NOTES.

(1, p. 97.) Corfu is the island which called itself Korkyra, but which in Attic and modern Greek is called Kerkyra. It is better to use the real Greek names of Greek places than their Turkish or Italian names. But Corfu is a case where one Greek name has been changed for another. It comes from κορυφαί, peaks, or perhaps from κόρφος-κόλπος, the gulf.

(2, p. 108.) The dates of the death of Orkhan and of the taking of Hadrianople seem not to be quite certain. I have followed Von Hammer and Finlay, who place the death of Orkhan in 1359, and the taking of Hadrianople in 1361. But it seems that there are other authorities according to which Orkhan did not die till 1362, and Hadrianople was taken the next year. See Jirecek, Geschichte der Bulgaren, p. 319.

(3, p. 112.) The different dates given to the taking of Philadelphia range from 1374 to 1391; but it seems to have been taken during the reign of Bajazet.

(4, p. 113.) See History and Conquests of the Saracens, p. 181.

CHAPTER V.

THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN POWER.

THE difference between the time which we have just gone through and the time to which we have now come is well marked in this way. Thus far it is easy for any one who follows the history, even in the most general way, to carry in his head the names and order of the Ottoman Emirs and Sultans. Each of them has a character of his own; the reign of each is marked by some special event, commonly by some conquest, which is the prince's own doing. The reign of Othman is marked by the establishment of the Ottomans as an Asiatic power. Under Orkhan they pass into Europe. Under the first Amurath Hadrianople is taken; the Eastern Empire is hemmed in; Servia becomes tributary. Bajazet, the first Sultan, defeats the great crusade from the West at Nikopolis. Mahomet the First restores the Ottoman power after its overthrow by Timour. Amurath takes Thessalonica and overthrows Wladislaus at Varna. Mahomet the Conqueror wins the city of the Cæsars; he gives his dominions their lasting extent, and organizes as well as conquers. The second Bajazet, the first Sultan who was deposed, seems like a shadow from the second period cast back into the first. But the few years of Selim nearly double the extent of the

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Ottoman dominion, and crown its master with the sacred honours of the Caliphate. Under Suleiman the Ottoman power reaches its highest point. Even the second Selim, unworthy of remembrance in himself, lives in the memory as the prince in whose days Cyprus was won and Lepanto lost. Thus far it is easy to go, even without book. But to remember the Sultans after Selim needs an effort. A few of them stand out through some special point in their character. Amurath the Fourth (1623-1640) stands forth as the most bloody, Ibrahim (1640-1648) as the most brutally sensual, of the line. Suleiman the Second (1687-1691) and Mustafa the Second (1695-1703) were men of some force of character, who might have played a greater part than they did, if they had lived in days when their empire was rising instead of falling. Of course any one who studies the Ottoman history minutely will be able to remember the Sultans of this time, just as he may remember the Kings of England or France, great and small. The difference is that no one who reads the general history of the world with any thoughtfulness will fail to remember the order of the Sultans for the first two hundred years or more, while for the next two hundred years he may follow the general course of events, and the general relations of the Ottomans to other powers, without always remembering who was Sultan at any particular time. No one can help remembering that Amurath died at Kossova and that Mahomet took Constantinople. But it is easy to remember the second siege of Vienna, and to remember what territories were lost and won by the peace of Carlowitz and the peace of Passarowitz, without remembering who was Sultan when each of those events happened.

At one part of the history, namely the second half of the seventeenth century, the ministers stand out rather than the sovereigns. In an Eastern despotism, where all alike are the slaves of the prince, there can hardly be such a thing as an hereditary aristocracy. A man may rise from the lowest place, even from slavery itself, to the highest offices in the empire. It is rare then in the Ottoman empire, or in any other Eastern despotism, to find anything like a succession of power in the same family. But in the seventeenth century there was an exceptional case of this kind in the family of Kiuprili. Several members of that house were chief ministers of the Sultans; they were all men of ability, and some of them were really better and more tolerant rulers than the common run either of the Sultans or their ministers. But, as a rule, through the whole of this period, such a sketch as this may deal with events and with the general course of things, without having so much to say as before about particular men. In short, the time of the great Sultans has passed away, and the time of the small Sultans has begun.

Allowing, as has been already said, for occasional fits of revived energy, the Ottoman power went steadily down after the time of Suleiman the Lawgiver. It went down in two ways. Though territory was still sometimes won, yet on the whole the Ottoman frontiers fell back. After Suleiman no lasting conquests of any importance were made, except those of the islands of Cyprus and Crete. The frontier on the north towards Hungary, and in later times towards Russia, though there have been considerable fluctuations and winnings back of territory, has on the whole steadily gone back. And, last of all, in our own age

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large parts of the Ottoman territory have been separated from it to form distinct states, either tributary or wholly independent. In these ways the extent of the Ottoman dominion on the map has lessened wonderfully indeed since the days of Suleiman. And, during the greater part of the times with which we are dealing, the power of the Sultans was getting less and less in the dominions which were left to them. The central administration got more and more corrupt, more under the influence of ministers, favourites, and women than under the authority of the Sultans themselves. The Pashas or governors of provinces got more and more independent, and in some cases they made their offices practically hereditary. In some parts indeed, especially toward the end of the last century, when the power of the Sultans was at its lowest, there was utter anarchy without any control of any kind. Through the seventeenth century especially, we may mark the short reigns of the Sultans, as contrasted with the long reigns of most of the great Sultans. Many of them were deposed and murdered, as they have again begun to be in our own times. Nor must we forget, as one cause of decay, the wretched education, if we may so call it, of the Sultans themselves. Kept in a kind of imprisonment till they came to the throne, with every means of enjoying themselves, but with no means of learning the duties of rulers, they came forth from prison to be clothed with absolute power. One is really inclined to wonder that they were not even worse than they were, and that any of them shewed any sign of virtue or ability of any kind.

This may pass as a general picture of the character of Ottoman rule during the days of the decay of