judicial act, such a deed, describing the estate
as conveyed subject to an outstanding mortgage, estops the grantee
from denying the validity of the mortgage.
6. If a mortgage in Pennsylvania covers two or more tracts of land, and a
sheriff under judgment for foreclosure, and execution, sells one tract
for more than enough to pay the mortgage debt, and then proceeds
to sell the other tracts, and all the sales are duly completed, and the
deeds to the purchasers duly executed and delivered, without ob-
jection on the part of the owners, it is too late to object to the
regularity of the proceedings. lb.
7. In Pennsylvania, the fact that a judgment for foreclosure of a mortgage
was erroneous and could have been reversed upon a writ of error,
does not destroy a sheriff's sale, made under the judgment, while the
same stands in full force and unreversed.
8. In Illinois a judgment by default in a proceeding in a county court
under the statutes of that State for the collection of taxes on real
estate, by sale of the property, is not conclusive upon the taxpayer,
and may be impeached collaterally. Gage v. Pumpelly, 454.
9. Under the laws of that State, as construed by its courts, if any portion
of a tax assessed upon real estate and levied and collected by sale of
the property is illegal, the sale and the tax deed are void, and may
be set aside by bill in equity. Ib.
10. In a proceeding in equity in a court of the United States to set aside
a tax sale in Illinois as illegal, the complainant should offer to re-
imburse to the purchaser all taxes paid by him, both those for which
the property might have been legally sold, and those paid after the
sale. Ib.
11. The Pennsylvania act of May 15, 1871, No. 249, sec. 6, which provides
as follows: "In all actions of replevin, now pending or hereafter
brought, to recover timber, lumber, coal, or other property severed
from realty, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover, notwithstanding
the fact that the title to the land from which said property was
severed may be in dispute: Provided, said plaintiff shows title in
himself at the time of the severance," has no operation as between
tenants in common. Bohlen v. Arthurs, 482.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ;
MECHANICS' LIEN.
LOUISIANA.
See LOCAL LAW, 3.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION;
TAX AND TAXATION, 2.
1. The statutes of North Carolina of March 28, 1870, and March 1, 1873,
the first, giving a lien to mechanics and laborers in certain cases, and
the other, regulating sales under mortgages given by corporations,
do not give to those performing labor and furnishing materials
in the construction of railroads, a lien upon the property and fran-
chises of the corporation owning and operating such roads. Buncombe
County v. Tommey, 122.
2. Ordinary lien laws giving to mechanics and laborers a lien on buildings,
including the lot upon which they stand, or a lien upon a lot or farm
or other property for work done thereon, or for materials furnished in
the construction or repair of buildings, should not be interpreted as
giving a lien upon the roadway, bridges, or other property of a rail-
road company, that may be essential in the operation and maintenance
of its road for the public purposes for which it was established. Ib.
3. The proviso of the third section of the act of 1873, Battle's Revisal,
ch. 26, § 48, has reference to the debts and contracts of private cor-
porations formed under the act of February 12, 1872, Pub. Laws
N. C., 1871-2, ch. 199, and not those of railroad corporations, organ-
ized for public use, under the act of February 8, 1872. lb.
1. In proceedings under Rev. Stat. §§ 2325, 2326, to determine adverse
claims to locations of mineral lands, it is incumbent upon the plaintiff
to show a location which entitles him to possession against the United
States as well as against the other claimant; and, therefore, when
plaintiff at the trial admitted that that part of his claim wherein his
discovery shaft was situated had been patented to a third person, the
court rightly instructed the jury that he was not entitled to recover
any part of the premises, and to find for defendant.
Gwillim v. Don-
nellan, 45.
2. No title from the United States to land known at the time of sale to be
valuable for its minerals of gold, silver, cinnabar, or copper can be
obtained under the preemption or homestead laws, or the town-site
laws, or in any other way than as prescribed by the laws specially
authorizing the sale of such lands except in the States of Michigan, Wis-
consin, Minnesota, Missouri, and Kansas. Deffeback v. Hawke, 392.
3. A certificate of purchase of mineral land, upon an entry of the same by
a claimant at the local land office, if no adverse claim is filed with the
register and receiver, and the entry is not cancelled or disaffirmed by
the officers of the Land Department at Washington, passes the right
of the goverment to him, and, as against the acquisition of title by
any other party, is equivalent to a patent. The land thereby ceases
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